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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AFFECTIVE STATES AND WORK ATTITUDES LINKING ABUSIVE
SUPERVISION TO EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE AND THE IMPACT OF
ETHICAL CLIMATE ON ABUSIVE SUPERVISION AND WORK ATTITUDES
by
Armando Falcon
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Major Professor
Prior research indicates that abusive supervision (AS, Tepper, 2000) is associated
with employee job performance. On the other hand, ethical organizational climate (EOC;
Victor & Cullen, 1988) has yet to be investigated in the context of AS. The objective of
the present study is to evaluate, within a general sample of US employees, (1) the relative
strength of specific indirect effects of AS on performance via positive (PA) and negative
(NA) affect, and via work-related attitudes (Leader-member exchange, LMX; Interactional
justice, IJ; Perceived organizational support, POS; Affective organizational commitment,
AOC), and (2) the relationship between EOC, AS, and the same work-related attitudes. It
was expected that the indirect effects of AS on performance would be stronger via affect
(PA, NA) than via attitudes referencing the supervisor (LMX, IJ), which would in turn be
stronger than the indirect effects via attitudes referencing the organization (AOC, POS).
Moreover, EOC was expected to show a negative association with AS, a positive
association with each work-related attitude, and to moderate the effects of AS on the workrelated attitudes. Data was collected using web-based questionnaires. Employees
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completed attitude measures and rated how frequently they experienced AS and affective
states in the prior month. Coworkers rated job performance. Analyses take a nonparametric
approach due to departures from multivariate normality. Indirect effects and pairwise
contrasts between specific indirect effects were evaluated using bootstrap confidence
intervals. Hypotheses involving moderation were analyzed using moderated multiple
regression. Mediation analyses generally confirm prior findings when indirect effects were
analyzed separately. When modeled in parallel however, only the indirect effects via NA
and AOC are significant. Pairwise contrast generally failed to show significant differences
between specific indirect effects. Consistent with predictions, EOC was negatively
associated with AS and positively associated with each work-related attitude. Interestingly,
EOC also moderated the effects of AS on work-related attitudes, albeit in a direction
inconsistent with predictions. Implications for future research are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Organizational/Workplace Aggression
Organizational/workplace aggression refers to a broad set of behaviors
characterized by the actor’s intent to harm (Baron & Neuman, 1998). Organizational
aggression ranges from subtle (negative eye contact, silent treatment) to relatively overt
expressions of hostility (homicides, physical assaults; Hershcovis, 2011). Despite having
devastating consequences, physical aggression (acts that breach a spatial barrier between
perpetrator and victim, i.e., violence; Nixon & Spector, 2015), represent only a tiny fraction
of the aggressive behaviors that occur within US organizations (Schat & Kelloway, 2003;
Schat, Frone, & Kelloway, 2006). Moreover, acts of physical aggression tend to be
perpetrated by persons external to the organization (robbers, relatives of employees) rather
than employees (Barling, Dupre, & Kelloway, 2009).
Until recently (1990s), little research attention was given to the subtle and
nonphysical forms of organizational aggression that involve employees and have been
shown to be most prevalent in the workplace (Barling et al., 2009; Bowling & Beehr, 2006).
Notable exceptions are sexually and racially motivated aggression (Berdahl, 2007), which
in addition to research attention, has also been the subject of intense judicial (Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Service, Inc., 1997) and legislative scrutiny (Civil Rights Act of
1964).
Empirical evidence has consistently shown nonphysical (and nonsexual) forms of
aggression (verbal and/or psychological abuse) to be most prevalent in American
workplaces (Greenberg & Barling, 1999; U.S. Postal Service Commission, 2000). For
instance, less than 1% of persons employed in the US become victims of homicide while
1

at work and only 6% of workers in the US report a prior experience of violence (Schat et
al., 2006). On the other hand, 1 in 3 American workers report at least one experience of
nonphysical organizational aggression (Schat et al.).
In a survey of Human Resource (HR) professionals conducted by the Society for
Human Resource Management (SHRM, 2012), most organizations (51%) had experienced
an incident of workplace bullying, defined by the researchers as “persistent, offensive,
abusive, intimidating or insulting behavior or unfair actions directed at another
individual…”. What’s more, the most frequently reported type of bullying behavior was
verbal abuse (e.g., shouting, yelling, swearing, name- calling), reported by 73% of HR
professionals whose organization had dealt with bullying.
Other studies find that between 71% (Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout,
2001) and 98% of workers report experiencing workplace incivility (low intensity
[aggression] with ambiguous intent to harm; Anderssen & Pearson, 1999) in the past year,
with half of the workers reporting weekly experiences (Porath & Pearson, 2013). Overall,
the data clearly show the prevalence of less overt forms of aggression in American
workplaces far exceeds the prevalence of more extreme acts of workplace aggression (e.g.,
homicide, physical assault). Moreover, these “mild” acts of aggression have been shown
to have a negative impact on the individuals, the organizations they staff (Cortina et al.,
2001; Estes & Wang, 2008; Penney & Spector, 2005; Welbourne & Sariol, 2016), and the
customers who merely witness these behaviors (Porath, MacInnis, & Folkes, 2011). The
present dissertation is primarily concerned with abusive supervision, a type of workplace
aggression characterized by subordinate’s perceived aggression from their supervisor.
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Although Tepper (2000) defines abusive supervision as expressions of hostility
(unfriendliness, antagonistic), he does not regard abusive supervision as a type of
aggression. Tepper clarifies this point by noting that many of the behaviors constituting
abusive supervision— because they do not require the actor’s intent to harm—are
inconsistent with traditional definitions of aggression (Tepper, 2007). The examples he
provides however, “a supervisor may mistreat subordinates to elicit high performance or
to send the message that mistakes will not be tolerated”, appear to fit well within the scope
of aggression. Anderson and Bushman (2002) distinguish between proximate (immediate)
and ultimate (higher order, distal) goals and suggest it is only necessary that actors have
the proximate intent to cause the target harm. Further, they define instrumental aggression
as a “premeditated means of obtaining some goal other than harming the victim” (Anderson
& Bushman, 2002, p.121).
Applying Anderson and Bushman’s (2002) conceptualization of instrumental
aggression to Tepper’s (2000) example, supervisors who “mistreat subordinates to elicit
high performance” can be said to have a proximate goal of causing harm to the subordinate
and an ultimate goal of improving their performance (or promoting rule adherence). This
suggests that supervisors may use (instrumental) aggression, in the form of verbal abuse
and other non-verbal behaviors consistent with abusive supervision (silent treatment,
invasions of privacy, credit taking; Tepper, 2000), to harm the subordinate (proximal goal)
and as a means to improve that subordinate’s performance (ultimate goal). Consistent with
this notion, a recent study by Watkins, Fehr, and He (in press) finds that leaders differ in
their instrumentality beliefs regarding abusive supervision and that leaders who believe
abusive supervision has a positive impact on employee performance engaged in more
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abusive supervision. Moreover, several researchers (e.g., Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007;
Steinert, 2015; Whitman, Halbesleben, & Holmes IV, 2014) have conceptualized abusive
supervision as interpersonal aggression.
Unlike interpersonal aggression in general—which can occur between coworkers
at any level of the organization—the concept of abusive supervision is specific regarding
the organizational roles of the parties involved. Indeed, a key aspect of abusive supervision
is the inherent power imbalance between the parties that arises from the organizational
roles of the victim (subordinate) and perpetrator (supervisor). Research suggest that
aggression from supervisors is associated with greater psychological strain than aggression
from those perceived to be of equal power (Nixon & Spector, 2015). Relative to coworkers,
supervisors “are uniquely positioned to make available outcomes that many employees find
attractive” (Tepper, Carr, Breaux, Geider, Hu, & Hua, 2009, p. 156). For instance, the
supervisor’s legitimate position allows him or her to control access to promotions and
desirable work assignments (Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002). Consistent the notion that
aggression within supervisor-subordinate relationships produces particularly detrimental
outcomes, meta- analysis of organizational aggression from various sources shows
aggression from supervisors has stronger (negative) associations with work-related
attitudes (job satisfaction, organizational commitment) and work behaviors than aggression
from other sources (e.g., outsiders; Hershcovis & Barling, 2010).
Workplace relationships, however, do not exist in a vacuum. These relationships
are shaped by the attitudes and behaviors of each party, and by situational forces internal
(e.g., leadership, HR policies, culture, climate) and external (e.g., labor market demands,
prestige, natural disasters) to organizations. While organizational culture represents

4

implicit values, climate represents shared perceptions of “the way things are done around
here” (Vardi, 2001, p. 327).
Organizational climate broadly refers to shared perceptions of formal and informal
organizational policies, practices and procedures (Vardi, 2001). Prior research indicates a
positive association between organizational aggression and organizational climates marked
by hostility and violence (Spector, Coulter Stockwell, & Matz, 2007). Moreover,
aggressive workplace norms and perceived organizational sanctions against aggression
have also been positively associated with employee aggression (Inness, LeBlanc, &
Barling, 2008). The impact of ethical organizational climate (EOC) in the context of
abusive supervision, however, remains largely unexplored and is the subject of the present
investigation.
In the following sections I introduce Ethical Climate Theory (ECT; Victor &
Cullen, 1987) and argue that subordinate’s perceived ethical climate (PEC) differentially
affects the workplace attitudes under consideration. I then describe various ways in which
abusive supervision affects subordinate job performance indirectly and argue for a
complimentary approach that reflects the reality that employees hold these various workrelated attitudes simultaneously, and that each has a unique role in predicting shaping
subordinate’s job performance. Finally, it is argued that PEC moderates the relationship
between abusive supervision and these same workplace attitudes to varying degrees.
Employees often develop a shared perception of the criteria organizational
members (coworkers, supervisors) use to make ethical decisions (Martin & Cullen, 2006).
ECT (Victor & Cullen, 1987, 1988) crosses three levels of analysis (individual, local,
cosmopolitan) with three stages from Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development

5

(egoism, benevolence, principle) to arrive a nine possible EOC types. For instance, an EOC
characterized by a strong adherence to Rules (i.e., compliance-based) involves the cross
between the local level of analysis (where ethical concerns are framed in reference to the
team and organization) and the Principle level of moral development (where ethical
concerns are based on concern for adherence to personal moral codes).
Subsequent empirical research has identified five of the nine EOCs originally
proposed—instrumental, caring, independence, rules and law-and-codes. Moreover, a
number of studies show that ethical climate perceptions are associated with work-related
attitudes (Cullen et al., 2003; DeConinck, 2011; Hsieh & Wang, 2016, Mulki, Jaramillo,
& Locander, 2006) and behaviors (Bollman & Krings, 2016; Leung, 2008; Vardi, 2001).
EOCs differ in how consistent they are with abusive supervision. Simply put,
supervisory abuse is more consistent with (and perhaps expected in) organizations with
climates characterized by self-serving behaviors and decision-making (e.g., Instrumental
EOC) than in organizations with EOCs characterized by mutual goodwill and a
consideration of others (e.g., Benevolence EOCs). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect
that when abusive supervision is inconsistent with the organization’s ethical climate,
attributions of responsibility (causation, control, intentions; Mikula, 1993) for the abuse
are more likely to be ascribed to the supervisor, and thereby have a stronger effect on
supervisor-referenced attitudes than on organization-referenced attitudes. When the
organization’s ethical climate is consistent with abusive supervision however, subordinates
should be more likely to hold the organization responsible and abusive supervision will
have a stronger effect on organization-referenced attituded than on supervisor-referenced
attitudes.

6

Prior research suggests attributions of responsibility play a role in shaping
subordinates’ behavioral and attitudinal responses to abusive supervision (Bowling &
Beehr, 2006; Bowling & Michel, 2011; Wang & Jiang, 2015). Moreover, Nixon and
Spector (2015) found that, among employees who reported frequent experiences of
aggression, attributions (of intent to harm) moderated the negative impact of aggression on
indicators of psychological strain (i.e., stress-response). Together, these findings suggest
that EOC, to the extent they affect how subordinates attribute ambiguous supervisory
actions, will moderate the impact of abusive supervision on work-related attitudes.
Subordinate Job Performance
Although many employee actions (and inactions) can affect organizational
functioning, job performance—which is conceptually distinct from “results” (e.g., number
of sales, number of publications)—includes three broad dimensions: task performance,
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), and counterproductive work behaviors
(CWBs). Task (in-role) performance refers to behaviors formally prescribed for an
organizational role differs from contextual (extra-role) performance, which subsumes
OCBs and CWBs (Miles, Borman, Spector, & Fox, 2002; Motowidlo & van Scotter, 1994).
Scholarly interest in abusive supervision has increased dramatically over the last
10 years, with over a dozen investigations reporting on the impact of abusive supervision
on subordinate’s job performance (Tepper et al., 2017). Prior studies find positive
associations between abusive supervision and CWBs (Hussain & Sia, 2017; Mitchell &
Ambrose, 2007), and negative associations between abusive supervision and OCBs
(Decoster, Camps, & Stouten, 2014) and task performance (Walter, Lam, van der Vegt,
Huang, & Miao, 2015).

7

In the following sections I describe six mechanisms, each of which partly explain
the effects of abusive supervision on subordinate job performance. These mechanisms do
not represent an exhaustive list of all mechanisms advanced in the literature, but instead
capture those that are reasonably grounded in theory and have received empirical support.
With few exceptions, these mechanisms have been tested in isolation. The contributions of
this study are thus twofold: First, the study seeks to determine the extent to which each
affect- and attitude-driven mechanism uniquely accounts for the (total) effects of abusive
supervision on each job performance dimension, when the other mechanisms are also
considered. Second, this study aims to show how well these mediators, as a set, account
for the effects of abusive supervision on employee job performance. An additional study
contribution will be to establish the role of EOC (as perceived by the subordinate) as a
moderator of the relationships between abusive supervision and the subordinate’s workrelated attitudes.
In his review of the abusive supervision literature, Tepper (2007) noted that while
abusive supervision has been investigated in a variety of settings (e.g., healthcare,
paramilitary, military), researchers have yet to investigate how abusive supervision differs
across industries. In other words, empirical evidence regarding the contextual factors (e.g.,
job characteristics, industry effects) associated with abusive supervision is lacking
(Martinko et al., 2013). More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that the relative
strength of these mechanisms will be affected by industry factors. That said, the present
aim is to determine the relative importance of attitudinal and affective mechanisms in a
general population of US workers.
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Mechanisms Linking Abusive Supervision to Subordinate Job Performance
Abusive supervision has been shown to affect subordinate job performance
indirectly through (1) positive affective states, (2) negative affective states, (3)
leader-member exchange, (4) interactional justice, (5) perceived organizational support,
and (6) affective organizational commitment. These six mechanisms are viewed as
complimentary and broadly classified into affective- and judgment/attitude-driven
reactions to abusive supervision. Mechanisms 1 and 2 (via PA and NA) represent
emotional reactions to abusive supervision while the remaining mechanisms represent the
effects of abusive supervision on work-related attitudes related to the supervisor
(Mechanisms 3 and 4) and to the organization (Mechanisms 5 and 6). The distinction
between affect- and attitude-driven behaviors is a key feature of Affective Events Theory
(AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
AET frames workplace events (“things that happen to people in work settings,” p.
11)—rather than environmental work features, as the proximal causes of affective
reactions. Affective reactions, in turn, shape work attitudes and behaviors. Nonetheless,
structural/environmental work features influence affective reactions indirectly (via work
events) and directly impact work attitudes. AET proposes that while affect-driven
behaviors are a direct result of affective experiences, judgement-driven behaviors are
mediated by work attitudes. In other words, while the behavioral effects of abusive
supervision, as mediated by affective states, occur relatively immediately, the behavioral
effects of AS, as mediated by work-related attitudes, have a longer onset and stem from
subsequently thinking about the abuse (Lee & Allen, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
It should be noted that job performance includes affect- and judgment-driven behaviors.
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Inherent in the AET framework is the construct of time. That is, AET views work
behaviors as shaped by discrete occurrences (i.e., events), rather than by stable
environmental factors. While acts of abusive supervision can be observed as discrete
events, the persistence of abusive supervision may also come to be seen, at least by some
employees, as a stable characteristic of their work environment. AET suggests that while
discrete acts of abuse will influence job behavior through affective reactions,
persistent/on-going abusive supervision, to the extent it comes to be viewed as a stable
job characteristic, will influence job behavior through its effects on work attitudes. As
discussed in the following sections, the distinction between affect- and attitude- driven
behaviors is a crucial consideration in hypotheses related to the role of ethical climate.
State Affect. The concept of state affect refers to ephemeral emotional experiences
and differs from the concept of trait affect (i.e., trait affectivity), which reflects individual
differences in disposition to experience affective states that are of a similar valence (e.g.,
positive, negative) across a variety of contexts. Although plausible, it seems unlikely that
abusive supervision will produce changes in individual dispositions, as these tend to remain
relatively stable across the lifetime and are likely to already be in place by the time
individuals are placed in an organizational role. That said, the present focus is on the
momentary experiences of emotions at work (job-related state affect) that are likely to cooccur alongside experiences of supervisory abuse. I operationalize state affect as a selfreported retrospective account of the frequency with which target employees experienced
key emotional states at work in the prior 30 days. Importantly, abusive supervision and job
performance measures are also operationalized to reflect the same retrospective interval
(prior 30 days).
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Acts of abusive supervision represents workplace events which are associated with
less frequent positive affective states (e.g., joyful, happy, at ease; PA; Harvey et al., 2007)
and more frequent negative affective states (e.g., anxiety, anger, fear; NA; Hoobler & Hu,
2013; Michel, Newness, & Duniewicz, 2016). Moreover, PA and NA vary in their
relationship to CWBs and OCBs (Lyons & Scott, 2012; Spector & Fox, 2002). Specifically,
PA and NA are associated with engagement in prosocial behaviors (e.g., OCBs) and
behaviors that detract from organizational goals (e.g., CWBs), respectively (Bauer &
Spector, 2015; George, 1991; Khan, Quratulain, & Crawshaw, 2013).
The decrease in PA and increase in NA that result from abusive supervision are
expected to have detrimental effects on subordinates’ extra-role performance (decrease in
PA decrease OCBs, increase in NA increases CWBs). While PA has been shown to benefit
task performance (Tsai, Chen, & Liu, 2007), the relationship between negative affect and
task performance is equivocal. Paradoxically, negative emotional experiences can (1)
hinder performance by creating additional cognitive demands (i.e., appraisal, rumination),
thereby shifting attentional focus away from the task at hand (Beal, Weiss, Barros, &
MacDermid, 2005) and (2) improve performance by serving as signals (feedback) that
things are not going well, thereby mobilizing additional cognitive resources to the task at
hand (George & Zhou, 2002).
Leader-Member Exchange (LMX). Research in organizational leadership has
identified key qualities of leader-follower relationships (mutual trust, respect, and
perceived obligation) that serve to promote the attainment of organizational goals (Gerstner
& Day, 1997). Specifically, employees that report low LMX view their employment
relationship in strictly transactional terms. These employees may refrain from performing
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the extra-role behaviors that help their organizations succeed because they do not trust their
supervisor to “return the favor” at a later date. Abusive supervision reflects ongoing
downward hostility and is unlikely to be conducive to the development of high-quality
relationships between a leader and his or her subordinates. Predictably, the (low-quality)
social exchange relationships that follow from persistent supervisory abuse are in turn
negatively associated with in-role and extra-role performance.
Interactional Justice (IJ). IJ refers to the fairness of the treatment received from
organizational agents (Moorman, 1991). Meta-analytic studies show that while abusive
supervision is negatively related to all dimensions of organizational justice (i.e.,
distributive, procedural, interactional; Colquitt, 2001), it has the strongest (negative)
association with IJ (Mackey, Frieder, Brees, & Martinko, 2017; Zhang & Liao, 2015).
Interactional (in)justice that is experienced as a result of abusive supervision will lead
employees to react in ways that diminish their in-role and extra-role performance. As
predicted by social exchange theory—an important framework for understanding the
effects of justice (Colquitt et al., 2013)—these employees will respond to interactional
injustice by reducing their work output (task performance), behaving less generously
towards coworkers (OCBs) and engaging in other retaliatory activities (CWBs).
Perceived Organizational Support (POS). Consistent with the idea that
supervisors embody the organization, the favorability of the treatment subordinates receive
from their supervisors is associated with POS, a general belief regarding how much the
organization values and cares about them (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). In the context
of ongoing and persistent abuse from supervisors, some employees may come to view their
organization as either incompetent (i.e., unaware and/or unable to provide assistance) or
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complicit (i.e., unwilling to provide assistance) in the abuse. Employees who take this
position are unlikely to believe their organization cares about them.
Prior research shows that when employees believe their organization cares about
them, they reciprocate by behaving in ways that help organizations meet their goals.
Specifically, this includes engaging in interpersonal helping behaviors (OCBs) and
refraining from behaviors that detract from organizational functioning (e.g., shirking of
duties, CWBs; Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhoades, 2001). Likewise,
employees who feel mistreated will also engage in reciprocity. Overall, a negative relation
is expected between abusive supervision and POS. In turn, POS is expected to have a
negative relationship with CWBs and a positive relationship with OCBs and task
performance.
Affective Organizational Commitment (AOC). The favorability of interpersonal
treatment received from one’s supervisor serves as an indication of one’s organizational
worth and is associated with AOC (desire to remain with the organization; Meyer & Allen,
1990). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Tepper et al., 2008), abusive supervision is
expected to have a negative relationship with AOC. In turn, AOC is expected to have a
positive relationship with task performance and OCBs and a negative relationship with
CWBs. AOC has a positive effect on in- role and extra-role performance because
individuals emotionally attached to their organization will see the organization’s mission
and goals as compatible with their own and be willing to behave in ways that align with
organizational interests (Cetin, Gurbuz, & Sert, 2015; Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin,
& Jackson, 1989; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Riketta, 2002).
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Role of EOC
Past studies also find positive associations between EOC and (1) AOC (Cullen et
al., 2003), (2) POS (Hsieh & Wang, 2016), and (3) trust in the supervisor (i.e., LMX,
DeConinck, 2011; Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander, 2006). Results consistently show a
negative relation between these attitudes and instrumental climates and a positive relation
between principled and Benevolent EOCs the same (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Despite a
lack of empirical evidence, IJ is expected to show a similar pattern. That is, Principle and
Benevolent EOCs (e.g., Caring, Rules-based)—because they often reference values
consistent with the fair treatment of others (i.e., society, coworkers)—should have a
positive association with IJ perceptions.
The distinction between affect- (emotional) and cognition-driven (attitudinal)
reactions to workplace events (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996) is key to understanding the
moderating role of EOC. Emotional responses to workplace events (e.g., anger) occur
quickly and involve less mental deliberation. Responses that are driven by cognition, such
as attitude formation/modification, occur more slowly and thus allow individuals to
consider additional information. It is precisely when individuals consider additional
information that perceived ethical climate (i.e., PEC) will play a role in shaping their
response. Stated differently, responses to abusive supervision will be affected by ethical
considerations only when individuals have had an opportunity to process the abuse.
Consequently, PEC is expected to interact with abusive supervision to predict
attitudinal mediators (i.e., LMX, IJ, AOC, POS) but not affective mediators (PA, NA).
Moreover, within attitudinal mediators I further distinguish between attitudes related to the
supervisor (LMX, IJ) and attitudes related the organization (AOC, POS). Principled and
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benevolent ethical climates will have an invariably positive association with each of the
proposed attitudinal mediators and instrumental climates will have a negative association
with the same. Moreover, the relative impact of ethical climate on each work-related
attitude will depend on whether the target attitude reflects the organization or the
supervisor.
EOC affects how subordinate view the unethical treatment they receive from their
supervisors (i.e., abusive supervision). When the organization’s ethical climate is perceived
to be guided by the care for well-being and the adherence to rules, laws, and a code of
ethics (i.e., benevolent and principled climates) abusive supervision (persistent unethical
supervisory behaviors) is more likely to blamed on the hostile intentions of the
supervisor—thereby enhancing the negative effects of abuse on attitudes with a supervisor
focus (e.g., LMX, IJ) to a greater degree than attitudes with an organization focus (e.g.,
AOC, POS).
In contrast, when the organization’s ethical climate is seen as being driven by
instrumental concerns, abusive supervision enhances the negative impact of abusive
supervision on attitudes towards the organization to a greater degree than attitudes towards
the supervisors. Consistent with these expectations, Wang and Jiang (2015) found that
when abusive supervision was attributed to the organization, it had no impact on IJ
(supervisor-directed attitude). On the other hand, when organizational attributions for
abuse were low (i.e., supervisor was blamed), abusive supervision had a negative
relationship to IJ.
To my knowledge, only a single study (Biron, 2010) has investigated the effects of
abusive supervision and ethical climate simultaneously. In a sample of workers from seven
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(operationalized as ethical orientation within the firm) showed a strong negative correlation
(-.51; Biron, 2010). Moreover, the generally negative relationship between ethical values
and negative work behaviors directed at the organization was attenuated at higher levels of
abusive supervision. Biron proposed that the attenuating effect is the result of the
supervisor’s behavioral inconsistency with the ethical values espoused by the organization.
In other words, the lack of supervisor behavioral integrity reduces the salience of the ethical
values. As Biron notes, “the degree to which the [supervisor’s] words and deeds are
consistent may have substantial implications for employee behavior” (p. 890).
In light of prior studies, PEC is expected to moderate the relationship between
abusive supervision and work-related attitudes that reference the supervisor (i.e., LMX, IJ),
such that the (negative) effects of abusive supervision are stronger when individuals view
their coworkers as deferring to principle and benevolence values in their ethical decisionmaking (i.e., benevolence ethical climate) than when they perceive that their coworkers’
ethical decisions are guided by self-interest (i.e., instrumental ethical climate). In contrast,
abusive supervision is expected to have a stronger (negative) impact on attitudes that
reference the organization (i.e., AOC, POS) when an instrumental ethical climate is
perceived than when a principle or benevolence ethical climate is perceived.
Chapter Summary
The research on abusive supervision has matured in the last decade, as marked by
increased model complexity (Tepper, et al., 2017) and theoretical developments (Chan &
McAllister, 2014; Klaussner, 2014). With few exceptions (Lian, Ferris, & Brown, 2012a,
2012b; Priesemuth, Schminke, Ambrose, & Folger, 2014; Rafferty & Restubog, 2011; Xu,
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Huang, Lam, & Miao, 2012; Yu, Lin, Wang, Ma, Wei, et al., 2016), mechanisms linking
abusive supervision to subordinate job performance have been studied in isolation and
there have been few attempts to evaluate them relative to each other. Despite
acknowledging the insights gained from the dozens of studies that have investigated
mechanisms linking abusive supervision to distal outcomes (e.g., job performance), Tepper
et al. (2007) note,
What is problematic is that the mediation frameworks scholars test typically account for
one and rarely more than two mechanisms underlying the effects of supervisory abuse.
Consequently, the research being conducted is not able to shed light on the relative
explanatory power of the theoretical perspectives that seem relevant to understanding
abusive supervision. [emphasis added] (p. 134)

Moreover, although studies that test one or two mechanisms at a time have their
use, they allow little to be inferred in terms of the relative explanatory power of the
underlying mechanisms and may lead to increased theoretical fragmentation (Tepper et
al.).
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there is extant research showing abusive
supervision affects subordinate job performance, in part, because (1) abuse decreases the
frequency of PA, (2) abuse increases the frequency of NA, (3) abuse is detrimental to
subordinate’s relationship his or her supervisor (LMX), (4) subordinate’s view abuse as a
form of unfair interpersonal treatment (IJ), (5) abuse reduces how much subordinates
perceive their organization cares about them (POS), and (6) abuse reduces subordinate’s
affection for, and desire to stay with, their organization (AOC). The primary contribution
of this study will be to evaluate the relative strength of these mechanisms.
Finally, PEC is postulated to have a direct effect on work-related attitudes that
reference the supervisor (LMX, IJ) and on work-related attitudes that reference the
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organization (AOC, POS). Moreover, PEC is expected to moderate the effects of abusive
supervision on work-related attitudes, such that “strong” ethical climates (i.e.,
characterized by Principle, Benevolence) enhance the negative effects of abusive
supervision on supervisor-referenced attitudes (i.e., LMX, IJ) and “weak” ethical climates
(e.g., Instrumental EOC) enhance the negative effects of abusive supervision on
organization- referenced attitudes (i.e., AOC, POS).
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter begins with a review of the abusive supervision literature, followed by
the development of hypotheses related to the indirect effects of abusive supervision on
subordinate task and contextual performance, the latter of which includes organizational
citizenship behaviors (OCBs), and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) directed at
the organization and directed at individuals within the organization (e.g., coworkers). Study
hypotheses are derived from evidence that links abusive supervision to each of the
proposed mediators and evidence that links each mediator to one or more performance
outcomes. Finally, I discuss the concept of ethical organizational climate (EOC; Victor &
Cullen, 1987) and develop hypotheses regarding the impact of subordinates’ ethical climate
perceptions on the relationship between abusive supervision and key work-related
attitudes. Specifically, EOC is expected to influence the strength of the relationships
between abusive supervision and work-related attitudes.
Abusive Supervision: Subordinate-targeted Aggression
Organizational aggression differs from the related concept of occupational violence
by being “organization-motivated” (precipitated by factors within the control of the
organization; O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin, & Glew, 1996) and can have a variety of sources—
including those that are internal (e.g., coworkers) and external (e.g., general public,
customers; Barling et al., 2009) to the organization. Relative to other sources, it can be
argued that aggression from the immediate supervisor is more concerning to employees
because it threatens harm to employee’s organizational status. Unlike coworkers and
subordinates, supervisors are uniquely positioned to harm through their control over work
schedules, assignments, and access to organizational resources and developmental
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opportunities (mentoring, training). Consistent with this notion, meta-analytic evidence
shows aggression from supervisor (i.e., targeting subordinates) to be more strongly
associated with the subordinate outcomes of interest (job performance) than aggression
from coworkers or outsiders (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010).
Defining Abusive Supervision
The concept of abusive supervision (Tepper, 2000) reflects organizational
aggression “from above” (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007).
Specifically, abusive supervision refers to “the sustained display of hostile verbal and
nonverbal behaviors, excluding physical contact” (Tepper, 2000, p. 178). Although not
explicit in the definition, abusive supervision notably reflects the subordinate’s subjective
assessment of the supervisor’s behavior rather than an objective indicator of the
supervisor’s behavior.
As Tepper (2000) notes, “The same individual could view a supervisor’s behavior
as abusive in one context and as non-abusive in another context, and two subordinates
could differ in their evaluations of the same supervisor’s behavior” (p.178). Indeed, in
some organizational contexts (e.g., police agencies), many of the behaviors included in
Tepper’s (2000) scale could be interpreted as “tough love” rather than “abusive” (Simon
Hurst, Kelley, & Judge, 2015). Throughout this manuscript, “abusive supervision” refers
to perceptions of (having been the target of) and/or perceived abusive supervision.
Following the tradition of Tepper and colleagues (2017), the words “perceived” and
“perceptions of” are omitted to produce a less cumbersome prose.
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Conceptual and Methodological Issues
Extant research on interpersonal aggression has identified many constructs that are
conceptually distinct yet tend to be operationalized in similar ways (Hershcovis, 2010). A
partial list includes interpersonal deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) social undermining
(Duffy, Ganster & Pagon, 2002), incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999), rudeness (Porath
& Erez, 2007), abusive behavior (Keashly, Trott, & MacLean, 1994), emotional abuse
(Keashly, 1997), workplace harassment (Bowling & Beehr, 2006), victimization (Aquino
& Bradfield, 2000) and workplace mistreatment (Cortina & Magley, 2003). In addressing
theoretical fragmentation and cross-proliferation concerns, several researchers (e.g.,
Hershcovis, 2010; Aquino & Thau, 2009) suggest the need to measure the precise
dimensions that differentiate the target concept from similar and broader concepts (i.e.,
organizational aggression, workplace mistreatment).
Baillen, Escartin, Gross, and Zapf (2017) differentiated between workplace
bullying (Leymann, 1996) and interpersonal conflict (Spector & Jex, 1998) on the basis of
frequency, duration, and power imbalance. Indeed, many related interpersonal aggression
concepts can be distinguished (at least theoretically) based on their inclusion of a physical
or sexual component, visibility (extent to which they are witnessed by non-targets),
intensity, frequency, duration, and relationship power between victim and perpetrator (cf.
Hershcovis, 2010). In their investigation of workplace aggression, Nixon and Spector
(2015) found that greater psychological strain (psychosomatic complaints, depression) was
reported by persons who experienced aggression more frequently, more intensely, perceive
the aggression to be visible to others, and when the aggressor has greater relationship
power. Using Nixon and Spector’s framework, abusive supervision could be described as
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a type of nonsexual, non-physical aggression which occurs with high frequency and
duration, and is characterized by a power imbalance between parties.
Several methodological issues arise when the relationship between abusive
supervision and subordinate job performance are investigated. One methodological issue
concerns the validity of supervisor ratings of performance in the context of abusive
supervision is questionable. Tepper et al. (2017) argued that supervisors can express
hostility by rating the subordinate lower than he or she deserves, such that abusive
supervision and supervisor performance ratings may represent two indications of the same
construct. Although dozens of investigations have found associations between abusive
supervision and job performance, only two studies (described below) have followed Tepper
et al.’s recommendations to employ more objective measures of performance (e.g., Yu,
Lin, Wang, Ma, & Wei, et al. 2016; Walter, Lam, van der Vegt, Huang, & Miao., 2015).
An additional methodological concern arises from the use of cross-sectional
designs, which despite being unable to support definitive causal claims, comprise a large
portion of the abusive supervision literature. That said, while subordinate performance is
presently framed as an outcome of abusive supervision, the temporal precedence of abusive
supervision and subordinate job performance remains controversial. Moreover, a diverse
set of theoretical perspectives (Victimization Theory; Aquino & Thau, 2009; Employee
Maintenance Theory; Tepper & Simon, 2015) and empirical investigations (e.g., Eissa,
Lester, & Gupta, 2019; Khan, Moss, Quratulain, & Hameed 2016; Lian, Ferris, Morrison,
& Brown, 2014; Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011) have subordinate’s characteristics and
behaviors as causes of abusive supervision.
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Yet a third possibility is that abusive supervision and subordinate behaviors (such
as job performance) are reciprocally related, such that the supervisor’s abusive reactions to
the subordinate’s (poor) performance precipitates further declines in performance. Indeed,
this reciprocal relationship has been described as “cycles of abuse” (Simon et al, 2015) and
“escalating spirals” (Klaussner, 2014) and is made explicit in two recent theories of abusive
supervision (e.g., Chan & McAllister, 2014; Klaussner, 2014). However, there exists no
theoretical rationale to suggest what factors influence the tempo of these cycles. For
instance, Lian et al. (2014) found that CWBs directed at the organization (CWBO) and
abusive supervision were reciprocally related at six months but not at twenty months. More
research is clearly needed to understand the influence of time in the dynamic interaction
between subordinate job performance and abusive supervision.
Individual-level Outcomes
The concept of abusive supervision has generated hundreds of investigations in the
nearly two decades since Tepper’s (2000) introduction. Arguably, the most active area of
the literature concerns the (mostly negative; cf. Lee, Yun, & Srivastava, 2013) subordinatelevel consequences of abusive supervision (Tepper et al., 2017). Abusive supervision has
been linked to negative personal outcomes including problems with alcohol (Bamberger,
2006), conflict with family members (Carlson, Ferguson, Hunter & Whitten, 2012;
Carlson, Ferguson, Perrewé, & Whitten, 2011), spousal undermining (Restubog, Scott &
Zagenczyk, 2011), subjective well-being (Bowling & Michel, 2011), psychological
distress (Li, Wang, Yang, & Liu, 2016), emotional exhaustion (Aryee et al., 2008; Wu &
Hu, 2009; Yagil, 2006), and a variety of subclinical psychological complaints such as
anxiety and depression (Tepper, Moss, Lockhart, & Carr, 2007). This non-exhaustive list
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suggests that the negative consequences of abusive supervision extend beyond the
workplace—affecting personal health and relationships with persons outside of work.
Abusive Supervision and Subordinate Job Performance
In addition to personal and family outcomes, abusive supervision also shapes
attitudes and behaviors at work. Job performance refers to employee behaviors “…that are
linked with and contribute to organizational goals” (Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000, p.216).
Job performance includes three broad dimensions: task performance, organizational
citizenship behavior (OCBs), and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). Task
performance supports the organization’s technical core and contributes to organizational
effectiveness. Task performance is further distinguished from contextual performance
(extra-role performance), which includes OCBs and CWBs (Miles, Borman, Spector, &
Fox, 2002; Motowidlo & van Scotter, 1994).
While OCBs make positive contributions to organizational effectiveness, CWBs
contribute negatively to organizational effectiveness. It is crucial to note that OCBs and
CWBs represent theoretically and empirically distinct performance dimensions rather than
opposite poles of a single dimension (Dalal, 2005; Dalal, Lam, Weiss, Welch & Hulin,
2009; Spector, Bauer, & Fox, 2010). For instance, Dalal (2005) reported a population
estimate regarding the relationship between OCB and CWB of p = -.32 (k = 49, n = 16), a
magnitude that many organizational researchers would consider as evidence of their
independence. Moreover, an experimental study conducted by Spector et al. (2010)
suggests that many of the strong negative correlations reported in the literature may be the
product of measurement artifacts (e.g., use of overlapping item sets, agreement response
format, supervisor- [vs. employee-] rated).

24

Interestingly, both the CWB and OCB literatures distinguish between extra-role
behaviors that target the organization (OCBO, CWBO) and extra-role behaviors that target
individuals within the organization (OCBI, CWBI; Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007; Coleman
& Borman, 2000; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; Robinson & Bennett,
1995). Consistent with these theoretical developments and prior empirical findings, the
present study distinguishes between, and makes separate predictions for, the interpersonaland organization-directed dimensions of contextual performance.
Task Performance
Relatively few studies have investigated the effects of abusive supervision on
subordinate task performance. Indeed, Tepper’s (2007) review of abusive supervision
literature revealed a single study of US automotive employees (Harris, Kacmar, &
Zivnuska, 2007) in which it was reported that the negative effects of abusive supervision
on subordinate task performance (supervisor-rated) manifested only in persons that
attached high meaning to their work.
Walter et al.’s (2015) study found a negative relationship between abusive
supervision and objective job performance (Chinese garment workers production output).
Interestingly, the effects of perceived subordinate performance (supervisor-rated)
predicted abusive supervision only under conditions of low outcome dependence
(supervisor-rated). In addition, the negative effect of abusive supervision on subsequent
objective performance (1 month after) was not significant after controlling for prior
objective performance.
Further, Nandkeolyar et al. (2014) observed an interaction between abusive
supervision and employee conscientiousness such that the negative relationship between
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abusive supervision and job performance existed only for employees with low (i.e., lower
than .76 SD below mean) conscientiousness. Two studies (e.g., Jian, Kwan, Qiu, Liu et al.,
2012; Xu, Huang, Lam, & Miao, 2012) have explored the relationship between abusive
supervision and task performance using supervisor-subordinate dyads.
Jian et al.’s (2012) study of 354 dyads working in various Chinese hotels showed a
negative relationship between abusive supervision and service performance. Similarly, Xu
et al.’s (2012) study of 366 dyads working for a Chinese garment company also revealed a
negative relationship between abusive supervision and subordinate task performance.
Finally, Mackey, Frieder, Brees, and Martinko’s (2017) meta analytic study estimated a
population correlation of between abusive supervision and task performance of p = -.19.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
Several investigations have reported negative associations between abusive
supervision and general measures of OCBs (Chu, 2014), citizenship behaviors directed
towards organizational members (OCBI; Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 2007; Decoster,
Camps, & Stouten, 2014), the organization proper (OCBO; Aryee et al., 2007; Decoster,
et al, 2014) and customers of the organization (Lyu, Zhu, Zhong, & Hu, 2016).
Interestingly, Zellars, Tepper, and Duffy (2002) found that the relationship between
abusive supervision and OCBs was stronger for those who defined OCB as extra-role
behavior.
Abusive supervision has also been linked to narrower facets of OCBs such as
helping coworkers (Peng, Schaubroeck, & Li, 2014), prosocial voice and silence behaviors
(Rafferty & Restubog, 2011), civic virtue (Shoss et al., 2013), and interpersonal facilitation
and job dedication (Aryee, Sun, Chen, & Debrah, 2008). Furthermore, meta-analytic
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studies have observed a negative relationship between abusive supervision and OCBs
(Mackey et al., 2017) and between abusive supervision and OCBI and OCBO (Zhang &
Liao, 2015).
Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Relative to the other job performance dimensions currently investigated (task,
OCBs), a much larger portion of the research on abusive supervision has focused on its
links to counterproductive behaviors (Martinko et al., 2013). For instance, in Martinko et
al.’s (2013) review of the abusive supervision literature, fifty percent of the thirty-four
studies that examined outcomes of abusive supervision investigated aggressive (i.e.,
counterproductive) responses (attitudes and behaviors). Overall, evidence from over a
dozen empirical investigations suggest a positive link between abusive supervision and
CWBs (Tepper et al., 2017).
The overarching conclusions gleaned from these studies is that abusive supervision
has a positive association with CWBs that target the organization and with CWBs that
target individuals within the organization (CWBI/CWBO; Tepper et al., 2015; Martinko et
al., 2013). Meta-analytic estimates (Mackey et al., 2017; Zhang & Liao, 2015) of the
association between abusive supervision and CWBI suggest a population correlation
ranging from .35 from .37 and a population correlation between abusive supervision and
CWBO ranging from .38 to .41.
Problem Statement and Study Contributions
Scholarly interest in abusive supervision has increased dramatically over the last
10 years (see Tepper, et al., 2017), with over a dozen investigations reporting on the impact
of abusive supervision on subordinate’s extra-role performance. The following sections
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describe three types of variables—affective states, attitudes towards supervisor, attitudes
towards organization—that account for the effects of abusive supervision on subordinate
job performance. This study makes the following contributions: (1) provides a mediation
framework to test the relative influence of these mediators and, (2) establishes the role of
EOC (Victor & Cullen, 1987) as a boundary condition vis-a-vis the strength of the
relationship between abusive supervision and attitudes directed at the supervisor and
organization.
In their review of studies that have examined the effects of abusive supervision on
distal outcomes (e.g., behaviors), Tepper et al. (2017) suggest that progress in this area has
been impeded piecemeal examination of explanatory mechanisms. Specifically, the authors
note that,
the mediation framework scholars test typically account for one and rarely more than two
mechanism underlying the effects of supervisory abuse. Consequently, the research being
conducted is not able to shed light on the relative explanatory power of the theoretical
perspectives that seem relevant to understanding abusive supervision (p.134)

The connections between abusive supervision and each mediator discussed below
are theoretically grounded and have varying degrees of empirical support. However, with
few exceptions (e.g.,, Peng, Schaubroeck, & Li, 2014; Rafferty & Restubog, 2011; Xu,
Huang, Lam, & Miao, 2012, Yu, Lin, Wang, Ma, Wei, et al., 2016), theoretically similar
mechanisms have been evaluated separately, with few attempts to compare their relative
strength (i.e., explanatory power) within a single sample. Determining the relative
contribution of mechanisms that rely on similar processes by testing them simultaneously
will provide evidence of their unique contribution and add clarity to the abusive supervision
literature.

28

The present study addresses these concerns by testing the relative explanatory
power of six mechanisms that represent diverse theoretical perspectives. The diversity of
mechanisms involved in shaping behavioral reactions to abusive supervision suggests that
a variety of interventions are possible to reduce the occurrence of abusive supervision
and/or mitigate the negative effects of abuse. Therefore, the knowledge gained from this
study—in terms of the relative importance of affect and attitudinal mechanisms—is
precisely the type of information organizational decision makers need to design and
implement the most effective interventions. The full conceptual model is presented in
Figure 1.
The second contribution is extending ECT (Victor & Cullen, 1987) to the study of
abusive supervision by showing that EOC moderates the relative impact of abusive
supervision on supervisor and organizational attitudes. Existing empirical evidence links
abusive supervision to EOC and to attitudinal mediators under present investigation. This
study is the first to investigate how attitudinal behavioral reactions to abusive supervision
are shaped by subordinate’s perceptions of various EOC types. As discussed below,
distinguishing mechanisms which are the product of affective reactions from those driven
primarily by cognition (i.e., attitudes) is crucial to understanding the moderating effects of
EOC.
The present study examines the extent to which specific behavioral consequences
of abusive supervision, namely job performance, are the result of (1) affective experiences
(PA, NA) at work, (2) attitudes that develop towards the organization (AOC, POS) and (3)
attitudes that develop towards the supervisor (LMX, IJ). Moreover, I measure job
performance via coworker (peer) ratings, which have been shown to converge with
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supervisor ratings at the construct level (Viswesvaran, Schmidt, & Ones, 2002) and raise
fewer objectivity concerns than supervisory ratings of subordinate performance when it is
assessed in the context of an abusive supervisor (see Tepper et al., 2017).
Meta-analytic estimates of the relationship between abusive supervision and each
attitudinal mediator and job performance outcome under investigation are presented in
Table 1. As shown on Table 1, all work-related attitudes under investigation have a
negative relationship with abusive supervision, and abusive supervision has a stronger
relationship with attitudes that reference the supervisor (LMX, IJ) than with attitudes that
reference the organization (AOC, POS). This suggests that all things other being equal,
abusive supervision should have a stronger influence on attitudes towards the supervisor
than on attitudes towards the organization. Moreover, Table 2 lists meta-analytic estimates
of the relationships between each mediator and employee job performance. Overall, the
pattern of correlations shown on Tables 1 and 2 suggest the effects of abusive supervision
are stronger for contextual performance than for task performance.
In the sections that follow, I review the empirical and theoretical support for each
mechanism linking abusive supervision to the subordinate job performance outcomes. This
is followed by a review of ECT and prior investigations that link EOC to abusive
supervision and to the attitudinal mediators under present investigation. As previously
noted, abusive supervision is negatively related to subordinate in-role and extra-role
performance, and these negative relationships are mediated by (1) the experience of
affective states (PA, NA), (2) attitudes towards the supervisor (LMX, IJ), and (3) attitudes
towards the organization (POS, AOC). Moreover, EOC is related to abusive supervision
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and work-related attitudes (POS, AOC, LMX, IJ) and (2) interacts with abusive supervision
to shape the same work-related attitudes.
Based on the arguments articulated in the sections that follow, abusive supervision
and LMX and IJ should have a stronger negative relationship when subordinates perceive
their firm’s EOC is characterized by a concern for others (e.g., Principle, Benevolence)
than when EOCs are characterized by a focus on individual’s self-interest (e.g., philosophy
of Egoism). On the hand, the negative relationships between abusive supervision and POS
and AOC should be stronger when EOCs focus on individual’s self-interest than when they
focus on the interests of others.
State Affect versus Attitudes
The distinction between state affect and attitudes—summary evaluations of a
psychological object along attributes such as good-bad, harmful-beneficial (Ajzen,
2001)—is not without controversy. Addressing prior research in job satisfaction, Weiss
(2002) argued that while attitudes have both an affective and a cognitive component (i.e.,
beliefs), they are distinct from pure affective states. He then summarized the empirical
support for the distinction between affect and attitudes in measures of job performance into
three categories: (1) factor-analytic studies showing attitudes and affect measures load on
separate factors, (2) studies showing that affect and beliefs independently predict overall
job performance (i.e., global attitude), and (3) evidence that affective states, but not beliefs,
mediate the relationship between trait affectivity and job satisfaction. Indeed, the leading
view of attitudes is that they have distinct cognitive and affective components (Ajzen,
2001; Eagly & Chaike, 1993; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997).
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More importantly, while the behavioral consequences of affective states are
immediate and unmitigated by cognitions, the behavioral consequences of attitudes reflect
planning and deliberation (Ajzen, 1991). Weiss (2002) further states that “many, if not
most, relationships between affect and work behaviors are not mediated by any overall
evaluation of the job” (p. 185). Although his comments referred specifically to the affective
component of job satisfaction— researchers have used similar logic to distinguish between
the affective and cognitive bases of reactions to injustice (Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano,
1999), and between the cognitive and affective antecedents of organizational citizenship
behaviors (Lee & Allen, 2002; Lyons & Scott, 2012) and workplace deviance (Judge, Scott,
& Ilies, 2006; Lee & Allen, 2002). Results from these studies do not provide a clear answer
to which types of mechanisms play a stronger role in shaping behaviors and instead
suggests a complex interplay between affect and cognition in shaping specific behavioral
outcomes. For instance, Lee and Allen (2002) found that the relative contribution of affect
and job-related cognitions (justice, pay) depended on the contextual performance outcome
investigated (OCBs, CWBs) and how affect was conceptualized.
Affective experiences are distinguished based on valence (positive vs. negative), a
distinction which is prevalent in the organizational behavior literature (Tellegen, Watson,
& Clark, 1999), and is practical considering the outcomes of interest. An important feature
of affective experiences is that they take control precedence, which refers to “the
phenomenon whereby affective states consume cognitive resources, diverting attention,
reasoning, and memory to the affective state being experienced” (Lyons & Scott, 2012,
p.69). Lyons and Scott further note that affective experiences disrupt the rational tracking
of inputs and outcomes that characterize exchange relationships, leading to behaviors that
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may or may not align with reciprocity norms. These findings suggest that (1) affective
experiences resulting from abusive supervision are the product of action-tendencies and
will have immediate behavioral consequences, and (2) neither the affective experience
itself nor its behavioral consequences should be moderated by subordinate’s EOC
perceptions. In other words, while EOC perceptions are expected to moderate the effect of
abusive supervision on work-related attitudes, they should not moderate the effects of
abusive supervision on the experience of affective states (PA, NA).
Supervisor- versus Organization-referenced Attitudes
Attitudes can be formed regarding any attitude object (Ajzen, 2001). Attitudes are
not mere descriptions of the work environment, nor are they the same as perceptions (Judge
& Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012). As noted by Judge et al. (2012), “these constructs
[perceptions, descriptions] are not attitudes if they do not include an explicit appraisal or
evaluation of the object in question” (p. 346). In the workplace, individuals can develop
attitudes towards virtually any facet of their job—ranging from objects in their physical
environment (e.g., office furniture, factory equipment) to the more abstract features of
organizational life (e.g., promotional opportunities, task meaningfulness). AOC and POS
reflect employee attitudes towards (i.e., summary evaluations of) the organization.
Specifically, POS captures evaluations regarding how much employee believe the
organization values them and AOC reflects how much employees value their organization.
Although AOC represents the most affective component of organizational
commitment, its attitudinal properties are readily apparent in widely used measures of
AOC. For instance, Allen and Meyer’s (1990) measure of AOC asks respondents to
indicate the extent to which they endorse items such as, “This organization has a great deal
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of personal meaning for me.” and “I enjoy discussing my organization with people.” These
items have a clear cognitive component and suggest AOC can conceptualized as an attitude
that captures employees’ evaluations of their organization.
In contrast to AOC and POS however, the attitude object referenced by LMX and
IJ is the supervisor. It is important to note that attitudes towards the organization and
attitudes towards the supervisor may share a variety of antecedents and thus likely to
covary. Moreover, prior research (e.g., Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002) and intuition suggests
that the actions of the supervisor influence not only evaluations of the supervisor, but also
evaluations of the organization. Eisenberger et al. ‘s (2010) concept of supervisor
organizational embodiment (perceived similarity between characteristics of supervisor and
organization; SOE) is particularly useful to understanding why supervisory behaviors
affect employee attitudes towards the organization.
Supervisory functions often include carrying out tasks on behalf of the organization
(e.g., staffing, discipline), which lead employees to view supervisors as organizational
agents. When subordinates view their supervisors as organizational agents, the supervisor’s
actions—even those harmful to employees—are seen as being aligned with the
organization’s objectives. Indeed, mistreatment by the supervisor is interpreted as
mistreatment by the supervisor on behalf of the organization. Shoss et al. (2013) found that
POS mediated the relationship between abusive supervision and subordinate extra-role
performance (OCBs, CWBs). More importantly, the effect of abusive supervision on extrarole behaviors was conditional on SOE, such that subordinates were more likely to hold
the organization accountable for the mistreatment (by engaging in negative extra-role
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behaviors) when supervisors embodied the organization (i.e., high SOE) than when they
did not (i.e., low SOE).
Affective Mechanisms Linking AS to Job Performance
There is considerable debate regarding the structure and dimensionality of affect
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Shockley, Ipsas, Rossi, & Levine, 2012). Although much
of the discussion is beyond the current scope, the reader should note that affect is a broad
umbrella term used to describe a range of emotions, moods, and dispositions. Affect differs
from affectivity however, with the latter term referring to individual dispositions to
experience specific emotions consistently across time and situations (Barsky & Kaplan,
2007; Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, & Haynes, 2009).
The hierarchical model of affect (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999) positions
dimensional state affect (PA and NA) below a general “hedonic-evaluative” component.
Prior research indicates that abusive supervision is (1) positively associated with the
experience of negative affective states such as anger, fear, anxiety, frustration, and
embarrassment (Atwater, Kim, Witt, Latheef, Callison, Elkins, & Zheng, 2016; Hoobler &
Hu, 2013; Michel et al., 2016) and (2) negatively associated with the experience of positive
affective states such as interested, enthusiastic, and attentive (Harvey, Stoner, Hochwarter,
& Kacmar, 2007). Interestingly, a recent study by Peng, Schaubroeck, Chong, and Li (in
press) reports that while abusive supervision is associated with discrete emotions of anger,
shame, and fear, only the behavioral action tendencies associated with anger were in turn
related to higher employee CWBI. Although these studies demonstrate the merits of
conceptualizing discrete emotions, relatively few discrete emotions have received research
attention in the context of abusive supervision—with efforts heavily skewed in favor of
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emotions with a negative valence (e.g., anger, fear; Oh & Fahr, 2017). Hypotheses are
therefore formulated at the broader level of dimensional state affect (i.e., PA and NA).
Abusive Supervision and State Affect
As Tepper and Almeda (2012) note, instances of abusive supervision can be viewed
as affective events that “evoke momentary fluctuations in state negative affect and distal
reactions in the form of redress” (p. 87). The present expectations—that PA and NA
mediate the effects of abusive supervision on employee performance—are consistent with
AET (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996) and with Spector and Fox’s (2002) Theory of
Voluntary Work Behavior—which independently propose that affective states mediate the
effect of work events/environmental conditions on employee performance. Note that in
contrast to AET, the voluntary work behavior model explicitly adopts the two-factor
(independence) view of affect.
The implications of the two-factor approach for the present investigation concern
expectations regarding the relationship of PA and NA with CWBs and OCBs. Specifically,
Spector and Fox’s (2002) model predicts that while NA primarily influences CWBs, PA
primarily influences OCBs. Miles et al. (2002) found general support for the dual
mechanisms proposed by Spector and Fox’s model, as have later investigations (e.g., Dalal
et al., 2009) reporting differences in the antecedents and consequences of PA and NA (and
the discrete emotions associated with each). Interestingly, Yagil, Ben-Zur, and Tamir
(2011) found abusive supervision to be related to high NA but unrelated to low PA.
PA and Job Performance. PA is thought to influence task performance through
motivational, interpersonal (Tsai, Chen, & Liu, 2007), and self-regulatory processes (Beal,
Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005). The motivational benefits of PA on task performance
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are primarily the result of employees’ expectancy, instrumentality, and valence
considerations (Erez & Isen, 2002). Erez and Isen’s experimental study showed a
connection between PA, three components of motivation— valence, instrumentality, and
expectancy—and task performance. Specifically, results suggest that employees who
experience PA will feel greater attraction towards organizationally-relevant rewards
(valence), perceive a clearer connection between their behavioral efforts and success on
the task (expectancy) and between their success on a task organizationally-relevant rewards
(instrumentality).
PA also exerts a positive influence on in-role and extra-role performance through
interpersonal processes. Employees who experience positive moods are more likely to
elicit similar emotions in others (e.g., coworkers) and as a result they are more likely
receive help from those persons when they need it (Lyons & Scott, 2012). Lyon and Scott,
guided by social exchange theory, argue that employees who feel they have received help
from others (or have been harmed by others) are likely to reciprocate helping (and harming)
behaviors. Finally, PA may negatively influence task performance because it pulls
cognitive resources away from the task at hand (Beal et al., 2005).
Empirical investigations have shown a positive link between PA and task
performance and between PA and OCBs (George, 1991; Miner & Glomb, 2010; Shockley
et al., 2012). Interestingly, several studies (e.g., Dalal, et al., 2009; Fisher, 2002; Lyons &
Scott, 2012; Shockley et al., 2012) find that while PA predicts OCBs well, it has a weak
relationship to CWBs. The existing research supports the following expectation:
H1: PA mediates the relationship between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b)
OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
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NA and Job Performance. NA affects task performance through motivational,
interpersonal, and self-regulatory processes. McColl-Kennedy and Anderson (2002)
provide evidence that feelings of frustration due to the supervisor’s behavior reduce task
performance because they lead to feelings of hopelessness and the subordinate essentially
gives up trying to perform well (i.e., motivational process). Moreover, action-tendencies
that accompany NA are generally antisocial—suggesting that employees who experience
NA are likely to push others away and thus less likely to receive help from coworkers when
needed (Lyons & Scott, 2012).
Finally, Self-Regulatory Theory (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) suggests that the
experience of emotional states inhibits task performance because processing emotions
draws upon cognitive resources (e.g., attention, memory) that could otherwise be allocated
towards the task at hand (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Collins & Jackson,
2015). Shockley et al., (2012) meta-analysis also found a negative relationship between
NA and the negative discrete emotions that characterize NA and task performance.
Shockley et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis also link NA to employee contextual
performance. Specifically, NA, and the discrete emotions that characterize NA, have
positive relationships with CWBs and negative relationships with OCBs (Shockley et al.).
Additional research has shown that the effects of NA on contextual performance are the
product of specific action-tendencies associated with the discrete emotions that
characterize NA (e.g., anger is associated with attack-tendency; Colquitt et al., 2013),
which facilitates engagement in CWBs but hinders engagement in OCBs because it reduces
interpersonal attraction towards (i.e., liking for) coworkers and the organization. Consistent
with Spector and Fox’s (2002) model of voluntary work behavior, simultaneous
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investigations of PA and NA and contextual performance have shown that while NA
predicts CWBs well, it predicts OCBs weakly (Dalal, 2005; Shockley et al., 2012) or not
at all (Dalal et al., 2009; Fisher, 2002).
NA has been shown to mediate the relationship between abusive supervision and
CWBs (Avey, Wu, & Holley, 2015; Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2002; Michel, Newness, &
Duniewicz, 2017). Similarly, state hostility (discrete emotion characteristic of NA) was
found to mediate the effect of interpersonal justice (i.e., unfair treatment) on CWBs (Judge,
Scott, & Ilies, 2006). The indirect effects of abusive supervision on OCBs and task
performance (through NA) have yet to be shown empirically. However, these effects are
theoretically congruent with prior studies demonstrating that the experience of negative
affective states (frustration, contempt) mediates leaders’ behaviors (e.g., leadership style)
on subordinate task performance (McColl-Kennedy & Anderson, 2002) and OCBs (Sund
& Lines, 2017). The state of the literature suggests the following:
H2: Negative Affect mediates the relationship between AS and (a) Task
Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
Supervisor-referenced Attitudes Linking AS to Job Performance
Leader-Member Exchange
At the core of Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX; Graen & Schiemann,
1978) is the notion that the quality of the leader-follower relationships varies across
followers. While high quality exchanges are marked by high levels of trust, respect, and
obligation, low quality exchanges are characterized by low levels of the same dimensions
(Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Abusive supervision refers to specific supervisory behaviors
(e.g., verbal, nonverbal hostility). In contrast, LMX characterizes the overall quality of the
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supervisor-subordinate relationship (Xu, Loi, & Lam, 2015). That said, abusive
supervision can occur within the context of an otherwise high-quality relationship (Lian,
Ferris, & Brown, 2012b; cf. Martinko, Harvey, Sikora, & Douglas, 2011).
Prior studies show that LMX has a positive relationship with task performance
(Gerstner & Day, 1997) and mediates the relationship between abusive supervision and
task performance (Xu et al., 2012)—although a one recent study failed to find an indirect
effect of LMX once affective commitment and emotional exhaustion were accounted for
as competing mediators (Yu et al., 2016). LMX has a direct positive effect on OCBs (Ilies,
Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007), and mediates the effects of abusive supervision on OCBs
and task performance (Xu et al., 2012). In a replication of Xu et al.’s (2012) study however,
Decoster, Camps and Stouten (2014) confirmed that LMX mediated the effects of abusive
supervision OCBI and OCBO but failed to find the mediating role of LMX for the abusive
supervision—task performance relationship.
Empirical evidence to support the expected indirect effects of abusive supervision
on task performance (via LMX) is equivocal. However, such a prediction is congruent with
social exchange and justice- based explanations, which tend to suggest that a lack of trust
and mutual respect for the supervisor will lead workers to exert less effort on their jobs—
presumably because they lack confidence that the organization or the supervisor will repay
them later. Finally, the mediating role of LMX in the abusive supervision-CWB
relationship remains untested, but is suggested by meta-analytic studies that show negative
associations between (1) abusive supervision and LMX (Mackey et al., 2017), and (2)
LMX and CWBs (Martin, Guillaume, Thomas, Lee, & Epitropaki, 2016).
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H3: Leader-member exchange mediates the relationship between AS and
(a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
Interactional Justice
Organizational justice theorists (Colquitt, 2001; Moorman, 1991) have suggested
that individuals form distinct justice evaluations regarding (1) the favorability of their
resource exchange with the organization relative to others (distributive justice), fairness in
the procedures used by the organization to make allocation decisions (procedural), and
fairness in the way the decisions are implemented and are treated by the organizational
agents who implement the procedures (interactional justice). Malatesta and Byrne (1997)
suggest that immediate supervisors—because they administer policies and procedure (i.e.,
ensuring rule compliance)— represent a primary source of interactional justice. Consistent
with this notion, a study by Aryee et al. (2007) found that interactional justice (but not
procedural justice) mediated the effect of abusive supervision on OCBs.
Abusive supervision violates the rules of conduct and workplace norms regarding
equitable treatment (Tepper, 2000). Empirical support for this claim comes from metaanalyses that find strong negative associations between interactional justice and abusive
supervision (Mackey et al., 2017; Zhang & Liao, 2015; see Table 1). Moreover, metaanalytic studies have also shown that interactional justice has (1) a negative association
with CWBs, (2) a positive association with task performance, and (3) a positive association
with OCBs (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt,
Scott, Rodell, Long, Zapata, et. al., 2013; Dalal, 2005; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2002).
Overall, the extant literature suggests subordinate’s interactional justice helps shape the
effects of abusive supervision on their performance.
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H4: Interactional justice mediates the relationship between AS and (a) Task
Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
Organization-referenced Attitudes Linking AS to Job Performance
Perceived Organizational Support
Central to organizational support theory (Eisenberger, 1986) are the ideas that
employees tend to personify (assign humanlike qualities to) their organization and view
the motives of its agents (decision-makers) as those of the organization proper. Perceived
organizational support (POS) refers to employees’ “global beliefs concerning the extent to
which the organization values their contributions and cares about their well-being”
(Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002, p. 698). Abused subordinates are likely to infer that their
employer, having placed the supervisor in a position of formal authority and failed to take
corrective action, cares little about them (low POS). Low POS should in turn reduce
subordinate task performance and OCBs and increase CWBs.
Relative to the other mediators under present investigation, there is less direct
empirical evidence supporting the mediating role of POS—and the strength of the indirect
effect appears to be moderated by how much blame subordinates assign to the organization.
For instance, Bowling and Michel (2011) found that subordinates who attributed abusive
supervision to the organization were more likely engage in CWBOs (Bowling & Michel,
2011). Moreover, POS was found to mediate the relationship between abusive supervision
and task performance, OCBs and CWBs— but the indirect effect was observed only among
persons who viewed their supervisor as highly embodying the organization (Shoss,
Eisenberger, Restubog, & Zagencyzk, 2013). In addition, prior meta-analytic studies link
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abusive supervision to POS (Mackey et al., 2017) and link POS to in-role performance
(task performance) and extra-role performance (OCBs; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002).
H5: Perceived Organizational Support mediates the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
Affective Organizational Commitment
Organizational commitment theory (Allen & Meyer, 1990) proposes three
components to explain why employees stay with an organization: (1) Affective
commitment (desire to remain with organization), (2) Continuance commitment
(unwillingness to forfeit side-bets associated with leaving), and (3) Normative commitment
(sense of loyalty and obligation to organization; Allen & Meyer, 1990). Consistent with
the idea that some subordinates blame the organization for their abusive supervisors are
observations of a negative association between abusive supervision and subordinates’
affective attachment to the organization (Duffy et al., 2002; Tepper, 2000; Tepper, Henle,
Lambert, Giacalone, & Duffy, 2008). Moreover, affective commitment is negatively
associated with task performance and OCBs (Cetin, Gurbuz, & Sert, 2015; Riketta, 2002).
Researchers have observed the mediating role of affective commitment in the
relationship between abusive supervision and (1) task performance (Yu, Lin, Wang, Ma,
Wei, et al., 2016), and (2) CWBOs (Tepper et al., 2008). On the other hand, the mediating
role of affective commitment in the abusive supervision—OCB relationship has not been
previously reported. The indirect effects of abuse on OCBs (via affective commitment) can
be inferred from meta-analytic evidence of a positive relationship between (1) satisfaction
with one’s supervision and affective commitment (Meyer et al., 2002) and (2) affective
commitment and OCBs (Cetin et al., 2015; Riketta, 2002). The negative effects of abusive
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supervision on employees’ desire to remain with the organization should in turn reduce
their willingness to engage in discretionary acts beneficial to the organization. Indeed,
employees’ limited discretion over task performance relative to contextual performance
suggests the indirect effects of abuse (via affective commitment) should more pronounced
for OCBs and CWBs than for task performance.
H6: Affective Organizational Commitment mediates the relationship
between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO,
(e) CWBI.
Competing Mechanisms
It is not my intention to propose yet another mechanism linking abusive supervision
to job performance, as I believe each of the mechanisms presented above likely explains a
portion of the overall variance in employee job performance. Instead, the primary
contribution of this study is to evaluate the relative importance (i.e., proportion of variance
explained) of these mechanisms in a single sample. That said, I perform a simultaneous
test of the mediators discussed above to investigate how much each contributes to the
relationship between abusive supervision and job performance when they are all
considered. Until now, the abusive supervision literature features few empirical
investigations that include multiple mediators, and fewer still that have used a general
sample of employees. I leverage the wide reach of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to
recruit a large sample of full-time and part-time workers located in the United States.
MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform developed and operated by
Amazon.com, which claims to have over 500,000 registered workers across 190 countries
(Amazon.com, 2016). The term crowdsourcing—a blend of “crowd” and “out-sourcing”—
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refers to the procurement of information and/or services from a collection of individuals
(Lovett, Bajaba, Lovett, & Simmering, 2018). Arguably, much of the popularity of MTurk
lies in the platform’s ability to remove logistical challenges regarding the procurement of
human labor across a geographically dispersed group of individuals. In addition, MTurk
protects user privacy by employing a set of unique—yet anonymous—identifiers which
allow human resources to be managed without the need to reveal the identity of its users.
Due to their temporal immediacy, affective mediators (PA, NA) should have a
stronger indirect effect on the relationship between abusive supervision and the
performance outcomes of interest. Moreover, because abusive supervision involves
interactions with the supervision, supervisor-directed attitudes should have stronger
indirect effects than organization-related attitudes. The following hypotheses formalize
these general expectations.
H7: PA has a stronger indirect effect than AOC in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (c) CWBI.
H8: PA has a stronger indirect effect than POS in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H9: PA has a stronger indirect effect than LMX in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H10: PA has a stronger indirect effect than IJ in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H11: NA has a stronger indirect effect than AOC in the relationship
between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO,
(c) CWBI.
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H12: NA has a stronger indirect effect than POS in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H13: NA has a stronger indirect effect than LMX in the relationship
between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO,
(e) CWBI.
H14: NA has a stronger indirect effect than IJ in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H15: AOC has a stronger indirect effect than LMX in the relationship
between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO,
(c) CWBI.
H16: AOC has a stronger indirect effect than IJ in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
H17: POS has a stronger indirect effect than LMX in the relationship
between AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO,
(e) CWBI.
H18: POS has a stronger indirect effect than IJ in the relationship between
AS and (a) Task Performance, (b) OCBO, (c) OCBI, (d) CWBO, (e) CWBI.
Ethical Organizational Climate
Organizational climate research often rests on the assumption that individuals
develop summary perceptions of the organization based on their observation of the work
environment and organizational practices and procedures (Schneider, 1975). Schneider and
Reichers (1983) identify three sources of organizational climate, which broadly refers to
descriptions of the work environment that are shared among organizational members.
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Specifically, they propose that organizational climates emerge from (1) observations of the
physical environment (structural), (2) organizational processes such as hiring and selection,
and (3) interactions that occur during socialization. That is, organizational members share
similar perceptions of organizational events because (1) they are objective observers and
actually share a similar environment, (2) organizational processes have resulted in an
organization whose members are similar and thus judge the environment in similar ways
(organizational processes; i.e., Attraction-Selection-Attrition framework), and (3) social
interactions during newcomers’ socialization period result in them adopting the views of
the organization held by the existing membership.
Researchers have identified a variety of organizational climates—including
innovation climates (Klein & Sorra, 1996), safety climates (Zohar, 2010), and justice
climates (Liao & Rupp, 2005)—and have shown that these climates are associated with
important organizational outcomes. In addition, meta-analysis of the antecedents of
abusive supervision has shown a positive relationship (mean r = .38, k = 7) between
organizational climates that promote aggressive norms and abusive supervision (Zhang &
Bednall, 2016).
Ethical Climate Theory
ECT (Victor & Cullen, 1987) draws from Kohlberg’s (1984) work on moral
development and Schneider’s (1975) work on organizational work groups—to propose a
two-dimensional model of EOC types (Simha & Cullen, 2012). The first dimension is
ethical philosophy. Kohlberg (1984) argued that as individuals develop, they progress
through distinct stages of moral reasoning. Stages of moral reasoning have been shown in
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prior research to be incompatible with each other, suggesting that true qualitative
differences exist among the various stages (Cullen, Victor, & Bronson, 1993).
Whereas initial stages of moral reasoning are governed by concerns for rewards and
the fear of punishment (egoism), later stages are governed by concern for maximizing joint
rewards (utilitarianism) and by concerns related to one’s moral obligations to society
(deontology). Cullen et al., (1993) argue that, “organizations, like individuals, may be
characterized as instrumental, caring, or principled” (p. 668), which correspond to the
ethical philosophies of egoism, utilitarianism, and deontology, respectively. This argument
is consistent with research showing that individuals ascribe personal qualities to
organizations (Eisenberger et al., 2010).
Drawing upon Schneider’s (1983) work, ECT also proposes that ethical criteria are
considered at three levels—individual, local, and cosmopolitan—corresponding to the
three referent groups used in ethical decision-making, the self, the organization, and
society, respectively (Martin & Cullen, 2006). At the individual level, ethical criteria are
considered in relation to the self- and interpersonal relationships involving the self (i.e.,
friendships). At the local level of analysis, ethical criteria focus on groups within the social
system (team, department, organization). Finally, at the cosmopolitan level of analysis, the
referent group is broad and may include humanity and/or society at large.
ECT crosses three ethical philosophies (egoism, utilitarianism, deontology) with
three loci of analysis to hypothesize nine possible EOC types. When ethical criteria are
characterized by egoism, a focus on the self (i.e., individual locus of analysis) creates an
EOC of self-interest. Organizational members are viewed as making ethical decisions in
ways that maximize their own gains, even at the expense of others (Martin & Cullen, 2006).
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The same ethical philosophy (egoism) yield EOCs based on company profit and efficiency
when analyzed at the local and cosmopolitan levels, respectively.
When ethical criteria are characterized by concern for the well-being of others (i.e.,
benevolence), a focus on the individual locus of analysis creates an EOC of friendship. An
ethical philosophy of utilitarianism yields a climate of team interest when analysis takes
local level and a climate of social responsibility when analysis takes a cosmopolitan level.
Utilitarianism views the maximization of utility (i.e., hypothetical sum of all parties’ wellbeings minus sum of all parties’ suffering) as the primary determinant of whether a given
behavior is ethical. Finally, an ethical philosophy of principle (i.e., deontology) results in
the EOCs of independence, rules, and law-and-code at the individual, local, and
cosmopolitan locus of analysis, respectively.
Deontology emphasizes individual’s sense of duty and obligation. In contrast to
philosophies of egoism and utilitarianism, deontology emphasizes the process over the
outcome (i.e., means justify ends). That is, egoism and utilitarianism are concerned with
whether behaviors result in the maximization of self-interest (egoism) or in the
maximization of the interests of all involved (utilitarianism). Deontology on the other hand,
is concerned with whether the process applied to judge ethical dilemmas adheres to external
codes. Behaviors are ethical when they conform with external codes and unethical when
they do not.
Empirical research has confirmed several predictions from ECT (Simha & Cullen,
2012). In a study of salespersons, Barnet and Vaicy (2000) found that EOC moderated the
relationship between behavioral intentions to engage in unethical behavior (questionable
sales practices) and actual engagement in unethical behavior such that it was weaker for
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employees who reported an EOC of benevolence (and marginally weaker for those who
reported a principle climate). Moreover, an EOC of egoism seems to enhance the
relationship between unethical intentions and unethical behaviors, although the effect was
not significant (Barnet & Vaicy, 2000).
ECT research suggest that in addition to behavioral intentions, EOCs influence
employee reactions to work events. For instance, studies have linked EOCs to employee
attitudes towards their organization, attitudes towards the supervisor, and to in-role and
extra-role performance (Bollman & Krings, 2016; Bulutlar & Oz, 2009; Cullen et al., 2003;
DeConinck, 2011; Hsieh & Wang, 2016; Leung, 2008; Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander,
2006; Schwepker, 2001; Vardi, 2001). In addition, Mayer, Kuenzi, and Greenbaum’s
(2009) review of the EOC literature outlines significant evidence linking EOCs to workrelated attitudes.
Bulutlar and Oz (2009) reported a positive relationship between interpersonal
mistreatment (bullying) and EOCs marked by egoism in a sample of full-time employees.
However, their study did not discern across sources of the bullying, making it impossible
to isolate the relationship between EOC and supervisory mistreatment. Moreover, a study
by Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005) investigated the role of leaders in shaping EOC.
They distinguished between ethical leadership and related leadership concepts (e.g.,
transformational leadership) and noted that abusive supervision “contrast sharply with the
care and concern ethical leaders display” (p. 122). Consistent with this reasoning, they
observed a strong negative correlation (r = -.61) between ethical leadership and abusive
supervision in a sample of working MBA students (Brown et al., 2005; Study 5).
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Despite the strength of this relationship, Brown et al. (2005) concluded that abusive
supervision and ethical leadership were conceptually distinct. Moreover, Detert et al.
(2007) showed that abusive supervision but not ethical leadership predicted unit-level food
theft (i.e., counterproductivity). A recent study by Lin, Ma, and Johnson (2016) further
suggests that the relationship between abusive supervision and ethical leadership depends
on whether a within-subject approach is taken. Lin et al. (2016) assessed leaders four times
over a period of three days and observed that behaving ethically was associated with an
increase in abusive supervision on the following day. Results were consistent across two
samples suggest that the relationship between abusive supervision and ethical leadership is
mediated by supervisor’s cognitive resource depletion and moral licensing (i.e., “moral
credits” accumulated from earlier displays of ethical behavior allow actor to behave
unethically without loss of status). Ironically, a leader’s attempt to behave ethically may
produce —at least in the short-run— higher levels of abusive supervision.
In addition, numerous investigations (e.g., Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith,
2004; Neubert, Carlson, Kacmar, Roberts & Chonko, 2009; Wimbush & Shepard, 1994)
show that supervisors (1) play a unique role in establishing EOCs and (2) are a source of
employees’ EOC perceptions (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Zhang and Bednall’s (2016) metaanalysis yielded a similar conclusion. Specifically, they report a strong negative association
(mean r = -.57; k = 7) between abusive supervision and ethical leadership and a strong
positive association (mean r = .58, k = 10) between abusive supervision and unethical
leadership. Although studies that investigate ethical leadership have yielded interesting
insights, the impact of EOC has yet to be investigated in the context of abusive supervision.
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Employee’s perceived ethical climate (PEC) reflects “holistic impressions of the
organizations’ ethical context” (Hsieh & Wang, 2016, p. 3602). Hsieh and Wang (2016)
measured PEC using a combination of the five empirically derived EOC types
(instrumental, caring, independence, rules, and law-and- code). Instrumental EOC items
were reverse-scored. Fit indices from a confirmatory factor analysis for five first order
factors and one second-order factor were within an acceptable range—which the authors
took as evidence that PEC formed a global construct. Although taking this measurement
approach runs the risk of ignoring important differences across the EOC types predicted
by ECT, it is pragmatic given the present state of the EOC literature and the focus on
employee outcomes. In a recent review of the research related to the effects of EOC on
organizational outcomes, Simha and Cullen (2012) note the following:
The essential theme emerging from this stream of research is that benevolent and principled
climates (i.e., caring, independence, rules, and law and code) are the climates associated
with positive outcomes, and egoistic climates (i.e., instrumental) are associated with a
whole host of negative outcomes (p. 27).

In light of these observations, PEC reflects an adequate means of conceptualizing
the ethical climate perceptions. To my knowledge, no prior study has analyzed the
relationship between abusive supervision and EOC (or PEC). A study that comes close
however, Biron (2010), reports a negative correlation (r = -.25) between perceived
organizational ethical values (ethical orientation of organizational members) and
perceptions of abusive supervision. In addition, many of the hostile behaviors that
characterize abusive supervision are, arguably, more tolerated egoistic EOCs (i.e., low
PEC) than under benevolent or principled EOCs (i.e., high PEC). PEC is therefore expected
to have a negative relationship with abusive supervision.

52

In contrast to the numerous studies linking ethical climate to organizationreferenced attitudes, direct empirical support for the relationship between ethical climate
and the supervisor-referenced attitudes considered in this study (LMX, IJ) is lacking.
Nonetheless, two prior studies (e.g., DeConinck, 2011; Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander,
2006) observe a strong positive correlation between ethical norms and supervisory trust—
a key element of LMX (see Gerstner & Day, 1997). These studies suggest that EOCs that
emphasize concern for others (e.g., Benevolence, Principle) are more likely to promote fair
interpersonal treatment among organizational members than EOCs that emphasize
personal gains. Thus, PEC should have a positive association with LMX and IJ.
Finally, extensive empirical evidence links EOC to work-related attitudes that
reference the organization (for reviews see Arnaud & Schminke, 2012; Martin & Cullen,
2006; Simha & Cullen, 2012). Results from several investigations (e.g., Ambrose et al.,
2008; Cullen et al., 2003; Neubert et al., 2009; Schwepker, 2001) on the effects of EOC on
organizational commitment suggest that EOCs dominated by an egoism philosophy reduce
while benevolent and principled climates promote organizational commitment. Overall, the
results of several studies suggest a positive association between an organization’s ethical
context and work-related attitudes that reference the organization (e.g., AOC; DeConinck,
2011, Hsieh & Wang, 2016; Neubert et al., 2009; Parboteeah et al., 2003), and lead to the
following expectations:
H19: PEC has a negative association with (a) AS and a positive association
with (b) LMX, (c) IJ, (d) AOC, and (e) POS.
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Moderating Role of PEC
Prior research (Eisenberger et al., 1997) indicates that employees view their
organization as having control over their relationship with their supervisor. Indeed, the
duties and functions of the supervisor (e.g., staffing, discipline) lead employees to view
them as organizational agents and to see their actions as representative of the organization
proper (i.e., high SOE; Eisenberger et al., 2010). In addition, Wang and Jiang (2015) report
that abusive supervision has a negative impact on IJ only when organizational attributions
for abusive supervision is low (vs. high; indicating that supervisors received greater
blame).
It is proposed that PEC affects how subordinates assign blame for the abuse. When
PEC is low, subordinates may view their organizations as promoting (or at the very least
failing to sanction) ethical decision making that regards self-interests and personal gain as
the primary criteria. Abusive supervision in this context—so long as it benefits the
supervisor—would not be inconsistent with the values of the organization may allow
supervisors to “save face” at the expense of the organization. Stated differently, employees
are likely to place a greater share of the blame for the abuse on the supervisor at high levels
of PEC (i.e., climates characterized by greater benevolence).
Among employees who have these beliefs regarding the ethical decision making of
their fellow organizational members, abusive supervision may simply reflect “the way
things are done around here.” In contrast, when employees perceive that their firm’s EOC
espouses a concern for the well-being of others and rejects self-interested behaviors (high
PEC), the hostile actions of their supervisors are less likely to be viewed as being aligned
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with the organization’s ethical values and/or as reflecting the organization’s motives and
intentions.
In other words, increasing levels of PEC should correspond with supervisors being
ascribed a greater share of the blame for their hostile actions. In the present study, this shift
in blame and responsibility for the hostility is reflected by pattern of interactions between
abusive supervision and PEC such that the (negative) relationships between abusive
supervision and attitudes that reference the supervisor (LMX, IJ) are stronger when PEC
is high as opposed to low, while the negative relationships between abusive supervision
and attitudes that reference the organization (POS, AOC) are stronger when PEC is low as
opposed to high.
H20: PEC moderates the relationship between abusive supervision and (a)
LMX and (b) IJ, such that each is stronger when PEC is HIGH (vs LOW).
H21: PEC moderates the relationship between abusive supervision and (a)
POS and (b) AOC, such that each is stronger when PEC is LOW (vs HIGH).
Chapter Summary
The research reviewed clearly demonstrates a link between abusive supervision
three aspects of subordinate’s job performance—task performance, OCBs, and CWBs. The
relative contribution of affective (PA, NA) and attitudinal (LMX, IJ, POS, AOC) mediators
of the relationship between abusive supervision and job performance is presently
investigated. Evidence supporting each mechanism, which can be found in prior theoretical
work and in empirical investigations, is reviewed. Finally, the concepts of EOC and PEC—
which reflects employees’ holistic assessment of their organization’s ethical context—are
discussed and prediction are made regarding the association between PEC and the work-
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related attitudes (LMX, IJ, POS, AOC) framed as mediators of abusive supervisionsubordinate job performance relationships. The chapter concludes with a discussion
regarding the moderating role of PEC in the relationship between abusive supervision and
these same work-related attitudes.
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III. METHOD
Recruitment and Eligibility Criteria
The present study was described to prospective participants as a “Survey of
workplace experiences,” and was made visible only to persons residing within in the United
States. The posting also contained privacy disclosures that explicitly guaranteed the
confidentiality of participant data. The length to complete the questionnaires was stated as
20 and 10 minutes for the participant and coworker questionnaires, respectively. These
estimates are based on a reasonable pace of 4 items per minute and total item counts of 86
(participant survey) and 34 (coworker survey). Moreover, the posting stated that
individuals whom are invited to participate must meet the conditions listed. Eligibility
status was determined through responses to the demographic items appearing at the
beginning of the questionnaires.
To be included in the study, focal employees had to meet the following eligibility
criteria (listed conspicuously within the study posting). Specifically, at the time of the
study, he or she must have been (1) gainfully employed (not volunteering or interning), (2)
working 20 or more hours per week (on average), (3) working for the same organization
for at least one year, (4) working under the same (and current) supervisor for at least the
prior six months, and (5) willing to invite one or more eligible coworkers to the study. As
noted in the posting, coworkers are eligible to participate if they (1) work at the same
organization as the focal participant, (2) have contact with the focal participant on a
consistent basis (at least once per week) and are at least moderately familiar with the focal
participant’s formal job duties and obligations. In addition, all study participants had to be
18 years or older.
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In both the focal employee and coworker questionnaires, the demographic items
are presented first in order to determine participant eligibility. In the focal employee
questionnaire, the demographic items are followed by instructions on how to invite one or
more coworkers to the study. Upon meeting eligibility criteria, participants are presented
with the abusive supervision scale, the PEC instrument, and the state affect and attitude
measures. On the coworker’s questionnaire, self-rated abusive supervision and PEC are
presented immediately after the demographic questionnaire, and this is followed by the
task and contextual job performance measures, which are presented in a random order to
reduce concerns of order effects.
Participants and Procedure
Approval for the recruitment and research protocol was obtained from the author’s
university research ethics review board prior to the start of recruitment efforts. Participant
recruitment efforts are conducted on Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and limited to adult
participants whom are US residents. The MTurk platform caters to two types of users—
requesters and workers. The latter group can browse this “labor marketplace” and select
among the posted tasks those they wish to complete—most often remotely—in exchange
for cash payment. Although not designed as a research participant management pool,
researchers can assume the role of “requesters” and post tasks (e.g., questionnaires,
experiments, opinion polls) for “workers” to complete.
Participants were screened out based on their responses to the demographic
questionnaire, questionnaire completion times, and/or their failure to provide the correct
response to the attention check items. Recruitment proceeded until data was collected from
over 250 coworker dyads. Interested participants received a link to the survey landing page
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(hosted on Qualtrics.com), which displayed the adult informed consent form approved by
the university’s research ethics board.
In accordance with the protocol approved by the ethics board, viewing any section
of the questionnaire (including the eligibility section) required each individual (focal
employee, coworker) to provide their informed consent. Focal employees were asked to
invite one or more eligible coworkers by providing them with a Study Link (survey
URL/QR code) and a unique (randomly generated) Invitation Code. The Study Link led
interested coworkers to the informed consent landing page of the coworker questionnaire.
The Invitation Code allowed the focal participant and coworker questionnaires to be
matched.
Measures
Focal Employee Questionnaire
In addition to demographic items, the employee’s questionnaire contains measures
of abusive supervision, perceived ethical climate, positive affective states, negative
affective states, leader-member exchange, interactional justice, perceived organizational
support, and affective organizational commitment. Unless otherwise stated, response
alternatives range from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The focal employee
and coworker questionnaires appear in Appendices A and B, respectively.
Demographic Items. Focal participants are asked to provide their age (in years),
gender, ethnicity, educational achievement (highest degree earned), and location of
employment (State). Another set of items inquire about participant’s employment,
including employment status (part-time, full-time, self-employed, unemployed), whether
the participant reports to someone whom they would consider a boss or supervisor, their
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tenure with current organization, tenure at current position/job classification, and the
number of hours worked per week (on average).
Participants are also asked to self-identify their job industry sector using the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018),
which has three levels comprising ten super-sectors (e.g., Natural Resources and Mining),
twenty sectors (e.g., Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, Mining, Quarrying, Oil
and Gas Extraction) and over 100 sub-sectors (e.g., Crop Production, Animal Production,
Forestry and Logging, Fishing, Hunting and Trapping). Finally, participants were provided
with a list of common job activities sourced from the Occupational Network (O*NET,
2018), and had to check whether each of the 40 generalized work activities listed (e.g.,
Getting Information, Developing Objectives and Strategies, Interacting with Computers,
etc.) applied to them.
Abusive Supervision. Abusive supervision is measured using 15 items from
Tepper’s (2000) scale. Respondents are asked to rate the frequency of abusive supervisory
behaviors in the prior 30 days. Response alternatives range from 0 (Never) to 5 (Very
often). Sample items include “ridicules me”, “invades my privacy,” and “makes negative
comments about me to others.” Higher scores are interpreted as more frequent abuse.
Perceived Ethical Climate. PEC is measured using Hsieh and Wang’s (2016) PEC
instrument, which borrows items from the five ethical climate subscales developed by
Victor and Cullen (1988). Specifically (1) six items are used to measure Instrumental
climate, (2) four items are used to measure Rules climate, (3) four items are used to measure
Law and Code climate, (4) four items are used to measure Caring climate, and (5) four
items are used to measure an Independence climate. Instrumental climate scores are
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reversed and added to the sum of the remaining four subscales to arrive at an overall score
for PEC.
Positive Affective States. PA is measured using 10 items from van Katwyk, Fox,
and Spector’s (1999) job-related affective well-being scale (JAWS). Respondents are
asked to indicate how often any part of their job has made them feel each target emotion
during the prior 30 days. Responses alternatives range from 1 (Never) to 5 (Extremely
often). Sample items include “at ease,” “calm,” and “content.” Higher scores indicate more
frequently experienced PA.
Negative Affective States. NA is measured using 10 items from van Katwyk, et
al.’s (1999) job-related affective well-being scale (JAWS). Respondents are asked to
indicate how often any part of their job has made them feel each target emotion during the
prior 30 days. Responses alternatives range from 1 (Never) to 5 (Extremely often). Sample
items include “angry,” “anxious,” and “discouraged.”

Higher scores indicate more

frequently experienced PA.
Leader-Member Exchange. LMX is measured using seven items from the LMX7 (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Response alternatives vary across items and range from 1 to
5. The word leader in each item is substituted for the word “supervisor” for consistency.
For instance, the item, “How well does your supervisor understand your job problems and
needs?”, has the following response alternatives: (1) Not a bit, (2) A little, (3) A fair
amount, (4) Quite a bit, and (5) A great deal. The very next item, “How well does your
supervisor recognize your potential?”, has the following response alternatives: (1) Not at
all, (2) A little, (3) Moderately, (4) Mostly, (5) Fully. The wording and anchoring of each
item are such that higher ratings are invariably associated with higher LMX.
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Interactional Justice. IJ is measured using Moorman’s (1991) six-item scale.
Sample items include, “Your supervisor considered your viewpoint,” and “Your supervisor
took steps to deal with you in a truthful manner.” Higher scores correspond to higher IJ.
Perceived Organizational Support. POS was assessed using eight items from the
Survey of Perceived Organizational Support (SPOS; Eisenberger, Cummings, Armeli, &
Lynch, 1997). Sample items include, “My organization would forgive an honest mistake
on my part”, and “My organization really cares about my well-being.” Higher scores
indicate greater POS.
Affective Organizational Commitment. AOC is measured with eight items from
the Affective Commitment Scale (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Sample items include, “I enjoy
discussing about my organization with people outside it,” and “This organization has a
great deal of personal meaning for me.” Higher scores on the ACS indicate greater AOC.
Coworker Questionnaire
The coworker’s questionnaire will contain the same demographic items as the
employee survey (see above) with the addition of three items—the first two of which shall
be used to determine coworker eligibility. The first asks the coworker to rate how
frequently they work with the target employee (i.e., share the same shift). Response
alternatives are anchored as follows: (1) less than once per week, (2) once per week, (3)
two or more times per week, and (4) every shift. The second asks coworkers to rate the
extent to which he or she is familiar with the formal duties and responsibilities of the target
participant’s job. Response alternative are: (1) Not at all familiar, (2) Somewhat familiar,
(3) Very familiar, and (4) Extremely familiar. To be eligible, coworkers must respond with
3 or higher to both items.
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Finally, the third additional demographic item asks coworker respondents to rate
how often he or she has had the opportunity to observe the work behaviors of the target
employee during the prior 30 days. Response alternatives are anchored as follows: (1)
Never, (2) Less than once per shift, (3) Once per shift, and (4) Two or more times per shift.
Confidentiality and privacy notices are prominently displayed above the instructions,
which clearly state that participants are to refer to the target employee when responding to
each item. All items are rated on the same frequency scale—which ranges from 1 (Never)
to 5 (Extremely often).
Coworker-rated Abusive Supervision. This instrument was adapted from
Tepper’s (2000) 15-item self-report Abusive Supervision Scale described above. Items
were framed for coworkers. For instance, coworkers were asked how often they have
witnessed the focal employee’s supervisor express each target behavior (e.g., was ridiculed,
invaded their privacy, did not give them credit for jobs requiring a lot of effort, etc.)
towards the focal employee (i.e., the coworker that invited them to participate). The
frequency scale used in the original measure was retained.
Task Performance. Task performance is measured using four items from Williams
and Anderson’s (1991) In-Role Performance Scale. Respondents rate how often their
coworker “Meets formal performance requirements of the job.” Higher scores indicate
more frequent engagement in behaviors associated with high task performance.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors. OCBs are measured using Fox, Spector,
Goh, Bruursema, and Kessler’s (2009) scale, which includes six items that measure OCBI
(e.g., “Helps a less capable co-worker lift a heavy box or other object.”) and six items that
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measure OCBO (e.g., “Volunteers for extra work assignments.”). Higher scores indicate
more frequent OCBs.
Counterproductive Work Behaviors. CWBs are measured using Bennett and
Robinson’s (2000) Workplace Deviance Scale, which includes seven items to measure
CWBI (e.g., “Says something hurtful to someone at work.”) and twelve items to measure
CWBO (e.g., “Puts little effort into his or her work.”). The wording of items was adapted
for coworker report. For instance, “Littered your work environment” was changed to
“Litters your work environment” One item, “Falsified receipts to get reimburse for more
money than you spent on business expenses” was dropped because it is very narrow in
scope (i.e., applicable only to select jobs) and has a very low endorsement rate (Bennet &
Robinson, 2000). Higher scores indicate more frequent CWBs.
Data Integrity Checks
The present protocol (i.e., remote un-proctored administration) poses concerns
regarding data quality. Relative to “standardized” laboratory conditions, the
environment/setting of participants completing a web-based questionnaire that is mobileenabled (i.e., functional on devices with smaller screens) may vary considerably. The
potential for distractions during administration can also be a source of careless responding
and a cause for validity concerns. To detect insufficient effort and careless (i.e., inattentive,
low effort) responding, I measure completion times and include instructed-response
(“attention check”) items scattered throughout the questionnaires. Participants with survey
completion times under 400 seconds (or 240 seconds for coworker questionnaire) are
removed from the dataset.
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Inattentive responders are detected using a set of four (two for the coworker
questionnaire) attention check items, a strategy that has been shown to be effective without
compromising scale validity (Kung, Kwok, & Brown, 2018). In addition, these items have
a relatively straightforward interpretation. Consider the following attention check item,
“Please choose strongly agree.” It is reasonable to assume that responses to this item other
than “strongly agree” is evidence that the participant is responding carelessly and/or
randomly. Data from respondents that fail more than one attention check item (or any
attention check item in coworker questionnaire) is discarded.
The full employee sample (“full dataset”) is contrasted with the usable sample (i.e.,
containing only matched dyads) to assess the extent to which the two groups vary across
key variables (demographic and substantive). According to Cohen’s (1988) classification
of effect sizes for the social sciences, values between .1 and .23 are considered small,
values between .24 and .36 are considered moderate (medium), and values greater than .36
suggest a large effect. Note that values below .1 are considered negligible. Hedge’s g
statistic is used to estimate the effect of matching on each continuous variable. The
computation and interpretation of values for Hedge’s g is performed in much the same way
as for Cohen’s d.
In contrast to Cohen’s d however, the formula for Hedge’s g allows for the pooled
standard deviation (Eq. 1 denominator) to be weighed by sample size. Since the unmatched group is expected to be more than 10 times greater than the matched group, it
seems appropriate to reflect this reality by computing the pooled standard deviation using
sample size weighed SDs. Thus, Hedge’s g is computed shown in Equation 1 below, where
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𝑦

,𝑛

, and 𝑠

refer to the mean, sample size, and standard deviation of

the matched group, respectively.
(Eq. 1)

𝑔=
(
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Analysis of Normality
The characteristics of the distribution of the sample data (e.g., skewness, kurtosis)
affect many types of hypothesis tests, including tests of (difference between) means,
variance, and covariance (Mardia, Kent, Bibby, 1979). Although univariate normality may
be evaluated by visual means (e.g., graph of Quantile-Quantile plots), two distinct, albeit
related numerical indicators—skewness and kurtosis— may be tested statistically (Cain,
Zhan, & Yuan, 2016). Skewness is a measure of the symmetry of the distribution. Kurtosis
roughly measures the “tailedness” (i.e., mass of tails) of the distribution (DeCarlo, 1997).
Normal distributions are symmetrical (skewness = 0) and have a kurtosis of 3
(DeCarlo, 1997). Deviations from normality at the univariate level is indicated by observed
values of skewness (and/or kurtosis) that significantly differ from values that would be
expected if the sample data is MVN. The Shapiro-Wilk test (SW; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965)
is a univariate normality test that detects departures from normality due to skewness and/or
kurtosis. The S-W test has been shown to perform well with simulated data and has higher
power than other “mainstream” univariate normality tests (e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test, Lilliefors Test) for sample sizes under 2000 (Razali & Wah, 2011). S-W tests are
performed on each study variable, including single items and scale means—leading to a
total of 133 tests. As recommended by DeCarlo (1997), a Bonferroni correction
(alpha/number of variables = .05/133) was made to control for Type 1 error.
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Univariate normality is a necessary (but insufficient) condition for demonstrating
MVN. Therefore, two formal tests of MVN are provided by Mardia (1970). Mardia’s
measures contrast the observed skewness (and kurtosis) in a joint distribution comprised
of multiple variables against the values of skewness (and kurtosis) expected if the same
number of variables had a joint distribution that is indeed MVN (Cain et al., 2016).
Mardia’s measures of multivariate skew (b1) and kurtosis (b2) are computed using the
“Mardia” SPSS macro developed by DeCarlo (1997). Values of b1 greater than 0 and/or
values of b2 greater than p(p+2); where p is the number of variables; indicate departure
from MVN. Test statistics (e.g., b1z; b2z) are formed based on their expected distributions
(i.e., chi-square distribution with for b1; normal distribution for b2).
Hypothesis Testing
Mediation Analyses
Covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) is a general framework for
testing causal relationships and allows researchers to distinguish between manifest
(observed) and latent (unobserved) variables. In the analysis of questionnaire/survey data
for instance, constructs of interest (e.g., abusive supervision) can be represented as latent
factors and the survey items associated with these constructs (e.g., abuse 1, abuse 2, abuse
2, etc.) as their indicators. Although SEM is an extension of regression analyses, by
integrating the techniques of confirmatory factor analysis, it has the advantage of allowing
measurement errors to be estimated rather than relying on the assumption that constructs
are measured with perfect reliability (Iacobucci, 2009). Nonetheless, the validity of
inferences made with SEM also depend on numerous assumptions (e.g., no
misspecification, MVN; Kline, 2011).
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Moreover, SEM has sample size requirements that should be considered a priori.
Past research suggests sample size requirements vary as a function of the magnitude of the
effects to be detected, the desired power and level of confidence, the complexity of the
model (number of latent factors, number of indicators, the ratio of factors to indicators),
measurement qualities (factor loadings, scale of measurement), and the distributional
properties of the population and sample data (Westland, 2010; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, &
Miller, 2015). In general, sample size requirements increase as the effects to be detected
become smaller, the structural model(s) to be tested increase in complexity (number of
factors/indicators), and/or the sample data departs from MVN. Finally, the choice of
estimator (e.g., maximum-likelihood, least-squares) and the presence of missing data also
plays a role in determining minimum sample size (Wolf et al., 2015).
Some widely cited suggestions regarding the minimum sample size required for
SEM analyses range from at least 100 (Anderson & Gerbing, 1984) to 200-400 (Jackson,
2001). It is crucial to note that suggestions in the literature are applicable only to relatively
simple models and in situations where the sample data approximates MVN. Indeed, sample
size requirements can be several orders of magnitude larger if departures from MVN occur
and/or the indicators are not on a continuous scale of measurement (Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1996). In the present study, an SEM to test the mediation hypotheses would need to include
13 latent factors and a total of 120 indicators measured on ordinal scales.
Assuming no departures from MVN, achieving power of .80 to detect an effect of
.15 (at the .05 level of significance) in a model of with 13 latent factors and 120 indicators
requires a sample size of at least 850 (Westland, 2010). In contrast, achieving the same
statistical power to detect an effect of equal magnitude (at the .05 level of significance) in
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a multiple regression model with seven predictors (six mediators plus abusive supervision)
requires only 103 cases (Soper, 2019). If the present sample does not meet the requirements
for SEM, hypothesis testing will focus exclusively on manifest variables and proceed using
either a normal-theory (if data is MVN) or a nonparametric approach.
Normal Theory. Classical mediation theory (i.e., “causal steps approach”), as
outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), requires the existence of “an effect to be mediated.”
In other words, the first requirement to test for mediation is the existence of a significant
relationship exists between the independent and dependent variable (Path c’). In situations
where the direct (Path c) and indirect effect(s) (Path a * Path b) are of opposite signs (e.g.,
competitive mediation) however, Path c’ (total effect) approaches zero and becomes
exceedingly difficult to demonstrate—leading some (e.g., Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) to
view this initial requirement to test for mediation as inappropriate. The relationships among
the Paths a, b, c, and c’ are illustrated by the two equations shown below. The total effect
of Predictor X on Outcome Y is the sum of its direct and indirect effects (Eq. 2).
Alternatively, the indirect effect is equal to the difference between the total and direct
effects (Eq. 3; MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995).
Total effect (of X on Y) = path c’ = (path a * path b) + path c

(Eq. 2)

Indirect effect (of X on Y, via M) = path a * path b = path c’ – path c

(Eq. 3)

Accordingly, a variable functions as a mediator when variations in the levels of an
independent variable significantly account for variations in the mediator (Path a is
significant) and variations in the mediator significantly account for variations in the
dependent variable (Path b is significant). Note that an additional requirement to show
mediation described by Baron and Kenny—that the previously significant relationship
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between the independent and dependent variable is no longer significant in when Paths a
and b are controlled for—is obviated when the initial requirement of a significant total
effect is not imposed on the mediation analyses.
If the data is normally distributed (at the univariate and multivariate level), I will
test the indirect effect directly using the “product-of-coefficients approach” to test the
significance of the indirect effect. The product of coefficients approach requires estimating
a set of two regression equations (using ordinary-least-squares; OLS-criterion). In the first
equation, the mediator is regressed on the independent variable. In the second equation, the
dependent variable is simultaneously regressed on both the independent variable and the
mediator. Finally, the indirect effect is tested by estimating the product of the coefficient
associated with the predictor (from the first equation) and the coefficient associated with
the mediator (from second equation) and dividing this quantity by its standard error to
arrive at a critical ratio (Equation 4). It is important to note that this approach assumes the
indirect effect ab follows an MVN distribution—an untenable assumption in some
situations (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes,
2004). That said, an alternative approach is followed if the present data does not meet these
criteria.
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =

=√

∗

(Eq. 4)

MacKinnon et al. (1995) found that the standard error estimate used in Equation 4,
which adds a third term (sa2*sb2) to Sobel’s (1982) standard error estimator, performed
better than standard error estimates that subtracted or omitted the term. In Equation 4, a is
the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with the predictor (in the first
regression equation), b is the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with the
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mediator (in second regression equation), and sa and sb are their standard errors,
respectively. The null hypothesis is rejected if the critical ratio exceeds 1.96 in magnitude
(at .05 level of confidence).
Nonparametric Approach. Although MacKinnon et al. found the standard error
estimates made using Equation 4 as superior to other “normal theory” estimators of the
mediated effect, nonparametric methods are preferred when sample/population
distributions deviate from MVN or are unknown (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Preacher &
Hayes, 2004).
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach to effect size estimation and theory
testing (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) that, rather than relying on assumptions about the shape
of the distribution, requires the analyst to construct an empirical approximation of the
distribution of interest (e.g., indirect effect, pairwise contrast) via resampling from the
initial sample. Assumptions regarding the distributional properties of the indirect effects
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) can be relaxed. Once the bootstrap distribution of the effect is
obtained through resampling, several methods (e.g., percentile, bias-corrected [BC],
accelerated and bias corrected [BCa]) can be used to create bootstrap confidence intervals
(Fritz, Taylor, & MacKinnon, 2012).
In their review of the more widely used methods, Fritz et. al. (2012) concluded that
the percentile method had more accurate Type 1 error rates for sample sizes under 2500
than the bias-corrected and accelerated bias-corrected methods. Moreover, recent
simulation studies suggest that the, albeit less powerful, percentile method is less prone to
elevated Type 1 error rates and therefore the “more widely recommended method for
inference about the indirect effect in mediation analyses” (Hayes, 2017, p. 107).
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In the percentile method, the bootstrap distributions that are generated through
resampling are sorted in ascending order and values corresponding to the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentile are selected to create the 95% bootstrap confidence interval. The null hypothesis
is rejected if the interval excludes zero. For instance, to bootstrap the difference between
two indirect effects using the percentile method with 1000 resamples, values of this
difference are randomly sampled (with replacement) from the current dataset to create one
thousand datasets of equal size (n = 281). An estimate of the mean difference is recorded
for each dataset and these 1000 estimates—collectively referred to as the bootstrap
sampling distribution—are sorted in ascending order. The 25 th and 976th values correspond
to the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval, respectively.
Hypotheses regarding competing mechanisms are supported if the two effects differ
significantly in magnitude. Specifically, multiple mediator analyses are performed using
PROCESS, a free-license computational tool for SPSS developed by Hayes (2012) to
facilitate mediation testing for behavioral researchers. PROCESS provides bootstrap
standard errors (and confidence intervals) for specific indirect effects, which represent the
unique abilities of each mediator to account for the effect of abusive supervision on job
performance, controlling for the other mediators in the model (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
In addition to providing bootstrapped confidence intervals for specific indirect
effects, PROCESS facilitates pairwise contrast between specific indirect effects by
providing bootstrap confidence intervals for the difference (or absolute difference, see
below) between two specific indirect effects. As Hayes (2017) notes regarding tests
involving pairwise contrasts, “a bootstrap confidence interval is derived by estimating the
difference between specific indirect effects over repeated bootstrap sampling and model
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estimation” (p. 165). Significant differences between specific indirect effects allows for
statistical inferences regarding whether one mechanism is stronger (accounts for more of
the effect of X on Y) than another. Five multiple mediator models are estimated,
corresponding to the job performance outcomes of interest (task performance, OCBO,
OCBI, CWBO, CWBI).
Special care must be taken when the specific indirect effects to be contrasted differ
in signs. In these situations, taking the difference between the effects instead of the
difference between their absolute values may lead to the false conclusion that one effect is
stronger than the other. Consider specific indirect effect 1, a1b1 = .10, and specific indirect
effect 2, a2b2 = -.10. Although these values differ by .20, it would be wrong to conclude
that specific indirect effect 1 is stronger than specific indirect effect 2. To avoid these
issues, pairwise contrasts focus on differences between the absolute values of specific
indirect effects.
If the data is normally distributed, hypotheses involving a single mediator (H1a –
H6e) are tested using a critical z-ratio test (i.e., Sobel Test; Eq. 4) and supported if the ratio
exceed +/- 1.96. Alternatively, H1-H6 are evaluated using the bootstrapped confidence
interval about the indirect effect if data is not normally distributed. Further, H7a – H18e
are evaluated using multiple mediator models (with all mediators operating in parallel)
using PROCESS v3.1 (Model 4; Hayes, 2017) and supported if the bootstrapped
confidence interval for the (absolute) difference between the indirect effects excludes zero.
Hypothesis 19 (a-e) is are confirmed if PEC has a significant bivariate correlation with AS
(negative) and target attitude (positive).
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Moderated Multiple Regression
The remaining hypotheses (20a-21b) are tested using moderated multiple
regression (MMR) and significant interactions are probed at values of PEC equal to plus
and minus one standard deviation from the mean, corresponding to high and low values,
respectively. Since the current PEC measure is purported to represents a global construct
that subsumes five ethical climate types (Hsieh & Wang, 2016), a confirmatory factor
analysis is required to evaluate the dimensional structure of the PEC instrument.
Hypotheses 20a-21b are confirmed if (1) interactive effect of abusive supervision and PEC
(AS*PEC) significantly predicts each work-related attitude after controlling for the main
effects of abusive supervision and PEC and (2) the direction of the interaction is consistent
with the stated predictions.
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IV. RESULTS
Data Cleaning Protocol
Data was collected between July and September 2018. As shown on Table 3a, a
total of 8557 persons agreed to participate in the focal employee survey, from which 6905
completed the eligibility section. I removed 1652 participants did not complete eligibility
section and an additional 3613 whom did not meet eligibility criteria. Specifically, one case
was removed for age (under 18), 1660 cases were removed because they completed the
questionnaire in under 400 seconds, 522 cases were removed for employment status (selfemployed, unemployed, temporary employment), 546 cases were removed for working
less than 20 hours per week (on average), 384 were removed because participant indicated
they did not have a “boss” or supervisor, and 493 cases were removed because
organizational tenure was less than 1 year.
A total of 3292 participants met eligibility criteria. Approximately 17% of these
participants did not provide usable questionnaires, including 554 cases that had multiple
sections (i.e., instruments) missing entirely, suggesting the participant quit the
questionnaire (N = 543). Further, an additional eleven participants were removed because
they failed more than one of the four attention check items. The remaining 2738
participants provided usable data.
Data collection began concurrently for focal employees and coworkers. However,
the coworker questionnaire remained active for an additional month after the closing of the
focal employee questionnaire to allow for the focal participants to successfully recruit a
coworker and thereby improve the response rate for matched pairs. As shown on Table 3b,
785 persons agreed to participate in the coworker questionnaire, from which 572 provided
75

a valid invitation code. From these, 511 completed the eligibility section and 300 met
eligibility criteria. Specifically, four cases were removed for employment status, 29 cases
were removed because they completed the questionnaire in under 240 seconds, 10 cases
were removed for working less than 20 hours per week (on average), 20 cases were
removed for having less than 1 year of organizational tenure, 13 cases were removed
because they indicated having contact with the focal participant less than once per week,
24 cases were removed because the participant was less than “Moderately familiar” with
the focal employee’s job, one case was removed because the participant indicated working
outside the US, and 110 cases were removed because coworker indicated their relationship
to focal participant was anything other than peer-to-peer (i.e., at the same organizational
level; e.g., supervisory relationship, subordinate relationship).
Of the three hundred persons initially eligible to participate, 17 failed one or more
of the two attention check items. Although coworker data was collected from 283 focal
participants, this included two participants whom each recruited two coworkers. In each
case, only the data from the first coworker to complete the questionnaire was retained.
Thus, a total of 281 focal participants had a matching coworker whom also provided usable
data.
To reiterate, from the 2738 participants who provided usable data, 281 (10.3%) had
at least one coworker whom also provided usable data. Two datasets were created. The
first is the “full dataset”, which includes both matched and unmatched participants and is
used to test hypotheses H19-H21 regarding the effects of employee-rated PEC). The second
is the “matched-only” dataset, which includes only cases with usable data from both the
focal employee and his or her coworker and is used to test hypotheses regarding the indirect
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effects of self-rated abusive supervision on the (focal) employee’s job performance, as
rated by their peer (H1-H18).
Description of Sample Data
Table 4 shows the distribution of participant demographic characteristics and study
variables across the full and matched-only dataset for variables measured on continuous
scales. Further, Table 5 displays the demographic characteristics across the datasets for
categorical/nominal variables. In addition, Table 5 displays data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS.gov, 2018) showing how these demographic characteristics were
distributed across persons employed in the United States (i.e., US labor force) at the time
of the study (2018).
Matched-only Dataset
Participants in the matched-only dataset reported a median age of 32 (Mean = 34
SD = 9) and 45% identified as male. Most of this group identifies as Caucasian (75%),
although a significant portion identify as Asian (7%), African/Black (9%), and Hispanic
(8%). The mode response for educational achievement was bachelor’s degree (49%).
Moreover, the matched group includes participants from 45 of the 50 US States (90%) and
from all 20 major industrial sectors in the US. Approximately ninety-one percent reported
working “full-time”, and the average number of hours worked per week was 40 (SD = 7).
This group’s average organizational tenure was 6 years (SD = 5).
Full Dataset
Participants included in the full dataset reported a median age of 31 (Mean = 34,
SD = 9) and 52% identified as male. Most of this group identifies as Caucasian (74%),
although a significant portion identify as Asian (8%), African/Black (16%), and Hispanic
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(6%). The mode response for educational attainment was bachelor’s degree (45%). In
addition, participants in the full dataset represent all 50 States and all 20 major industrial
sectors in the US. Ninety percent reported working “full-time”, with an average of 40 hours
per week (SD = 8). The average organizational tenure of the unmatched group was 6 years
(SD = 5).
Although several study variables show significant mean differences across matched
and unmatched groups, the effect size estimates shown in the last column of Table 4 (and
discussed below) dispels concerns that these differences are substantial. Moreover, the
Pearson correlation coefficients for the study variables appear on Table 6a (unmatched
group) and Table 6b (matched group). Considering the outcome of the normality analyses
(see below), it is prudent to use Spearman’s rho correlations as our measure of association.
Spearman’s rho examines rank order, has same range as the Pearson correlation (0, 1), and
indicates the strength of a monotonic—but not necessarily linear—association. Tables 7a
and 7b display Spearman’s rho correlations across study variables for the full and matchedonly datasets, respectively.
Comparison of Matched and Unmatched Samples
The Hedge’s g effect size estimates for the difference in means across unmatched
and matched groups appear in Table 4. The differences are significant (at the .05 level) for
four of the eleven variables. The average effect size across these four variables is .30, which
is considered moderate based on Cohen’s (1988) classification. Overall, participants in the
full dataset tended to report higher levels of PEC, abusive supervision, PA, and NA, as
evidenced by the (positive) sign of the effect size estimates.
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Normality Analyses
The full and matched-only datasets were evaluated for normality at the univariate
and multivariate levels. Results of univariate normality (S-W) tests for the full and
matched-only datasets are shown on Tables 8a and 8b, respectively. The first column and
second columns of Tables 8a and 8b show the name of the variable and the corresponding
S-W test statistic, which has values that ranging between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1
indicating normality (Razali & Wah, 2011). The third and fourth columns correspond to
the degrees of freedom and p-values, respectively, for the S-W statistic. Recall that a
Bonferroni correction, which imposes a “penalty” proportional to the number of individual
tests performed (i.e., 94 in the full dataset; 133 in the matched-only dataset) is made to
control for Type 1 errors.
In the full dataset, the null hypotheses associated with the S-W tests are rejected at
the p< .0005 level (Bonferroni-corrected alpha) in all cases, suggesting none of the
variables in the matched dataset exhibit univariate normality. MVN tests were performed
separately on individual items (86 items) and on scale means (8 factors/scales). When the
individual items are considered, Mardia’s multivariate skew (b1 = 609.51, p < .0001) and
multivariate kurtosis (b2 = 9814.50, p < .0001) lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis
(at .0001 level) that the data is MVN. Mardia’s tests for skew (b1 = 5.59, p < .0001) and
kurtosis (b2 = 59.36, p < .0001) also lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis when the
set of scale means is considered. These results suggest the full dataset severely departs
from MVN.
In the matched-only dataset, the null hypotheses associated with the S-W tests are
rejected at the p < .0004 level (Bonferroni-corrected alpha) in all but one case (mean of PA
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items), suggesting none of the variables in the matched dataset exhibit univariate normality.
MVN tests were performed separately on individual items (120 items) and on scale means
(13 factors/scales). When the individual items are considered, Mardia’s multivariate skew
(b1 = 8297.77, p < .0001) and multivariate kurtosis (b2 = 15867.61, p < .0001) lead to the
rejection of the null hypothesis (at .0001 level) that the data is MVN. Mardia’s tests for
skew (b1 = 1847.31, p < .0001) and kurtosis (b2 = 248.38, p < .0001) also lead to the
rejection of the null hypothesis when the set of scale means is considered. In sum, the data
in the matched-only dataset severely departs from MVN.
Mediation Analyses
The modest sample size (N = 281) and distributional properties of the matched-only
dataset support the decision to proceed with a manifest variable analysis (rather than
covariance-based SEM for hypotheses H1-H18. Overall, it seems unlikely that the present
data will yield stable parameter estimates in a structural model involving 13 latent factors
and 120 indicators. Therefore, mediation hypotheses are tested using bootstrapped
confidence intervals about the indirect effect (H1-H6) and bootstrapped confidence
intervals about the difference between two specific indirect effects (H7-H18). All
hypotheses are tested at the .05 level of confidence and all bootstrap standard errors and
confidence intervals are based on 5000 samples unless otherwise noted. Moreover, all
bootstrap confidence intervals are constructed using the percentile method.
Mediating Effect of Positive Affect
Tables 9a-9e display a summary of the OLS regression models estimated to test
Hypotheses 1a – 1e, respectively. These hypotheses reference the mediating effects of PA
on each of the five job performance outcomes. The first column shows the name of the path
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in reference. The second and third columns show the unstandardized regression
coefficients (B) and their bootstrap standard errors (SE), respectively. The fourth and fifth
columns show the lower and upper limits of the 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the
unstandardized coefficients, respectively.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). As shown on Table 9a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.150) is significant in Model A1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.078. In addition, the coefficient associated with PA (B
= less than .001) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.044.
The product of these coefficients, less than 0.001, reflects a point estimate of the indirect
effect of abusive supervision on task performance via PA and has a bootstrap standard error
of 0.008. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of 0.014 and an upper limit of 0.018, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model A3 is
not significant and thus H1a is not supported.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). As shown on Table 9b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.150) is significant in Model B1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.078. In addition, the coefficient associated with PA (B
= 0.274) is significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.058. The product
of these coefficients, -0.041, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBO via PA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.022. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.090 and an upper limit
of -0.004, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is significant and thus H1b
is supported.

81

Hypothesis 1c (H1c). As shown on Table 9c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.150) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.079. In addition, the coefficient associated with PA (B
= 0.195) is significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.057. The product
of these coefficients, -0.029, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBI via PA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.017. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.068 and an upper limit
of -0.002, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is significant and thus H1c
is supported.
Hypothesis 1d (H1d). As shown on Table 9d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.150) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.077. In addition, the coefficient associated with PA (B
= 0.149) is significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.049. The product
of these coefficients, -0.022, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on CWBO via PA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.014. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.056 and an upper limit
of -0.001, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model D3 is significant and thus H1d
is supported.
Hypothesis 1e (H1e). As shown on Table 9e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.150) is significant in Model E1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.080. In addition, the coefficient associated with PA (B
= 0.157) is significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.043. The product
of these coefficients, -0.024, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
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supervision on CWBI via PA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.015. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.058 and an upper limit
of -0.001, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3 is significant and thus H1e
is supported.
Mediating Effect of Negative Affect
Tables 10a-10e display a summary of the models estimated to test Hypotheses 2a –
2e, respectively. Hypotheses 2a – 2e reference the mediating effects of NA on each of the
five job performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). As shown on Table 10a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = 0.608) is significant in Model A1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.075. In addition, the coefficient associated with NA (B
= 0.026) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.051. The
product of these coefficients, 0.016, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on task performance via NA and has a bootstrap standard error of
0.032. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of 0.041 and an upper limit of 0.085, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model A3 is
not significant and thus H2a is not supported.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). As shown on Table 10b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = 0.608) is significant in Model B1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.074. In addition, the coefficient associated with NA (B
= 0.048) is not significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.067. The
product of these coefficients, 0.029, is point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBO via NA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.042. The bootstrap
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confidence interval about the indirect effect ranges from -0.049 to 0.116, which includes
zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is not significant and thus H2b is not supported.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c). As shown on Table 10c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = 0.608) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.076. In addition, the coefficient associated with NA (B
= 0.060) is not significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.068. The
product of these coefficients, 0.037, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBI via NA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.043. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.045 and an
upper limit of 0.124, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is not significant
and thus H2c is not supported.
Hypothesis 2d (H2d). As shown on Table 10d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = 0.608) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.076. In addition, the coefficient associated with NA (B
= 0.054) is not significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.064. The
product of these coefficients, 0.033, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBO via NA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.038. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.042 and an
upper limit of 0.106, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model D3 is not significant
and thus H2d is not supported.
Hypothesis 2e (H2e). As shown on Table 10e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = 0.608) is significant in Model E1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.075. In addition, the coefficient associated with NA (B
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= 0.059) is not significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.056. The
product of these coefficients, 0.036, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBI via NA and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.033. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.034 and an
upper limit of 0.097, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3 is not significant
and thus H2e is not supported.
Mediating Effect of Leader-Member Exchange
Tables 11a-11e display a summary of the models estimated to test Hypotheses 3a –
3e, respectively. These hypotheses reference the mediating effects of LMX on each of the
five job performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). As shown on Table 11a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.538) is significant in Model A1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.073. In addition, the coefficient associated with LMX
(B = 0.041) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.048. The
product of these coefficients, -0.022, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on task performance via LMX and has a bootstrap standard error of
0.026. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of 0.074 and an upper limit of 0.029, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model A3 is
not significant and thus H3a is not supported.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b). As shown on Table 11b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.538) is significant in Model B1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.070. In addition, the coefficient associated with LMX
(B = 0.305) is significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.065. The
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product of these coefficients, -0.164, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBO via LMX and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.041. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.252 and an
upper limit of -0.089, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is significant
and thus H3b is supported.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c). As shown on Table 11c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.538) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.072. In addition, the coefficient associated with LMX
(B = 0.254) is significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.066. The
product of these coefficients, -0.137, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBI via LMX and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.041. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.224 and an
upper limit of -0.065, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is significant
and thus H3c is supported.
Hypothesis 3d (H3d). As shown on Table 11d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.538) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.070. In addition, the coefficient associated with LMX
(B = 0.199) is significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.052. The
product of these coefficients, -0.107, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBO via LMX and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.030. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.170 and an
upper limit of -0.050, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model D3 is significant
and thus H3d is supported.
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Hypothesis 3e (H3e). As shown on Table 11e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.538) is significant in Model E1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.072. In addition, the coefficient associated with LMX
(B = 0.185) is significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.056. The
product of these coefficients, -0.100, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBI via LMX and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.032. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.166 and an
upper limit of -0.039, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3 is significant
and thus H3e is supported.
Mediating Effect of Interactional Justice
Tables 12a-12e display a summary of the models estimated to test Hypotheses 4a
– 4e, respectively. These hypotheses reference the mediating effects of IJ on each of the
five job performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). As shown on Table 12a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.582) is significant in Model A1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.083. In addition, the coefficient associated with IJ (B =
0.037) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.059. The
product of these coefficients, -0.022, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on task performance via IJ and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.034.
The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.090 and
an upper limit of 0.045, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model A3 is not
significant and thus H4a is not supported.
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Hypothesis 4b (H4b). As shown on Table 12b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.582) is significant in Model B1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.083. In addition, the coefficient associated with IJ (B =
0.314) is significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.077. The product
of these coefficients, -0.183, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBO via IJ and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.050. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.288 and an upper limit
of -0.092, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is significant and thus H4b
is supported.
Hypothesis 4c (H4c). As shown on Table 12c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.582) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.084. In addition, the coefficient associated with IJ (B =
0.195) is significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.076. The product
of these coefficients, -0.113, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBI via IJ and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.046. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.206 and an upper limit
of -0.030, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is significant and thus H4c
is supported.
Hypothesis 4d (H4d). As shown on Table 12d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.582) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.081. In addition, the coefficient associated with IJ (B =
0.242) is significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.046. The product
of these coefficients, -0.141, is an estimate of the indirect effect of abusive supervision on
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CWBO via IJ and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.032. The bootstrap confidence interval
about the indirect effect ranges from-0.205 to -0.080, which excludes zero. The indirect
effect in Model D3 is significant and thus H4d is supported.
Hypothesis 4e (H4e). As shown on Table 12e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.582) is significant in Model E1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.083. In addition, the coefficient associated with IJ (B =
0.201) is significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.051. The product
of these coefficients, -0.117, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on CWBI via IJ and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.034. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.188 and an upper limit
of -0.054, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3 is significant and thus H4e
is supported.
Mediating Effect of Perceived Organizational Support
Tables 13a-13e display a summary of the models estimated to test Hypotheses 5a
– 5e, respectively. These hypotheses reference the mediating effects of POS on each of
the five job performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a). As shown on Table 13a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.404) is significant in Model A1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.068. In addition, the coefficient associated with POS (B
= -0.020) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.043. The
product of these coefficients, 0.008, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on task performance via POS and has a bootstrap standard error of
0.018. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -
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0.026 and an upper limit of 0.047, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model A3 is
not significant and thus H5a is not supported.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b). As shown on Table 13b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.404) is significant in Model B1
and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.068. In addition, the coefficient associated with
POS (B = 0.191) is significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.070.
The product of these coefficients, -0.077, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBO via POS and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.030. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.140 and an
upper limit of -0.023, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is significant
and thus H5b is supported.
Hypothesis 5c (H5c). As shown on Table 13c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.404) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.069. In addition, the coefficient associated with POS (B
= 0.176) is significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.070. The product
of these coefficients, -0.071, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of abusive
supervision on OCBI via POS and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.030. The bootstrap
confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.135 and an upper limit
of -0.017, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is significant and thus H5c
is supported.
Hypothesis 5d (H5d). As shown on Table 13d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.404) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.068. In addition, the coefficient associated with POS (B
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= 0.076) is not significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.069. The
product of these coefficients, -0.031, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBO via POS and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.030. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.090 and an
upper limit of 0.028, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model D3 is not significant
and thus H5d is not supported.
Hypothesis 5e (H5e). As shown on Table 13e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.404) is significant in Model E1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.068. In addition, the coefficient associated with POS (B
= 0.048) is not significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.069. The
product of these coefficients, -0.019, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBI via POS and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.029. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.074 and an
upper limit of 0.038, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3 is not significant
and thus H5e is not supported.
Mediating Effect of Affective Organizational Commitment
Tables 14a-14e display a summary of the models estimated to test Hypotheses 6a
– 6e, respectively. These hypotheses reference the mediating effects of AOC on each of
the five job performance outcomes.
Hypothesis 6a (H6a). As shown on Table 14a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.274) is significant in Model A1
and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.059. In addition, the coefficient associated with
AOC (B = -0.069) is not significant in Model A2 and has a bootstrap standard error of
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0.037. The product of these coefficients, 0.019, reflects a point estimate of the indirect
effect of abusive supervision on task performance via AOC and has a bootstrap standard
error of 0.012. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit
of -0.002 and an upper limit of 0.045, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model
A3 is not significant and thus H6a is not supported.
Hypothesis 6b (H6b). As shown on Table 14b, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.274) is significant in Model B1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.058. In addition, the coefficient associated with AOC
(B = 0.186) is significant in Model B2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.061. The
product of these coefficients, -0.051, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBO via AOC and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.021. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.099 and an
upper limit of -0.016, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model B3 is significant
and thus H6b is supported.
Hypothesis 6c (H6c). As shown on Table 14c, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.274) is significant in Model C1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.059. In addition, the coefficient associated with AOC
(B = 0.148) is significant in Model C2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.061. The
product of these coefficients, -0.040, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on OCBI via AOC and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.020. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.085 and an
upper limit of -0.008, which excludes zero. The indirect effect in Model C3 is significant
and thus H6c is supported.
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Hypothesis 6d (H6d). As shown on Table 14d, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.274) is significant in Model D1 and
has a bootstrap standard error of 0.058. In addition, the coefficient associated with AOC
(B = 0.072) is not significant in Model D2 and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.049. The
product of these coefficients, -0.020, reflects a point estimate of the indirect effect of
abusive supervision on CWBO via AOC and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.015. The
bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of -0.052 and an
upper limit of 0.009, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model D3 is not significant
and thus H6d is not supported.
Hypothesis 6e (H6e). As shown on Table 14e, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with abusive supervision (B = -0.274) is significant in Model E1
and has a bootstrap standard error of 0.059. In addition, the coefficient associated with
AOC (B = 0.075) is not significant in Model E2 and has a bootstrap standard error of
0.048. The product of these coefficients, -0.021, reflects a point estimate of the indirect
effect of abusive supervision on CWBI via AOC and has a bootstrap standard error of
0.015. The bootstrap confidence interval about the indirect effect has a lower limit of 0.052 and an upper limit of 0.007, which includes zero. The indirect effect in Model E3
is not significant and thus H6e is not supported.
Pairwise Contrasts Between Specific Indirect Effects
Testing H7a – H18e requires estimating five multiple mediator models—one for
each job performance outcome of interest—whereby the six mediators operate in “parallel”
and the significance of the difference between two specific indirect effects can be formally
tested (Hayes, 2017). The specific indirect effects, bootstrap standard errors, and
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confidence intervals about each specific indirect effect, are estimated for each job
performance outcome and appear on Tables 15a – 15e. Recall that in multiple mediator
models, the specific indirect effect is interpreted as that mediator’s unique ability to
account for the effects of abusive supervision on job performance, controlling for the other
mediators in the model.
Hypotheses 7a – 18e however, reference pairwise contrast across mechanisms
postulated in the study. In other words, the difference between two specific indirect effects
is estimated and a confidence interval is constructed about the difference. Contrasts with
confidence intervals that exclude zero provide evidence that the mechanisms being
contrasted differ significantly in strength (i.e., a1b2 – a2b2 ≠ 0). Therefore, Hypotheses 8a
to 17e are confirmed if the bootstrap confidence interval (95%) excludes zero. As noted
previously, it is necessary to use the absolute values of the indirect effects (i.e., |a 1b2| –
|a2b2|) when the contrast involves specific indirect effects that differ in sign. Otherwise, one
may erroneously conclude that two effects of similar magnitude but of different signs (e.g.,
-.10 vs .10) differ from each other in strength when they do not.
Hypotheses Contrasting the Mediating Effects of PA and Attitudinal
Mediators. Table 16 displays the contrasts between specific indirect effects associated
with PA and AOC. Each row represents the job performance outcome listed in the first
column. The point differences between the absolute value of the specific indirect effects
associated with PA and the absolute value of the specific indirect effects associated with
AOC (i.e.,│aPAbPA │— │aAOCbAOC│) appear on the second column. The third column
displays the bootstrap (5000 samples) standard error associated with the point estimate of
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the difference. The fourth and fifth columns indicate the lower and upper limits of the
bootstrap confidence interval for the difference, respectively.
The first row of Table 16 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.02). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.07 and
an upper limit of 0.01—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
associated with PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated
with AOC. Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H7a.
The second row of Table 16 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.04 (Boot SE = 0.03). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper
limit of 0.08—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H7b.
The third row of Table 16 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.02 (Boot SE = 0.02). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.03 and an upper
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limit of 0.06—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H7c.
The fourth row of Table 16 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.02). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper
limit of 0.04—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H7d.
The fifth row of Table 16 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.03 (Boot SE = 0.02). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper
limit of 0.07—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H7e.
The first row of Table 17 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is less than 0.01 (Boot SE =
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0.02). The bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of
-0.05 and an upper limit of 0.02—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect
effect associated with PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect
associated with POS. Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H8a.
The second row of Table 17 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.03). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.07 and an upper
limit of 0.07—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS.
Results from this pairwise contrast fail to support H8b.
The third row of Table 17 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.03). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.08 and an upper limit of 0.06—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with PA is not
significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS. Results from
this pairwise contrast fail to support H8c.
The fourth row of Table 17 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
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shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper
limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with POS. Results
from this pairwise contrast fail to support H8d.
The fifth row of Table 17 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.05 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper
limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with POS. Results
from this pairwise contrast fail to support H8e.
The first row of Table 18 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.04). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and
an upper limit of 0.01—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
associated with PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated
with LMX. Results fail to support H9a.
The second row of Table 18 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
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associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper
limit of 0.07—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H9b.
The third row of Table 18 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.07 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.19 and an upper
limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H9c.
The fourth row of Table 18 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper
limit of 0.04—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H9d.
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The fifth row of Table 18 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper
limit of 0.05—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H9e.
The first row of Table 19 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task performance.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.02 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.13 and an upper
limit of 0.01—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
PA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H10a.
The second row of Table 19 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.18 and an upper limit of 0.06—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with PA is not
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significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H10b.
The third row of Table 19 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper limit of 0.04—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with PA is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H10c.
The fourth row of Table 19 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.12 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.22 and an upper limit of 0.01—excludes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with PA is
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H10d.
The fifth row of Table 19 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with PA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.06 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.16 and an upper limit of 0.03—
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includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with PA is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H10e.
Hypotheses Contrasting the Mediating Effect of NA to Attitudinal Mediators.
The first row of Table 20 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.03 (Boot SE = 0.03). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.06 and
an upper limit of 0.06—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
associated with NA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated
with AOC. Results fail to support H11a.
The second row of Table 20 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.13 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of 0.01 and an upper
limit of 0.22—excludes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC. Results
support H11b.
The third row of Table 20 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As

102

shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.12 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of 0.00 and an upper
limit of 0.21—excludes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC. Results
support H11c.
The fourth row of Table 20 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.06 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper
limit of 0.13—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results support H11d.
The fifth row of Table 20 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.08 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.01 and an upper
limit of 0.14—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with AOC.
Results fail to support H11e.
The first row of Table 21 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
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associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is less than 0.01 (Boot SE =
0.03). The bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of
-0.04 and an upper limit of 0.08—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect
effect associated with NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect
associated with POS. Results fail to support H12a.
The second row of Table 21 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.09 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper
limit of 0.21—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS.
Results fail to support H12b.
The third row of Table 21 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is 0.10 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.02 and an upper limit of 0.20—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with NA is not
significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS. Results fail to
support H12c.
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The fourth row of Table 21 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper
limit of 0.12—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS.
Results fail to support H12d.
The fifth row of Table 21 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with POS, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is less than 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.07). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper
limit of 0.12—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with POS.
Results fail to support H12e.
The first row of Table 22 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.05). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and
an upper limit of 0.06—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
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associated with NA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated
with LMX. Results fail to support H13a.
The second row of Table 22 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.08 (Boot SE = 0.07). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.07 and an upper
limit of 0.21—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H13b.
The third row of Table 22 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.02 (Boot SE = 0.08). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper
limit of 0.17—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H13c.
The fourth row of Table 22 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.04 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.09 and an upper
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limit of 0.12—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H13d.
The fifth row of Table 22 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.04 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.10 and an upper
limit of 0.13—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H13e.
The first row of Table 23 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task performance.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.02 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper
limit of 0.06—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
NA is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H14a.
The second row of Table 23 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is 0.05 (Boot SE = 0.08). The bootstrap confidence
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interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper limit of 0.19—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with NA is not
significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H14b.
The third row of Table 23 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is 0.08 (Boot SE = 0.07). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.09 and an upper limit of 0.19—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with NA is not
significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H14c.
The fourth row of Table 23 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.07 (Boot SE = 0.07). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.20 and an upper limit of 0.07—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with NA is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H14d.
The fifth row of Table 23 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with NA and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As shown,
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the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper limit of 0.11—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with NA is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H14e.
Hypotheses contrasting the mediating effect of AOC to supervisor-referenced
mediators. The first row of Table 24 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.04). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and
an upper limit of 0.05—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated
with LMX. Results fail to support H15a.
The second row of Table 24 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.05 (Boot SE = 0.08). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper
limit of 0.19—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H15b.
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The third row of Table 24 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.09 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.20 and an upper
limit of 0.01—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H15c.
The fourth row of Table 24 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.02 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.11 and an upper
limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H15d.
The fifth row of Table 24 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper
limit of 0.02—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
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AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H15e.
The first row of Table 25 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task
performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.01 (Boot SE = 0.04). The
bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.10 and
an upper limit of 0.05—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect
associated with AOC is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated
with IJ. Results fail to support H16a.
The second row of Table 25 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.08 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.20 and an upper
limit of 0.02—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H16b.
The third row of Table 25 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.16 and an upper
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limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H16c.
The fourth row of Table 25 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.13 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.23 and an upper
limit of -0.02—excludes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail
to support H16d.
The fifth row of Table 25 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with AOC and the magnitude of the specific indirect
effect associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.09 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.18 and an upper
limit of 0.00—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
AOC is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H16e.
Hypotheses Contrasting the Mediating Effect of POS to SupervisorReferenced Mediators. The first row of Table 26 shows the difference between the
magnitude of the specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive
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supervision and task performance. As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.04
(Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap confidence interval about the difference—which has a
lower limit of -0.13 and an upper limit of 0.03—includes zero and indicates that the specific
indirect effect associated with POS is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect
effect associated with LMX. Results fail to support H17a.
The second row of Table 26 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper
limit of 0.08—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
POS is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H17b.
The third row of Table 26 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.08 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.19 and an upper
limit of 0.05—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
POS is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H17c.
The fourth row of Table 26 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
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associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.03 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.07 and an upper
limit of 0.10—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
POS is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H17d.
The fifth row of Table 26 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with LMX, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As
shown, the point estimate of the difference is 0.04 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.06 and an upper
limit of 0.12—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
POS is not significantly stronger than the specific indirect effect associated with LMX.
Results fail to support H17e.
The first row of Table 27 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and task performance.
As shown, the point estimate of the difference is -0.02 (Boot SE = 0.04). The bootstrap
confidence interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper
limit of 0.04—includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with
POS is not significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results
fail to support H18a.
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The second row of Table 27 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.04 (Boot SE = 0.06). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.17 and an upper limit of 0.05—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with POS is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H18b.
The third row of Table 27 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and OCBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.02 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.14 and an upper limit of 0.06—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with POS is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H18c.
The fourth row of Table 27 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBO. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.08 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.19 and an upper limit of 0.02—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with POS is not
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significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H18d.
The fifth row of Table 27 shows the difference between the magnitude of the
specific indirect effect associated with POS and the magnitude of the specific indirect effect
associated with IJ, in the relationship between abusive supervision and CWBI. As shown,
the point estimate of the difference is -0.01 (Boot SE = 0.05). The bootstrap confidence
interval about the difference—which has a lower limit of -0.12 and an upper limit of 0.09—
includes zero and indicates that the specific indirect effect associated with POS is not
significantly weaker than the specific indirect effect associated with IJ. Results fail to
support H18e.
Role of PEC
The remaining hypotheses reference the role of PEC and are tested using the
unmatched sample (N = 2738). As noted above, the sample data distribution exhibits strong
departures from normality at the univariate and multivariate levels. Therefore,
nonparametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) are used to test hypothesis 19 and the
PROCESS (Hayes, 2018) application is used to bootstrap the standard errors and construct
bootstrap confidence intervals for the coefficients in the OLS moderated multiple
regression models used to test hypotheses 20 and 21.
Correlational Analyses
Hypotheses 19a – 19e are tested via bivariate (zero-order) correlations and
confirmed if the correlation is significantly different from zero in the expected direction.
As shown on Table 7a, the (Spearman’s ρ) correlation coefficient associated with the
relationship between PEC and AS (ρ = -.35, p < .05) is negative and statistically significant.
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Similarly, the correlation coefficients associated with the relationship between employeerated PEC and (1) AOC (ρ = .55), (2) POS (ρ = .68), (3) LMX (ρ = .52), and (4) IJ (ρ =
.62), are positive and significantly greater than zero (i.e., p < .05). Results from the
nonparametric correlational analyses support hypothesis 19 (a-e).
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Hypotheses 20a - 21b refer to the moderating effects of employee’s perceived
ethical climate (PEC). The 22-item PEC instrument used in the present study was
developed by Hsieh and Wang (2016) based on items written by Victor and Cullen (1988).
The instrument purports to measure PEC as a “global construct [second-order]” composed
of five first order factors—caring, law and code, rules, independence, and instrumental—
that represent the distinct EOCs articulated by ECT. It is necessary to evaluate the extent
to which this instrument conforms with the expected higher order structure. Higher-order
CFAs were conducted in LISREL (v.10; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2018) with the maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator. Although items are measured on ordinal scales, they are treated
as continuous indicator in the present analyses. As noted by Iaccobucci (2007), this is
common practice in management research when items have 5 or more response categories.
An initial second-order CFA (five first-order factors plus one second order factor),
which included the full set of items, yields a poor fit (χ2 [df = 204] = 4251.31, RMSEA =
.09, CFI = .85, SRMR = .12). Two modifications are made to bring the select fit indices
within an acceptable range. First, items 19 and 21 are dropped from the Instrumental
subscale. Second, the residuals of (1) Independence and Caring and (2) Independence and
Instrumental, are allowed to correlate (rather than specified as zero). These two
modifications yielded a model with an acceptable fit ( χ2 [df = 163] = 2272.56, RMSEA =
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.07, CFI = .92, SRMR = .06). Moreover, the average variance extracted (AVE) exceeds
Fornell and Larcker’s (1984) conservative .50 threshold for all but one first-order factor
and the mean AVE across the first-order factors is .53.
Figures 2 and 3 display the standardized solutions for the initial and final secondorder CFAs, respectively. The results confirm expectations regarding the hierarchical
structure of PEC. The Cronbach’s alpha are .80, .83, .84, .77, and .82, for the (non)
instrumental, caring, independence, rules, and law and code climates, respectively. The
Cronbach’s alpha for the overall (modified) scale is .82. Further, the original and modified
PEC scales have a positive zero-order correlation that approaches unity (Pearson r = .98,
Spearman ρ = .98).
Moderated Multiple Regression
Moderated multiple regression (MMR) analyses were conducted to evaluate
Hypotheses 20 (a-b) and 21 (a-b), which stipulate the moderating effect of PEC in the
relationship between abusive supervision and each employee attitude of interest (e.g.,
organization-related, supervisor-related). Across MMR models, the attitude of interest is
treated as the outcome variable. The models specified to test H20a – H21b are summarized
below and the results are displayed on Tables 28a - 29b, respectively.
Two OLS regression models are estimated to test each hypothesis. In the first model
(Model 1), the variables corresponding to abusive supervision and PEC variables are
entered and a multiple R2 is calculated. The second model (Model 2) includes the same
variables as the first model, with the addition of the variable representing the product of
abusive supervision and PEC. The significance of the difference between the multiple R 2
of the second model and the multiple R2 of the first model (i.e., increase in multiple R2) is
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tested using an F-ratio test. A significant F-test suggests the second model explains a
significantly greater amount of variance in the dependent variable than the first model.
Since the only difference between the models is the addition of the interaction term, a
significant test provides evidence that a nontrivial portion of the variance in the dependent
variable is explained by the interaction of abusive supervision and PEC.
Hypotheses Related to the Moderating Effects of PEC on Supervisor-related
Attitudes. As shown under Model 1 on Table 28a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with AS (B = -0.20, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [-0.22, -0.17]) is
significant, as is the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with PEC (B = 0.79,
p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [0.73, 0.86]). When the interaction term is added the model (Model
2), the coefficient associated with this term is significant (B = 0.16, p < .05; 95% Boot CI
= [0.10, 0.13]). Moreover, the addition of the interaction term produces a significant
increase in the variance explained by the model (increase in Multiple R 2 = .01, p < .05). To
probe the interaction, simple slopes of the relationship between abusive supervision and
LMX were plotted at values of PEC one standard deviation above and one standard
deviation below the mean of PEC, which corresponds to high and low values, respectively
(see Figure 4). Despite evidence supporting the moderating role of PEC, the pattern of
simple effects is contrary to predictions and fails to support H20a.
As shown under Model 1 on Table 28b, the unstandardized regression coefficient
associated with AS (B = -0.11, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [-0.14, -0.09]) is significant, as is
the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with PEC (B = 1.01, p < .05; 95% Boot
CI = [0.95, 1.08]). When the interaction term is added the model (Model 2), the coefficient
associated with this term is significant (B = 0.34, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [0.29, 0.39]).
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Moreover, the addition of the interaction term produces a significant increase in the
variance explained by the model (increase in Multiple R2 = .05, p < .05). To probe the
interaction, simple slopes of the relationship between abusive supervision and IJ were
plotted at high and low values of PEC (see Figure 5). Despite evidence to support the
moderating role of PEC, the pattern of simple effects is contrary to predictions and fails to
support H20b.
Hypotheses Related to the Moderating Effects of PEC on Organization-related
Attitudes. As shown under Model 1 on Table 29a, the unstandardized regression
coefficient associated with AS (B = -0.10, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [-0.11, -0.08]) is
significant, as is the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with PEC (B = 1.06,
p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [1.02, 1.11]). When the interaction term is added the model (Model
2), the coefficient associated with this term is not significant (B = -.00, p > .05; 95% Boot
CI = [-0.04, 0.04]). Moreover, the addition of the interaction term does not produce a
significant increase in the variance explained by the model (increase in Multiple R 2 = .00,
p > .05). Results fail to support H21a.
As shown under Model 1 on Table 29b, the unstandardized regression coefficient
associated with AS (B = -0.13, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [-0.15, -0.11]) is significant, as is
the unstandardized regression coefficient associated with PEC (B = 0.85, p < .05; 95% Boot
CI = [0.80, 0.90]). When the interaction term is added the model (Model 2), the coefficient
associated with this term is significant (B = -0.16, p < .05; 95% Boot CI = [-0.20, -0.11]).
Moreover, the addition of the interaction term produces a significant increase in the
variance explained by the model (increase in Multiple R2 = .01, p < .05). To probe the
interaction, simple slopes of the relationship between abusive supervision and AOC were
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plotted at high and low values of PEC (see Figure 6). Despite evidence to support the
moderating role of PEC, the pattern of simple effects is contrary to predictions and fails to
support H21b.
Structural Equation Modeling
The larger sample size of the unmatched dataset (N = 2738) makes a latent variable
approach feasible for hypotheses 20 and 21. Eight-factor measurement models (i.e., CFAs)
are estimated using ML The latent factors in each measurement model include (1) the
modified PEC measure and its five first order factors, (2) AS, and (3) the outcome of
interest (e.g., LMX, IJ, AOC, POS). As shown on Table 30a, Models 1 and 2,
corresponding to LMX and IJ, respectively, showed acceptable fit statistics (given the
characteristics of this sample).
Models 3 and 4 however, were initially a poor fit to the data and thus required
modifications. Model 3 was modified by reducing the number of manifest indicators of
POS from eight to six (removed items #6 and #7; see Appendix). Similarly, Model 4
showed an acceptable fit once four of the eight indicators of AOC (items #1 - #4) were
removed. Invariably, the items removed from each factor were those with the lowest
loadings. No other modifications were made.
Latent variable scores were then estimated and used to construct the interaction
term (Joreskog, Sorbom, & Wallentin, 2006). Finally, the attitude of interest (outcome
variable) is regressed on the latent variable scores of (1) AS, (2) PEC, and (3) the product
of AS and PEC. The estimated regression equations are presented in Table 30b. Results of
the latent variable analyses yield identical conclusions to the manifest variable analyses
reported above.
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Chapter Summary
The data cleaning protocol and characteristics of the final datasets are described.
Usable data was obtained for 2738 individuals, from which 281 had a matching coworker
who also provided usable data. Severe departures from normality, as well as the modest
size of the matched sample, provided the impetus for taking a nonparametric (bootstrap)
approach.
Results show that task performance is not indirectly related to abusive supervision
through any of the proposed mediators. On the other hand, the indirect effects of abusive
supervision on OCBOs/OCBIs are significant for all but one mediator (NA). The
hypotheses related to CWBOs/CWBIs fared less favorably, such that a significant indirect
effect was observed for three of the six mediators (PA, LMX, IJ). When all mediators are
included in the same analysis, NA has a significantly stronger indirect effect than AOC.
No other significant differences between specific indirect effects are observed.
As expected, PEC showed a negative association with AS and a positive association
with the work-related attitudes (LMX, IJ, POS, AOC) proposed to mediate the effects of
AS on employee performance. Although PEC moderates the relationship between AS and
three of the four work-related attitudes investigated (LMX, IJ, AOC) the direction of these
effects is contrary to predictions. An analysis of the nonlinear effects of PEC using a latent
variable approach (covariance-based SEM) yields identical findings. Thus, hypotheses
regarding the moderating role of PEC are not supported. The status of study hypotheses
are listed on Table 31.
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V. DISCUSSION
Background and Purpose
The study of organizational/workplace aggression has evolved considerably over
the last few decades and has shed light the relative prevalence and nature of these
behaviors. An important theme emerging from this field is that while acts of physical
violence (e.g., homicides, battery) represent rare occurrences, subtle forms of aggression
(e.g., social undermining, incivility, rudeness) are relatively common in American
workplaces (Cortina et al., 2001; Porath & Pearson, 2013; Schat et al., 2006; SHRM, 2012).
Of interest in the present study is the concept of abusive supervision (AS; Tepper, 2000),
which broadly refers to sustained nonphysical (e.g., verbal) aggression from one’s
immediate supervisor. AS is distinct from similar forms of nonphysical workplace
aggression in that it specifies the formal relationship between the perpetrator and target.
The present study advances the AS literature in two ways. First, by integrating
across similar mechanisms linking AS (indirectly) to five dimensions of job performance—
task performance, citizenship behaviors (OCBO/OCBI), and counterproductive behaviors
(CWBO/CWBI)—the present study is able to shed light on the relative impact of these
related processes. In so doing, it directly answers Tepper et al.’s (2017) call for AS research
to incorporate multiple mechanisms under a single mediational framework and evaluate
their relative contribution in the same sample. Specifically, the study aims to investigate
these various mechanisms using a general sample of US employees. Second, by
investigating employee perceptions regarding their firm’s EOC as a potential boundary
condition vis-à-vis the relationship between AS and work-related attitudes, the present
study not only advances the AS literature, but also extends ethical organizational climate
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theory (Victor & Cullen, 1988). The remaining sections discuss the findings of this
investigation, highlight important limitations arising from aspects of the design and data
collection protocol, and offer theoretical and practical implications.
Study Findings
Primary Findings
Three sets of hypotheses were formulated with regards to: (1) the indirect effects
of AS on subordinate’s job performance, (2) the relative contribution (i.e.,
strength/magnitude) of each specific indirect effect, and (3) the relationships among EOC
and AS and the work-related attitudes framed as mediators of the AS-job performance
relationship. Employees provided ratings of their work-related attitudes and rated how
frequently they experienced AS and affective states during the prior month. Job
performance ratings were provided by a coworker whom, in all cases, reported being
familiar with the duties and formal responsibilities of the focal respondent’s job and
working with the focal respondent on at least a weekly basis. Coworkers that have
knowledge of the respondent’s formal work role and have regular contact with the
respondent are, presumably, more likely to provide valid ratings of the respondent’s onthe-job behaviors. That said, the first two sets of hypotheses were tested using the subset
of respondents for whom coworker data was available.
AS and Employee Job Performance. The estimated zero-order correlations show
significant associations between AS and each employee performance dimension (see Table
7b). AS has a negative association with task performance and citizenship behavior (i.e.,
OCBO/OCBI) and a positive association with counterproductive behavior (i.e.,
CWBO/CWBI). AS is also significantly associated with the affective states and work-
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related attitudes proposed to mediate its effects on performance. Overall, the pattern of
correlations among affective states, work-related attitudes, and job performance is
consistent with published meta-analytic estimates (see Tables 1 and 2). In line with these
estimates, AS shows a stronger association with CWB than with either task performance
or OCB.
As noted above, the first set of hypotheses focused on the indirect effects of AS on
job performance. Specifically, AS was expected to affect subordinate’s job performance
indirectly through (1) an decrease in the frequency of positive affective states (PA), (2) an
increase in the frequency of negative affective states (PA, NA), (2) its negative effects on
leader member exchange (LMX), (3) its negative effects on interactional justice (IJ), (5) its
negative effects on affective organizational commitment (AOC), and (6) its negative
effects on perceived organizational support (POS). The mediational analyses were
somewhat consistent with expectations. Overall, significant indirect effects were observed
in 16 (53%) of the 30 single-mediation models tested. These are now discussed, in turn, for
each job performance dimension.
Indirect Effects of AS on Employee Job Performance. The hypothesized indirect
effects of AS on task performance were not observed for any of the proposed mediators
when each was examined separately. The indirect effect of AS on task performance via
AOC is observed however, when the mediators were modeled simultaneously. The
generally null findings surrounding the indirect effect of AS on task performance suggest
attitudinal and affective processes represent poor explanations for the significant negative
association observed between AS and task performance. It is possible that the effects of
AS on task performance could be due to motivational processes. For instance, the
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experience of AS may push some employees to work harder (and thus escape AS) while
pushing others to decrease their work efforts (and thus disengage from work altogether).
The observed indirect effects of AS on contextual performance were generally
consistent with expectations. Moreover, each time a specific indirect effect of AS on
citizenship and/or counterproductive behavior was observed, findings were consistent
across organizational (OCBO, CWBO) and interpersonal (OCBI, CWBI) dimensions of
contextual behavior (see Table 31). AS was indirectly related to OCB through all but one
of the proposed mediators (NA) and indirectly related to CWB via PA, LMX, and IJ. When
the all mediators are modeled parallel however, the only significant indirect effects of AS
on OCB are via NA and PA (OCBO only). Similarly, the indirect effects of AS on CWB
are observed via PA (CWBI only) and IJ when modeled in parallel.
Mediation hypotheses supported by the planned analyses were further evaluated to
exclude competing explanations. In particular, the observed indirect effects AS on
contextual performance through positive affective states (PA) could be explained by trait
positive affect (TPA), which predisposes individuals to experience positive affective states.
Similarly, it was crucial to show that the observed indirect effects of AS on contextual
performance occur through the specific work-related attitudes proposed (i.e., LMX, IJ,
AOC, POS), as opposed to work-related attitudes in general. Job satisfaction (JS) refers to
“…evaluative judgment one makes about one’s job or job situation” (Weiss, 2002, p.175).
As an overall evaluation towards multiple aspects of work, JS could pose an alternative
explanation for these indirect effects. TPA and JS were included as covariates in analyses
involving affect and attitudinal mediators, respectively.
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When the mediation analyses are rerun with the inclusion of relevant covariates,
the indirect effects of AS on CWB remain significant. On the other hand, only a third of
the indirect effects of AS on OCB—those through LMX and IJ (OCBO only)—remain
statistically significant when relevant covariates are included in the model. These findings
provide greater confidence in the conclusions reached regarding the indirect effects of AS
on CWB. In addition, they highlight the multicollinearity issues that make attempts to
discern the specific influence of affective states and conceptually related attitudes a
challenging—yet necessary endeavor.
Relative Contribution of Specific Indirect Effects. An objective of this study was
to perform a simultaneous test of the mediators described above, which despite sharing
conceptual similarities, had yet to be tested in a manner that allowed their relative
contributions to be assessed. This was accomplished by modeling the six mediators, in
parallel, and contrasting specific indirect effects pairwise to determine whether they
differed in magnitude by a nontrivial amount. Expectations that the specific indirect effects
of affective states (PA, NA) would be stronger than the specific indirect effects of
supervisor-referenced attitudes (LMX, IJ), which would in turn be stronger than the
indirect effects of organization-referenced attitudes (POS, AOC) were generally
unsupported by the analyses, which were performed separately for each job dimension
(outcome).
Significant differences between specific indirect effects were observed for only
three (5%) of the sixty pairwise contrasts, and all significant differences involved the
contrast between the specific indirect effects of NA and AOC. Specifically, the specific
indirect effects of AS on both dimensions of citizenship behaviors (OCBO, OCBI) and on
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CWBI, were stronger for NA than for AOC. The findings regarding citizenship behaviors
are surprising given that AOC, but not NA, mediates the relationships between AS and
citizenship behaviors (OCBO, OCBI) when these indirect effects are analyzed separately.
Overall, results of the pairwise contrast are underwhelming, especially considering the
nominal Type 1 error rate for the analyses is also five percent (i.e., null hypotheses rejected
at p-values < .05). Ironically, the most likely explanation for the overall absence of
significant differences across specific indirect effects is the low statistical power associated
with the modest sample size.
Lastly, results of the single and multiple mediation analyses lead to remarkably
different conclusions regarding the statistical significance of these indirect effects (see
Table 32). Approximately half of the indirect effects that were significant when analyzed
in isolation were no longer significant when the indirect effects were modeled as a set.
These difference likely stem from the high inter-correlation of affective states and workrelated attitudes. Moreover, they suggest that evidence of mediation presented in prior
studies should be interpreted with caution, particularly when competing mechanisms were
not included in the analyses.
AS and EOC and Subordinate’s Work-related Attitudes. The negative
association observed between AS and PEC is consistent with prior research (e.g., Biron,
2010) and with the notion that supervisory behaviors associated with AS are, arguably,
more consistent with the behavioral prescriptions from EOCs associated with low PEC
(e.g., Instrumental) than from EOCs associated with high PEC (e.g., Caring). The expected
positive associations between PEC and each work-related attitude were also observed and
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are consistent with existing research (Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2009; Simha &
Cullen, 2012).
Although PEC was found to moderate the relationship between AS and workrelated attitudes, the direction the interactive effect is contrary to predictions. In contrast to
predictions, the relationship between AS and AOC is stronger (i.e., more negative) when
PEC is high (vs. low). These findings are noteworthy but require an alternative
interpretation. It is possible that AS may be more likely to be viewed as being motivated
by the supervisor’s self-interests when Egoism climates are perceived. On the other hand,
EOCs that emphasizes a concern for the well-being of others (e.g., Caring) may lead
subordinates to interpret the behaviors associated with AS as “tough love”, thus leading to
the observed positive relationship between AS and IJ.
Secondary Findings
This section describes observations regarding the (1) prevalence of AS in the
overall sample and across respondent subgroups, (2) consistency between employee- and
coworker-rated AS, and (3) viability of operationalizing EOC using the PEC measure.
These observations are not specific to any single hypothesis but have a direct bearing on
the overall interpretability of the present findings and on the generalizability of study
conclusions.
Prevalence of AS. The overwhelming majority of individuals surveyed (70%)
report experiencing AS during the prior 30 days. Items scores further suggest that nonverbal abusive behaviors, such as the failure to give proper credit (52%) and keep promises
(49%), are more prevalent than verbally abusive behaviors, such as “told me my thoughts
or feeling were stupid” (31%) and “told me I’m incompetent” (34%). Moreover, there are
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differences in AS reporting across respondent subgroups based on age, gender, educational
attainment, and employment status. Overall, greater AS is reported by respondents whom
are male, are under 31 years old (vs. 31 or more), work full-time (vs. part-time), and have
greater educational attainment. Combined, these demographic characteristics account for
approximately 10% of the total variance in self-rated AS.
Self- and Peer- rated AS. Measures of AS were rated by focal employees (selfreport) and by their coworkers. Recall that coworkers were asked to rate how frequently
they observed AS directed at the focal employee. Although many of the behaviors
associated with AS occur in the presence of others, these behaviors vary in their visibility.
Whereas abusive behaviors such as ridicule (item #1), expressions of anger (item #10),
and/or put-downs in front of others (item #4) are readily observable, behaviors that
reference the supervisor’s “broken promises” (item #9) and/or his or her failures to give
the subordinate proper credit (item #7) are somewhat less visible to coworkers.
Although a reasonable degree of consistency across rating sources is expected,
ratings of AS provided by the focal employee are virtually indistinguishable from those
provided by their coworkers (see Figure 7). Moreover, the degree of consistency between
sources is uniform across behaviors which vary in visibility. In other words, focal
employees and their coworkers rated abusive behaviors with greater visibility as
consistently as they rated abusive behaviors with less visibility. This uniform consistency
raises concerns about whether these two sets of ratings were provided by different
individuals and suggests that the correlation between employee- and coworker-rated
measures of AS shown on Table 6b (Pearson r = .86) may represent an estimate of
consistency across time (e.g., test-retest reliability) rather than across raters.
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Viability of Operationalizing EOC Using PEC. Prior literature reviews note that
EOC tends to be operationalize with discrete measures of each climate type (Martin &
Cullen, 2006; Simha & Cullen, 2012). In contrast, EOC was presently assessed using a
single measure—PEC (Hsieh & Wang, 2016)—purported to reflect employee’s global
assessment of EOC. The expected higher order structure (five first-order factors plus one
second-order factor) was observed—but only after two items (#19, #21) were dropped and
the residuals between two sets of first-order factors (Independence and Caring,
Independence and Instrumental) were allowed to correlate. The present findings suggest
that PEC represents a viable option for future research on EOC. Nevertheless, the benefits
of assessing EOC along a continuum (i.e., high/low), such as reducing the number of
hypotheses (and tests) to be formulated (and evaluated), must be weighed against the risks
of obscuring meaningful differences across climate types that may occur as a result
collapsing across them.
Limitations
Confidence in the results of the present study is primarily limited by (1) an inability
to establish temporal precedence, (2) artifactual covariance among constructs, and (3) the
idiosyncrasies of the sample. The study’s cross-sectional design does not support causal
claims. To be sure, the use of cross-sectional designs limits the ability to draw causal
inferences and is generally condemned by researchers (e.g., Maxwell, Cole, & Mitchell,
2011) as a means of testing mediation hypotheses. However, considering the lack of
guidance currently available regarding the timing of these processes, the added value of
anything short of an experimental (or-quasi-experimental) design is debatable (Spector,
2019). Justifications for the proposed temporal precedence among study constructs thus
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rely squarely on theory. Specifically, the present mediational framework is consistent with
theoretical arguments that conceptualize (1) AS (e.g., Tepper & Almeda, 2012), (2)
affective states (Affective Events Theory; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), and (3) attitudes
(e.g., Theory of Planned Behavior; Ajzen, 1991), as antecedents of employee behaviors.
The second major limitation noted above—the presence of artifactual covariance
among study constructs—is a direct result of the data collection protocol. Common method
variance (CMV; i.e., variance attributable to the measurement method; Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) is cause for concerns whenever predictor and
criterion measures (1) are obtained from the same individual, (2) contain items that share
certain characteristic (e.g., scale formats, anchors), and/or (3) share a common
measurement context (e.g., administration medium, location/timing of data collection).
CMV due to a common rating source should therefore pose relatively fewer concerns for
conclusions related to the indirect effects of AS on employee performance, which utilized
data from multiple sources, than for conclusions regarding the effects of PEC, which relied
on a single source for all measures.
In contrast to common rater variance, CMV stemming from the use of similar items
and/or a common measurement context is likely to represent a threat to all conclusions.
Efforts to reduce respondents’ cognitive burden during administration led to using scales
with identical format (agreement), number of response alternatives (five), and anchors
(strongly disagree-strongly agree) across large sections of the questionnaires.
Unfortunately, these efforts may have had the unintended consequence of introducing
CMV to the measurement model. CMV generally leads to inflated relationships among
constructs, and qualify study conclusions.
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The desire to reach a geographically diverse set of respondents in a cost-effective
manner guided most decisions regarding measurement context. Features of the
measurement context (e.g., research purposes, administration medium) give rise to
additional threats to internal validity. In the relatively low-stakes context of a research
study, some respondents may lack the motivation to remain attentive as they complete
multiple questionnaire measures. These concerns were addressed however, using survey
completion time and instructed items (e.g., Please select never.) scattered throughout the
questionnaire to screen out cases that suggested inattentive/low effort responding (based
on a priori criteria). Data screening practices have been shown to improve the quality and
trustworthiness of survey data (DeSimone & Harms, 2018).
Relative to administering a questionnaire in the laboratory, remote administration
affords researchers less control over basic participant management functions. At times, it
may be impossible to determine whether a single individual is the source of multiple
questionnaires and/or whether multiple individuals from completed (different parts of) the
same questionnaire. Although the compensation protocol was specifically designed
discourage multiple entries from the same individual, it is far from a guarantee that each
case in the present dataset represents a unique participant.
Moreover, the uniform consistency observed across employee- and coworker-rated
AS items (see above) calls into question the proportion of respondent who followed study
instructions to recruit a coworker relative to those whom may have elected to complete the
coworker questionnaire themselves. While the inability to ascertain the independence of
data from ostensibly different sources threaten conclusions regarding employee
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performance, it bears little influence on findings related to the effects of PEC, which by
design, involved only self-rated constructs.
The third major limitation to study conclusions arises from characteristics of the
recruitment platform and study participants. Recall that study participants were recruited
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Investigations regarding the viability of
conducting psychological research on MTurk conclude that the data quality is comparable
to undergraduate students (e.g., Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011) and to data
collected from other internet sources (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). MTurk
has also been shown to provide more diverse samples than university subject pools
(Behrend et al., 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava
& John, 2004). Moreover, Highhouse and Zhang (2015) note that in comparison with
university subject pool samples, samples collected on MTurk samples are more similar to
organizational samples and thus preferable in terms of their generalizability.
Nevertheless, the unique characteristics of study participants threaten the
generalizability of conclusions to the intended population of interest (i.e., full and part-time
employees in the US). Despite approximating the US labor force in terms of gender and
race (see Table 5; note that the BLS assesses Hispanic ethnicity separately from race),
participants in the study are markedly younger (sample median age = 31 vs. 42 in labor
force) and better educated (45% vs. 25% have college degree). Participants represent all
20 major industrial sectors. Lastly, some industries are overrepresented (e.g., Finance &
Insurance, Information, Management) and others are underrepresented (e.g., Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing & Hunting) in relation to their levels in the labor force. These sample
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characteristics suggest the present findings should be generalized only to US employees
whom are relatively young, highly educated, and hold “office jobs.”
Implications and Future Directions
Undoubtedly, organizations should be committed to the prevention and reduction
of AS. It is clear from the present study and from prior research in this area (see Tepper et
al., 2017), that AS is both prevalent in American workplaces and that its effects on
employee attitudes and work behaviors are largely detrimental. The present study suggests
however, that in addition to focusing on the actor’s behavior, organizations should be
mindful of the ethical climate created and perpetuated by their leadership staff and/or
implied by their policies. Interestingly, the present research shows that under some EOCs,
abused employees may nonetheless hold favorable work attitudes. That said, interventions
targeting organizational climate may yield favorable results in efforts to reduce the
detrimental effects of supervisory abuse. Finally, in light of the numerous ways in which
AS appears to impact employee performance, human resource practitioner may find it
worthwhile to develop interventions which, in addition to targeting the source of abusive
supervision (i.e., the supervisor’s hostility), also target multiple employee work attitudes.
The present findings also highlight subgroup differences regarding the prevalence
of AS and suggest that abuse is not evenly distributed among employees. Indeed, male
employees, as well as younger and more educated employees tend to report a higher degree
of AS than their counterparts. Moreover, corroborating data from coworkers suggests these
subgroup differences are not merely due to differences in the perception of abuse or the
result of reporting biases. These findings imply that organizations may find value in
targeting specific employee groups for interventions.
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The mediators hypothesized to explain the effects of AS on employee performance
performed somewhat better against contextual performance than against task performance.
While many of the hypothesized indirect effects of AS on contextual performance were
supported by the data, there was an overall failure to detect significant difference across
the various mechanisms. The most probable explanation, as noted earlier, concerns the lack
of statistical power. On this note, researchers seeking to use MTurk as a research platform
should be cognizant of its limitation with regards to multi-source samples. For instance,
less than a third of the more than 8,500 individuals whom initially agreed to participate
actually provided usable data. Further, only a tenth of the individuals whom provided
usable data recruited an eligible coworker. While the present study benefits from ecological
validity by virtue of a large heterogenous sample, future research may benefit from the use
of experimental designs. In particular, there is a clear need to establish the temporal
primacy of abusive supervision and/or abusive actions in shaping employee behaviors.
Although this study conceptualized all mediators operating in parallel, future
studies may benefit from exploring sequential mediator models. Indeed, AET (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996) specifically suggests that the behavioral effects of affective states are
further mediated by work attitudes. It should be noted however, that the present lack of
understanding regarding the tempo of affective states and attitude formation resulting from
AS continues to be an impediment to testing sequential models. That said, more research
is clearly needed to determine the timing of the psychological processes currently
investigated.
Lastly, findings regarding the interactive effects of AS and PEC need to be explored
in future research. At the present, these observations suggest that when EOCs emphasize a
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concern for others, increasing levels of AS are associated with more favorable perceptions
of IJ. As suggested, this could be due to a tendency on the part of some subordinates to
view these behaviors as an indication of their supervisor’s concern towards them.
Supervisors vary in the extent to which they view AS instrumentally (i.e., to improve
employee outcomes) and these beliefs predict engagement in AS (Watkins, Fehr, & He, in
press). Thus, investigation regarding the role of EOC (if any) in shaping supervisor’s AS
instrumentality beliefs represents a viable avenue for future research.
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Table 1. Meta-analytic relationships between abusive supervision and study variables.
Meta-analysis
Study Variable
Mackey et al. (2015)
Zhang & Liao (2015)
n
k
95 CI
n
k
95 CI
𝑟̅
𝑟̅
Attitudes – Supervisor
LMX
2786 11 -.54 -.70,-.39
IJ
829 5 -.39 -.64,-.15
3916 14 -.51 -.60,-.42
Attitudes – Organization
POS
1603 7 -.34 -.55,-.25
AOC
2758 9 -.26 -.31,-.21
2423 10 -.30 -.34,-.25
Performance
Task
4012 16 -.19 -.33,-.05
3346 14 -.16 -.23,-.09
OCB
2842 13 -.24 -.31,-.17
1319 6 -.24 -.31,-.17
OCBI
2007 7 -.21 -.28,-.14
OCBO
1848 8 -.17 -.24,-.09
CWB
1715 7 .37 .11,.72
CWBI
3726 13 .35 .23,.47
4470 14 .37 .30,.42
CWBO
7761 22 .41 .24,.57
9917 28 .38 .31,.44
Note. LMX = Leader-member exchange, IJ=Interactional Justice, POS=Perceived
organizational
support,
AOC=Affective
organizational
commitment,
OCBI=organizational
citizenship
behaviors
directed
towards
individuals,
OCBO=organizational citizenship behaviors directed towards organization, CWBI=
counterproductive work behaviors directed towards individuals, CWBO=
counterproductive work behaviors directed towards organization.
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Table 3a. Data cleaning efforts for focal employee participants
Criterion
No. of Cases Percent
PERSONS WHO AGREED TO PARTICIPATE
Completed eligibility
6905
80.69
Did not complete eligibility
1652
19.31
Agreed to participate
8557
100.00
PARTICIPANTS WHO COMPLETED ELIGIBILITY SECTION
Met eligibility criteria
3292
47.68
Did not meet eligibility criteria
3613
52.32
CASES REMOVED due to:
Time < 400 secs
1660
Age < 18
1
Employment Status
522
No boss
384
Work outside US
7
Weekly work hours < 20
546
Org Tenure < one year
493
Completed eligibility section
6905
100.00
PARTICIPANTS WHO MET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Provided usable data
2738
83.17
Did not provide usable data
554
16.83
TOTAL CASES REMOVED due to:
ACQ fails > 1
11
Missing Data
543
Met eligibility criteria
3292
100.00
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Table 3b. Data cleaning efforts for coworker participants
Criterion
No. of Cases Percent
PERSONS WHO AGREED TO PARTICIPATE
Provided valid InviteCode
572
71.95
Did not provide valid InviteCode
223
28.05
Agreed to participate
795
100.00
PARTICIPANTS WHO PROVIDED VALID INVITE CODE
Completed eligibility
511
89.34
Did not complete eligibility
61
10.66
Provided valid InviteCode
572
100.00
PARTICIPANTS WHO COMPLETED ELIGIBILITY SECTION
Met eligibility criteria
300
58.71
Did not meet eligibility criteria
211
41.29
CASES REMOVED due to:
Time < 240 secs
29
Age < 18
0
Employment Status
4
Peer relationship
110
Coworker interactions
13
Job Knowledge
24
Work outside US
1
Weekly work hours < 20
10
Org Tenure < one year
20
Completed eligibility section
511
100.00
PARTICIPANTS WHO MET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Provided usable data
281
93.67
Did not provide usable data
19
6.33
TOTAL CASES REMOVED due to:
ACQ fails > 0
17
Missing Data
0
More than one coworker
2
Met eligibility criteria
300
100.00
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Table 4. Variable distributions across matched and unmatched groups (continuous
variables)
Sig. (2Effect Size
MatchedA
Full Dataset
tailed)
(Hedge’s
OnlyB
Difference
g)
Characteristic
Mean
SD
Mean SD
in Means
Age (Years)
33.83
9.35 33.56 8.99
.64
.03
Org. Tenure (Years)
5.88
5.36
5.98 5.34
.67
.02
Average Hours Worked 40.29
8.15 40.09 7.27
.76
.02
Employee PEC
3.42
.47
3.49
.52
.03
.15
Abusive Supervision
1.96
1.14
1.49
.78
.00
.42
Perceived Org. Support
3.47
.78
3.51
.88
.49
.05
Affective Org.
3.26
.79
3.29
.87
.58
.04
Commitment
Leader-Member
3.50
.85
3.58
.87
.15
.09
Exchange
Interactional Justice
3.81
.82
3.85
.88
.43
.05
Positive Affect
3.38
.90
3.15
.91
.00
.26
Negative Affect
2.35
1.02
1.98
.86
.00
.37
Note. A. N = 281; B. N = 2738; PEC = Perceived ethical climate. Median age = 31, 32,
and 33 for Full dataset, Matched-Only, and US Labor Force (2018), respectively.
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Table 5. Demographic characteristics across study datasets and US labor force
Full Dataset
Matched-Only
US Labor ForceA
Frequency
%
Frequency
%
Frequency
%
Characteristic
[in thousands]
Gender
Male
1429
52.2
126
44.8
82,698
53.1
Female
1309
47.8
155
55.2
73,063
46.9
RaceB
Asian
196
7.6
20
7.1
9,832
6.3
African
401
15.6
24
8.5
19,091
12.3
Hispanic
175
6.4
23
8.2
27,012
17.3
Other
58
2.3
4
1.4
5,377
3.5
Caucasian
1908
74.4
210
74.7
121,461
78.0
Education
HS Diploma/G.E.D.
471
17.2
51
18.1
34,550
25.3
Associate’s
439
16.0
43
15.3
15,209
11.1
Bachelor’s
1246
45.5
137
48.8
55,995
25.6
Advanced degree
582
21.3
50
17.8
20,970
15.4
Employment StatusC
Full-Time
2457
89.7
255
90.7
128,572
82.5
Part-Time
281
10.3
26
9.3
27,189
17.5
Note. A. Source is Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 2018, retrieved from
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2018.pdf. B. Race counts do not total 100%. C. Participants indicating employment status other than
full-time and part-time did not meet eligibility criteria.
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Table 6a. Pearson zero-order correlations and internal reliability estimates (full dataset; N=2738)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. AS (Self-reported)
(.98)
2. Employee PEC
-.27*
(.80)
3. POS
-.26*
.70*
(.86)
*
*
4. AOC
-.28
.58
.70*
(.82)
*
*
5. LMX
-.35
.52
.60*
.52*
(.90)
*
*
*
*
6. IJ
-.27
.63
.67
.51
.74*
(.90)
*
*
*
*
7. PA (State)
.04
.55
.63
.59
.51*
.58*
(.93)
*
*
*
*
*
*
8. NA (State)
.67
-.38
-.42
-.47
-.37
-.32
-.29*
(.96)
Note. Internal reliability estimates (Cronbach alphas) appear, in parentheses, along diagonal. † = p<.05, *p<.01; AS= Abusive
Supervision; PEC= Perceived Ethical Climate PA= Positive Affect; NA= Negative Affect; AOC= Affective Organizational
Commitment; POS= Perceived Organizational Support; LMX= Leader-Member Exchange; IJ= Interactional Justice.
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Table 6b. Pearson zero-order correlations and internal reliability estimates (matched-only dataset; N=281)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
(.97)
1 AS (Self)
2 AS (Other) .86* (.97)
-.40* -.39* (.85)
3 E-PEC
-.37* -.40* .77* (.85)
4 C-PEC
-.36* -.35* .76* .62* (.91)
5 POS
-.25* -.26* .63* .50* .72* (.88)
6 AOC
-.48* -.44* .63* .52* .68* .60* (.92)
7 LMX
-.51* -.46* .66* .52* .71* .56* .81* (.93)
8 IJ
9 PA (State) -.13† -.17* .60* .49* .67* .64* .60* .60* (.94)
10 NA (State) .55* .58* -.47* -.43* -.48* -.39* -.40* -.41* -.44* (.93)
11 TASK
-.42* -.34* .23* .26* .13†
.02
.25* .25*
.06 -.21* (.91)
12 OCBO
-.16† -.10 .23* .24* .24* .23* .33* .34* .33* -.06 .41* (.84)
13 OCBI
-.10
-.08 .23* .29* .21* .18* .27* .22* .24* -.01 .45* .69* (.84)
14 CWBO
.59* .55* -.17* -.21* -.14† -.07
-.12
-.10
.09
.36* -.51* -.11
-.12 (.95)
15 CWBI
.58* .56* -.14* -.19* -.16* -.06 -.12† -.13† .11
.36* -.47* -.14† -.15† .89* (.95)
Note. Internal reliability estimates (Cronbach alphas) appear, in parentheses, along diagonal. † = p<.05, *p<.01; AS = Abusive
supervision; E-PEC = Employee perceived ethical climate; C-PEC = coworker perceived ethical climate; AOC = Affective
Organizational Commitment; POS = Perceived Organizational Support; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange; IJ= Interactional
Justice; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; TASK=Task Performance; OCBO=Organizational Citizenship BehaviorsOrganizational; OCBI=Organizational Citizenship Behaviors-Interpersonal; CWBO=Counterproductive Work BehaviorsOrganizational; CWBI=Counterproductive Work Behaviors-Interpersonal.
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Table 7a. Spearman’s rho correlations (full dataset; N=2738)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1. AS (Self-reported)
1.00
2. Employee PEC
-.35*
1.00
3. POS
-.37*
.68*
1.00
*
*
4. AOC
-.35
.55
.66*
1.00
*
*
5. LMX
-.45
.52
.59*
.49*
1.00
*
*
*
*
6. IJ
-.37
.62
.63
.46
.70*
1.00
†
*
*
*
7. PA (State)
-.04
.51
.57
.52
.48*
.55*
1.00
*
*
*
*
*
*
8. NA (State)
-.63
-.40
-.46
-.50
-.40
-.34
-.31*
1.00
Note. † = p<.05, *p<.01; AS= Abusive Supervision; PEC= Perceived Ethical Climate PA= Positive Affect; NA= Negative Affect;
AOC= Affective Organizational Commitment; POS= Perceived Organizational Support; LMX= Leader-Member Exchange; IJ=
Interactional Justice.
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Table 7b. Spearman’s rho correlations (matched-only group; N=281)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1.00
1 AS (Self)
.83* 1.00
2 AS (Other)
-.44* -.39* 1.00
3 E-PEC
-.07 -.13† .75* 1.00
4 C-PEC
-.51* -.46* .74*
.33* 1.00
5 POS
*
*
*
-.33
-.32
.62
.18*
.70* 1.00
6 AOC
-.56* -.50* .63*
.24*
.70*
.59* 1.00
7 LMX
*
*
*
*
*
-.61
-.51
.62
.27
.72
.55*
.79* 1.00
8 IJ
*
*
*
*
*
*
-.22
-.25
.56
.35
.64
.64
.58*
.55* 1.00
9 PA (State)
.54*
.56* -.44* -.14† -.49* -.43* -.40* -.42* -.46* 1.00
10 NA (State)
*
-.37
-.33* .26*
.10
.18*
.04
.26*
.28*
.05
-.19* 1.00
11 TASK
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
-.20
-.15
.24
.30
.26
.22
.33
.32
.30
-.09
.35* 1.00
12 OCBO
-.15† -.14† .28*
.22*
.25*
.19*
.27*
.24*
.22*
-.07
.40*
.66* 1.00
13 OCBI
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
.45
.43
-.27
-.05 -.22
-.11 -.20
-.20
-.03
.38
-.55
-.21* -.21* 1.00
14 CWBO
*
*
*
*
†
*
*
*
*
.49
.52
-.25
-.05 -.24
-.13
-.20
-.25
-.00
.34
-.47
-.22* -.27* .65* 1.00
15 CWBI
Note. † = p<.05, *p<.01; AS = Abusive supervision; E-PEC = Employee perceived ethical climate; C-PEC = coworker perceived
ethical climate; AOC = Affective Organizational Commitment; POS = Perceived Organizational Support; LMX = Leader-Member
Exchange; IJ= Interactional Justice; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; TASK=Task Performance; OCBO=Organizational
Citizenship Behaviors-Organizational; OCBI=Organizational Citizenship Behaviors-Interpersonal; CWBO=Counterproductive
Work Behaviors-Organizational; CWBI=Counterproductive Work Behaviors-Interpersonal.
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Table 8a. Univariate normality tests for all study variables (full dataset)
Variable Name
S-W
Mean of Abusive Supervision (AS) Items
.796
AS 1
.705
AS 2
.659
AS 3
.727
AS 4
.697
AS 5
.701
AS 6
.752
AS 7
.793
AS 8
.705
AS 9
.785
AS 10
.759
AS 11
.715
AS 12
.746
AS 13
.672
AS 14
.634
AS 15
.726
Mean of Perceived Ethical Climate (PEC) Items
.980
PEC 1
.856
PEC 2
.880
PEC 3
.907
PEC 4
.871
PEC 5
.826
PEC 6
.843
PEC 7
.829
PEC 8
.870
PEC 9
.824
PEC 10
.826
PEC 11
.892
PEC 12
.885
PEC 13
.907
PEC 14
.910
PEC 15
.913
PEC 16
.897
PEC 17
.903
PEC 18
.907
PEC 19
.913
PEC 20
.910
PEC 21
.915
PEC 22
.913
Mean of Positive Affective States (PA) Items
.980
PA 1
.896
PA 2
.905
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Df.
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738

Sig.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

PA 3
PA 4
PA 5
PA 6
PA 7
PA 8
PA 9
PA 10
Mean of Negative Affective States (NA) Items
NA 1
NA 2
NA 3
NA 4
NA 5
NA 6
NA 7
NA 8
NA 9
NA 10
Mean of Perceived Organizational Support (POS) Items
POS 1
POS 2
POS 3
POS 4
POS 5
POS 6
POS 7
POS 8
Mean of Affective Organizational Commitment (AOC) Items
AOC 1
AOC 2
AOC 3
AOC 4
AOC 5
AOC 6
AOC 7
AOC 8
Mean of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Items
LMX 1
LMX 2
LMX 3
LMX 4
LMX 5
LMX 6
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.894
.916
.907
.901
.910
.901
.911
.890
.939
.876
.901
.883
.826
.857
.807
.896
.754
.803
.828
.968
.844
.872
.877
.852
.849
.906
.904
.886
.985
.869
.882
.897
.897
.893
.896
.888
.898
.981
.887
.891
.890
.899
.917
.867

2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738
2738

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

LMX 7
.875 2738
Mean of Interactional Justice (IJ) Items
.927 2738
IJ 1
.794 2738
IJ 2
.876 2738
IJ 3
.844 2738
IJ 4
.838 2738
IJ 5
.835 2738
IJ 6
.832 2738
Note. S-W = Shapiro-Wilk Statistic (W); Df = Degrees of freedom; Sig. = p-value.;
*p>.00053 (Bonferroni-corrected p-value)
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0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Table 8b. Univariate normality tests for all study variables (matched-only dataset)
Variable Name
Mean of Abusive Supervision (AS) Items
AS 1
AS 2
AS 3
AS 4
AS 5
AS 6
AS 7
AS 8
AS 9
AS 10
AS 11
AS 12
AS 13
AS 14
AS 15
Mean of Perceived Ethical Climate (PEC) Items
PEC 1
PEC 2
PEC 3
PEC 4
PEC 5
PEC 6
PEC 7
PEC 8
PEC 9
PEC 10
PEC 11
PEC 12
PEC 13
PEC 14
PEC 15
PEC 16
PEC 17
PEC 18
PEC 19
PEC 20
PEC 21
PEC 22
Mean of Positive Affective States (PA) Items
PA 1
PA 2
PA 3
PA 4
PA 5
PA 6
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S-W
.686
.574
.454
.557
.511
.545
.648
.691
.504
.697
.610
.551
.597
.460
.417
.618
.976
.856
.867
.900
.865
.805
.820
.800
.862
.781
.784
.893
.882
.912
.912
.911
.879
.901
.909
.893
.892
.903
.912
.981*
.889
.904
.886
.902
.914
.897

Df.
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276

Sig.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0008
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

PA 7
PA 8
PA 9
PA 10
Mean of Negative Affective States (NA) Items
NA 1
NA 2
NA 3
NA 4
NA 5
NA 6
NA 7
NA 8
NA 9
NA 10
Mean of Perceived Organizational Support (POS) Items
POS 1
POS 2
POS 3
POS 4
POS 5
POS 6
POS 7
POS 8
Mean of Affective Organizational Commitment (AOC) Items
AOC 1
AOC 2
AOC 3
AOC 4
AOC 5
AOC 6
AOC 7
AOC 8
Mean of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Items
LMX 1
LMX 2
LMX 3
LMX 4
LMX 5
LMX 6
LMX 7
Mean of Interactional Justice (IJ) Items
IJ 1
IJ 2
IJ 3
IJ 4
IJ 5
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.907
.903
.912
.892
.906
.842
.875
.856
.733
.806
.697
.878
.612
.684
.712
.971
.849
.877
.887
.834
.839
.907
.887
.881
.978
.876
.875
.894
.886
.883
.885
.883
.886
.974
.863
.873
.868
.893
.915
.867
.879
.919
.793
.872
.819
.817
.819

276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

IJ 6
Mean of Task Performance (TASK) Items
TASK 1
TASK 2
TASK 3
TASK 4
Mean of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (Org.; OCBO) Items
OCBO 1
OCBO 2
OCBO 3
OCBO 4
OCBO 5
OCBO 6
Mean of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (Ind.; OCBI) Items
OCBI 1
OCBI 2
OCBI 3
OCBI 4
OCBI 5
OCBI 6
Mean of Counterproductive Work Behaviors (Org.; CWBO) Items
CWBO 1
CWBO 2
CWBO 3
CWBO 4
CWBO 5
CWBO 6
CWBO 7
CWBO 8
CWBO 9
CWBO 10
CWBO 11
Mean of Counterproductive Work Behaviors (Ind.; CWBI) Items
CWBI 1
CWBI 2
CWBI 3
CWBI 4
CWBI 5
CWBI 6
CWBI 7

.825
.793
.711
.706
.677
.690
.973
.845
.857
.869
.898
.880
.903
.973
.827
.841
.902
.882
.863
.876
.683
.611
.730
.696
.615
.529
.597
.551
.476
.375
.552
.486
.612
.657
.541
.397
.562
.504
.559
.417

276
281
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
272
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
276
281
276
276
276
276
276
276
276

Note. S-W = Shapiro-Wilk Statistic (W); Df = Degrees of freedom; Sig. = p-value.;
*p>.00042 (Bonferroni-corrected p-value)
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0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Table 9a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via PA (Hypothesis 1a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV=PA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.150
.078
-.314
-.010
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c`)
-.363
.061
-.489
-.253
Direct effect of PA (Path b)
.000
.044
-.083
.089
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via PA (Path ab)
.000
.008
-.014
.018
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; PA = Positive affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 9b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via PA (Hypothesis 1b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV=PA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.150
.078
-.315
-.013
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.128
.063
-.260
-.009
Direct effect of PA (Path b)
.274
.058
.159
.388
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via PA (Path ab)
-.041
.022
-.090
-.004
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; PA = Positive affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 9c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via PA (Hypothesis 1c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV=PA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.150
.079
-.316
-.009
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.072
.058
-.187
.039
Direct effect of PA (Path b)
.195
.057
.085
.304
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via PA (Path ab)
-.029
.017
-.068
-.002
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; PA = Positive affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 9d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via PA (Hypothesis 1d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV=PA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.150
.077
-.317
-.009
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.616
.073
.468
.756
Direct effect of PA (Path b)
.149
.049
.052
.246
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via PA (Path ab)
-.022
.014
-.056
-.001
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; PA = Positive affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 9e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via PA (Hypothesis 1e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV=PA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.150
.080
-.318
-.006
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.595
.077
.440
.742
Direct effect of PA (Path b)
.157
.043
.069
.237
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via PA (Path ab)
-.024
.015
-.058
-.001
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; PA = Positive affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 10a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via NA (Hypothesis 2a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV=NA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
.608
.075
.462
.755
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.379
.067
-.524
-.259
Direct effect of NA (Path b)
.026
.051
-.072
.128
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via NA (Path ab)
.016
.032
-.041
.085
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; NA = Negative affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 10b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via NA (Hypothesis 2b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV=NA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
.608
.074
.457
.748
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.199
.071
-.348
-.070
Direct effect of NA (Path b)
.048
.067
-.083
.179
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via NA (Path ab)
.029
.042
-.049
.116
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; NA = Negative affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 10c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via NA (Hypothesis 2c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV=NA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
.608
.076
.457
.749
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.138
.065
-.265
-.012
Direct effect of NA (Path b)
.060
.068
-.072
.190
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via NA (Path ab)
.037
.043
-.045
.124
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; NA = Negative affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 10d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via NA (Hypothesis 2d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV=NA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
.608
.076
.458
.749
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.561
.090
.380
.735
Direct effect of NA (Path b)
.054
.064
-.065
.182
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via NA (Path ab)
.033
.038
-.042
.106
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; NA = Negative affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 10e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via NA (Hypothesis 2e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV=NA)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
.608
.075
.458
.751
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.536
.085
.371
.704
Direct effect of NA (Path b)
.059
.056
-.051
.166
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via NA (Path ab)
.036
.033
-.034
.097
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; NA = Negative affect (state). Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 11a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via LMX (Hypothesis 3a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV= LMX)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.538
.073
-.690
-.406
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.341
.065
-.482
-.221
Direct effect of LMX (Path b)
.041
.048
-.051
.138
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via LMX (Path ab)
-.022
.026
-.074
.029
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS
= Abusive supervision; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 11b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via LMX (Hypothesis 3b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV= LMX)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.538
.070
-.686
-.411
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.005
.070
-.152
.121
Direct effect of LMX (Path b)
.305
.065
.172
.426
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via LMX (Path ab)
-.164
.041
-.252
-.089
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 11c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via LMX (Hypothesis 3c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV= LMX)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.538
.072
-.696
-.412
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.035
.062
-.089
.157
Direct effect of LMX (Path b)
.254
.066
.122
.384
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via LMX (Path ab)
-.137
.041
-.224
-.065
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 11d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via LMX (Hypothesis 3d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV= LMX)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.538
.070
-.688
-.409
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.701
.077
.538
.837
Direct effect of LMX (Path b)
.199
.052
.096
.301
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via LMX (Path ab)
-.107
.030
-.170
-.050
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 11e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via LMX (Hypothesis 3e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV= LMX)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.538
.072
-.687
-.406
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.671
.081
.502
.820
Direct effect of LMX (Path b)
.185
.056
.073
.291
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via LMX (Path ab)
-.100
.032
-.166
-.039
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; LMX = Leader-Member Exchange. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 12a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via IJ (Hypothesis 4a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV= IJ)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.582
.083
-.750
-.430
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.341
.066
-.482
-.222
Direct effect of IJ (Path b)
.037
.059
-.069
.163
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via IJ (Path ab)
-.022
.034
-.090
.045
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; IJ = Interactional Justice. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 12b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via IJ (Hypothesis 4b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV= IJ)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.582
.083
-.759
-.432
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.014
.068
-.129
.142
Direct effect of IJ (Path b)
.314
.077
.160
.465
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via IJ (Path ab)
-.183
.050
-.288
-.092
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; IJ = Interactional Justice. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 12c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via IJ (Hypothesis 4c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV= IJ)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.582
.084
-.758
-.427
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.012
.063
-.117
.131
Direct effect of IJ (Path b)
.195
.076
.051
.342
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via IJ (Path ab)
-.113
.046
-.206
-.030
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; IJ = Interactional Justice. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 12d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via IJ (Hypothesis 4d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV= IJ)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.582
.081
-.747
-.425
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.735
.073
.581
.873
Direct effect of IJ (Path b)
.242
.046
.146
.327
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via IJ (Path ab)
-.141
.032
-.205
-.080
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; IJ = Interactional Justice. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 12e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via IJ (Hypothesis 4e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV= IJ)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.582
.083
-.754
-.433
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.689
.081
.516
.832
Direct effect of IJ (Path b)
.201
.051
.098
.301
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via IJ (Path ab)
-.117
.034
-.188
-.054
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; IJ = Interactional Justice. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000 samples. Boot
95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 13a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via POS (Hypothesis 5a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV= POS)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.404
.068
-.554
-.286
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.371
.064
-.507
-.260
Direct effect of POS (Path b)
-.020
.043
-.102
.068
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via POS (Path ab)
.008
.018
-.026
.047
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; POS = Perceived organizational support. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 13b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via POS (Hypothesis 5b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV= POS)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.404
.068
-.551
-.287
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.092
.068
-.232
.030
Direct effect of POS (Path b)
.191
.070
.057
.326
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via POS (Path ab)
-.077
.030
-.140
-.023
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; POS = Perceived organizational support. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 13c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via POS (Hypothesis 5c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV= POS)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.404
.069
-.555
-.285
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.030
.061
-.154
.088
Direct effect of POS (Path b)
.176
.070
.041
.316
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via POS (Path ab)
-.071
.030
-.135
-.017
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; POS = Perceived organizational support. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 13d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via POS (Hypothesis 5d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV= POS)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.404
.068
-.552
-.286
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.624
.088
.450
.790
Direct effect of POS (Path b)
.076
.069
-.071
.197
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via POS (Path ab)
-.031
.030
-.090
.028
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; POS = Perceived organizational support. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 13e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via POS (Hypothesis 5e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV= POS)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.404
.068
-.556
-.286
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.591
.091
.407
.764
Direct effect of POS (Path b)
.048
.069
-.097
.170
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via POS (Path ab)
-.019
.029
-.074
.038
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; POS = Perceived organizational support. Boot= Bootstrap based on 5000
samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 14a. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on Task Performance via AOC (Hypothesis 6a).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model A1 (DV= AOC)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.274
.059
-.398
-.168
Model A2 (DV= Task)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.382
.062
-.512
-.269
Direct effect of AOC (Path b)
-.069
.037
-.140
.006
Model A3 (DV = Task)
Indirect effect of AS via AOC (Path ab)
.019
.012
-.002
.045
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; AOC = Affective organizational commitment. Boot= Bootstrap based on
5000 samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 14b. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBO via AOC (Hypothesis 6b).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model B1 (DV= AOC)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.274
.058
-.399
-.170
Model B2 (DV= OCBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.118
.066
-.253
.004
Direct effect of AOC (Path b)
.186
.061
.068
.306
Model B3 (DV = OCBO)
Indirect effect of AS via AOC (Path ab)
-.051
.021
-.099
-.016
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; AOC = Affective organizational commitment. Boot= Bootstrap based on
5000 samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 14c. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on OCBI via AOC (Hypothesis 6c).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model C1 (DV= AOC)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.274
.059
-.401
-.168
Model C2 (DV= OCBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
-.061
.060
-.179
.054
Direct effect of AOC (Path b)
.148
.061
.031
.270
Model C3 (DV = OCBI)
Indirect effect of AS via AOC (Path ab)
-.040
.020
-.085
-.008
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; AOC = Affective organizational commitment. Boot= Bootstrap based on
5000 samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 14d. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBO via AOC (Hypothesis 6d).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model D1 (DV= AOC)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.274
.058
-.398
-.172
Model D2 (DV= CWBO)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.613
.084
.441
.773
Direct effect of AOC (Path b)
.072
.049
-.035
.157
Model D3 (DV = CWBO)
Indirect effect of AS via AOC (Path ab)
-.020
.015
-.052
.009
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; AOC = Affective organizational commitment. Boot= Bootstrap based on
5000 samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
Table 14e. Direct and Indirect Effects of AS on CWBI via AOC (Hypothesis 6e).
Model

B

Boot SE

Boot 95% CI
LLCI
ULCI

Model E1 (DV= AOC)
Direct effect of AS (Path a)
-.274
.059
-.403
-.168
Model E2 (DV= CWBI)
Direct effect of AS (Path c’)
.592
.085
.422
.752
Direct effect of AOC (Path b)
.075
.048
-.027
.159
Model E3 (DV = CWBI)
Indirect effect of AS via AOC (Path ab)
-.021
.015
-.052
.007
Note. N=281; B = unstandardized coefficient; SE = Standard error; CI= Confidence interval, AS =
Abusive supervision; AOC = Affective organizational commitment. Boot= Bootstrap based on
5000 samples. Boot 95% CIs constructed using percentile method.
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Table 15a. Indirect effects of abusive supervision on task performance.
Mediator
Effect
Boot
Boot
(ab)
SE (ab)
95% CI
Positive Affect
-.00
.01
-.03, .02
Negative Affect
.01
.04
-.07, .09
Affective Organizational Commitment
.04
.02
.01, .08*
Perceived Organizational Support
.00
.03
-.05, .05
Leader-Member Exchange
-.05
.05
-.15, .04
Interactional Justice
-.03
.05
-.14, .08
*
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; CI excludes zero. Boot= based on 5000 samples.
Boot CIs is based on bootstrap percentile method.
Table 15b. Indirect effects of abusive supervision on OCBO.
Mediator
Effect
Boot
Boot
(ab)
SE (ab)
95% CI
Positive Affect
-.04
.03
-.11, -.00*
Negative Affect
.13
.05
.04, .24*
Affective Organizational Commitment
-.00
.02
-.05, .04
Perceived Organizational Support
.04
.04
-.03, .12
Leader-Member Exchange
-.05
.05
-.16, .05
Interactional Justice
-.08
.06
-.21, .05
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; *CI excludes zero. Boot= based on 5000 samples.
Boot CIs is based on bootstrap percentile method.
Table 15c. Indirect effects of abusive supervision on OCBI.
Mediator
Effect
Boot
Boot
(ab)
SE (ab)
95% CI
Positive Affect
-.03
.02
-.08, .00
Negative Affect
.12
.05
.02, .22*
Affective Organizational Commitment
.00
.02
-.04, .05
Perceived Organizational Support
-.02
.04
-.10, .05
Leader-Member Exchange
-.10
.06
-.22, .01
Interactional Justice
.04
.06
-.08, .17
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; *CI excludes zero. Boot= based on 5000 samples.
Boot CIs is based on bootstrap percentile method.
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Table 15d. Indirect effects of abusive supervision on CWBO.
Mediator
Effect
Boot
Boot
(ab)
SE (ab)
95% CI
Positive Affect
-.02
.02
-.06, .00
Negative Affect
.07
.04
-.00, .15
Affective Organizational Commitment
.01
.02
-.03, .05
Perceived Organizational Support
.06
.05
-.02, .16
Leader-Member Exchange
-.03
.05
-.13, .08
Interactional Justice
-.14
.05
-.25, -.04*
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; *CI excludes zero. Boot= based on 5000 samples.
Boot CIs is based on bootstrap percentile method.
Table 15e. Indirect effects of abusive supervision on CWBI.
Mediator
Effect
Boot
Boot
(ab)
SE (ab)
95% CI
Positive Affect
-.03
.02
-.08, -.00*
Negative Affect
.08
.04
.01, .15*
Affective Organizational Commitment
.00
.02
-.04, .04
Perceived Organizational Support
.08
.05
-.01, .18
Leader-Member Exchange
-.04
.06
-.15, .07
Interactional Justice
-.09
.05
-.19, -.00*
*
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; CI excludes zero. Boot= based on 5000 samples.
Boot CIs is based on bootstrap percentile method.
Table 16. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with PA and AOC
(Hypotheses 7a-7e).
Outcome
Absolute Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPAbPA │– │aAOCbAOC│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.04
0.02
-0.07 0.01
OCBO
0.04
0.03
-0.02 0.08
OCBI
0.02
0.02
-0.03 0.06
CWBO
0.01
0.02
-0.02 0.04
CWBI
0.03
0.02
-0.02 0.07
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
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Table 17. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with PA and POS
(Hypotheses 8a-8e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPAbPA │– │aAPOSbPOS│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
0.00
0.02
-0.05 0.02
OCBO
0.01
0.03
-0.07 0.07
OCBI
0.01
0.03
-0.08 0.06
CWBO
-0.04
0.04
-0.12 0.03
CWBI
-0.05
0.04
-0.14 0.03
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 18. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with PA and LMX
(Hypotheses 9a-9e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPAbPA│ – │aLMXbLMX│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.04
0.04
-0.14 0.01
OCBO
0.00
0.05
-0.11 0.07
OCBI
-0.07
0.06
-0.19 0.03
CWBO
-0.01
0.04
-0.11 0.04
CWBI
-0.01
0.04
-0.12 0.05
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 19. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with PA and IJ
(Hypotheses 10a-10e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPAbPA│ –│ aIJbIJ│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.02
0.04
-0.13 0.01
OCBO
-0.04
0.06
-0.18 0.06
OCBI
-0.01
0.05
-0.14 0.04
CWBO
-0.11
0.05
-0.22 -0.01
CWBI
-0.06
0.05
-0.16 0.03
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
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Table 20. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with NA and AOC
(Hypotheses 11a-11e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aNAbNA│ – │aAOCbAOC│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.03
0.03
-0.06 0.06
OCBO
0.13
0.05
0.01 0.22
OCBI
0.11
0.05
0.00 0.21
CWBO
0.06
0.04
-0.02 0.13
CWBI
0.08
0.04
-0.01 0.14
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 21. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with NA and POS
(Hypotheses 12a-12e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aNAbNA │– │aPOSbPOS│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
0.00
0.03
-0.04 0.08
OCBO
0.09
0.06
-0.02 0.21
OCBI
0.10
0.06
-0.02 0.20
CWBO
0.01
0.06
-0.12 0.12
CWBI
0.00
0.07
-0.14 0.12
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 22. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with NA and LMX
(Hypotheses 13a-13e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aNAbNA │– │aLMXbLMX│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.04
0.05
-0.12 0.06
OCBO
0.08
0.07
-0.07 0.21
OCBI
0.02
0.08
-0.14 0.17
CWBO
0.04
0.05
-0.09 0.12
CWBI
0.04
0.06
-0.10 0.13
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
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Table 23. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with NA and IJ
(Hypotheses 14a-14e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aNAbNA│ – │aIJbIJ│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.02
0.04
-0.11 0.06
OCBO
0.05
0.08
-0.11 0.19
OCBI
0.08
0.07
-0.09 0.19
CWBO
-0.07
0.07
-0.20 0.07
CWBI
-0.01
0.06
-0.14 0.11
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 24. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with AOC and LMX
(Hypotheses 15a-15e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aAOCbAOC │– │aLMXbLMX│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.01
0.04
-0.11 0.05
OCBO
0.05
0.08
-0.11 0.19
OCBI
-0.09
0.06
-0.20 0.01
CWBO
-0.02
0.04
-0.11 0.03
CWBI
-0.04
0.04
-0.14 0.02
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 25. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with AOC and IJ
(Hypotheses 16a-16e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aAOCbIJ │–│ aLMXbIJ│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
0.01
0.04
-0.10 0.05
OCBO
-0.08
0.06
-0.20 0.02
OCBI
-0.04
0.05
-0.16 0.03
CWBO
-0.13
0.05
-0.23 -0.02
CWBI
-0.09
0.05
-0.18 0.00
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
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Table 26. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with POS and LMX
(Hypotheses 17a-17e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPOSbPOS │– │aLMXbLMX│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.04
0.04
-0.13 0.03
OCBO
-0.01
0.05
-0.12 0.08
OCBI
-0.08
0.06
-0.19 0.05
CWBO
0.03
0.04
-0.07 0.10
CWBI
0.04
0.05
-0.06 0.12
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 27. Contrasts between specific indirect effects associated with POS and IJ
(Hypotheses 18a-18e).
Outcome
Difference
Boot SE Boot 95% CI
(│aPOSbPOS│ – │aIJbIJ│)
LLCI ULCI
Task performance
-0.02
0.04
-0.12 0.04
OCBO
-0.04
0.06
-0.17 0.05
OCBI
-0.02
0.05
-0.14 0.06
CWBO
-0.08
0.05
-0.19 0.02
CWBI
-0.01
0.05
-0.12 0.09
Note. N = 281; CI=confidence interval; Boot=5000 samples. Boot CIs based on percentile
method.
Table 28a. Moderating effects of PEC on relationship between abusive supervision and
LMX (Hypothesis 20a).
Model Variable
B Boot Sig.(B) 95% Boot
R2
ΔR2 Sig.(ΔR2)
SE(B)
LLCI ULCI
1
AS
-.20
.01
.000
-.223 -.172
PEC
.79
.03
.000
.732 .855
.33
.33
.000
2
AS
-.21
.01
.000
-.231 -.181
PEC
.78
.03
.000
.723 .837
AS*PEC .16
.03
.000
.099 .125
.34
.01
.000
Note. DV= Leader-member exchange (LMX). AS= Abusive supervision; PEC= Perceived
ethical climate. B= unstandardized coefficient, SE= Standard Error. Boot= Bootstrap
estimate based on 5000 samples. Boot CIs constructed with percentile method.
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Table 28b. Moderating effects of PEC on relationship between abusive supervision and
IJ (Hypothesis 20b).
Model Variable
B Boot Sig.(B) 95% Boot
R2 ΔR2 Sig.(ΔR2)
SE(B)
LLCI ULCI
1
AS
-.11
.01
.000
-.136 -.092
PEC
1.01
.03
.000
.953 1.075
.44
.44
.000
2
AS
-.13
.01
.000
-.149 -.110
PEC
.99
.03
.000
.938 1.054
AS*PEC
.34
.02
.000
.294 .391
.49
.05
.000
Note. DV= Interactional justice (IJ). AS= Abusive supervision; PEC= Perceived ethical
climate. B=unstandardized coefficient, SE= Standard Error. Boot= Bootstrap estimate
based on 5000 samples. Boot CIs constructed with percentile method.
Table 29a. Moderating effects of PEC on relationship between abusive supervision and
POS (Hypothesis 21a).
Model Variable
B Boot Sig.(B) 95% Boot
R2 ΔR2 Sig.(ΔR2)
SE(B)
LLCI ULCI
1
AS
-.10
.01
.000
-.111 -.079
PEC
1.06
.02
.000
1.017 1.107
.50
.50
.000
2
AS
-.10
.01
.001
-.112 -.094
PEC
1.06
.02
.000
1.016 1.109
AS*PEC -.00
.02
.917
-.040 .036
.50
.00
.917
Note. DV= Perceived organizational support (POS). AS= Abusive supervision; PEC =
Perceived ethical climate. B=unstandardized coefficient, SE= Standard Error. Boot=
Bootstrap estimate based on 5000 samples. Boot CIs constructed with percentile method.
Table 29b. Moderating effects of PEC on relationship between abusive supervision and
AOC (Hypothesis 21b).
Model Variable
B Boot Sig.(B)
95% Boot
R2
ΔR2 Sig.(ΔR2)
SE(B)
LLCI ULCI
1
AS
-.13
.01
.000
-.148 -.111
PEC
.85
.03
.000
.795 .904
.35
.35
.000
2
AS
-.12
.01
.000
-.140 -.103
PEC
.86
.03
.000
.804 .910
AS*PEC -.16
.02
.000
-.203 -.114
.36
.01
.000
Note. DV= Affective organizational commitment (AOC). AS= Abusive supervision; PEC
= Perceived ethical climate. B=unstandardized coefficient, SE= Standard Error. Boot=
Bootstrap estimate based on 5000 samples. Boot CIs constructed with percentile method.
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Table 30a. Maximum Likelihood Fit Statistics for eight-factor measurement models (N =
2738)
90% CI RMSEA
2
Model No. (DV)
χ
df Sig.
RMSEA LLCI
ULCI
CFI
Model 1 (LMX)
7778.37 810 .000
.056
.055
.057
.919
Model 2 (IJ)
8050.88 770 .000
.059
.058
.060
.916
Model 3 (POS)
11379.31 851 .000
.067
.066
.068
.884
A
Model 3R(POS)
8430.07 770 .000
.060
.059
.061
.912
Model 4 (AOC)
12278.51 851 .000
.070
.069
.071
.869
B
Model 4R(AOC)
8029.56 693 .000
.062
.061
.063
.911
Note. RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; CFI = Comparative fit index;
A. Two of eight indicators (POS_6, POS_7) were dropped from POS factor. B. Four of
eight indicators (AOC_1 - AOC_4) were dropped from AOC factor.
Table 30b. Multiple regression equations estimated with latent variable scores
Model
B SE (B)
Sig.
Multiple R2
Model 1 (DV = LMX)
.39
AS
-.19
.01
.000
PEC
.40
.01
.000
AS*PEC
.05
.01
.000
Model 2 (DV = IJ)
.58
AS
-.11
.01
.000
PEC
.53
.01
.000
AS*PEC
.09
.01
.000
Model 3R (DV = POS)
.83
AS
-.01
.01
.100
PEC
.90
.01
.000
AS*PEC
.01
.01
.074
Model 4R (DV = AOC)
.40
AS
-.44
.01
.000
PEC
.34
.02
.000
AS*PEC
-.19
.01
.000
Note. AS = Abusive supervision; PEC = Perceived ethical climate. B=unstandardized
coefficient, SE= Standard Error. Sig.= p-value.
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Table 31. Status of study hypotheses
Hypothesis
No.
a
b

Part
c

d
*

e
*

1
Reject
Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject
Do not reject
2
Reject
Reject*
Reject*
Reject
Reject*
*
*
Do not reject
3
Reject
Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject*
*
4
Reject
Do not reject Do not reject* Do not reject Do not reject
5
Reject
Do not reject* Do not reject*
Reject
Reject
*
6
Reject
Do not reject* Do not reject*
Reject
Reject
7
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
8
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
9
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
10
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
11
Reject
Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject
Reject
12
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
13
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
14
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
15
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
16
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
17
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
18
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
19
Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject Do not reject
20
Reject
Reject
N/A
N/A
N/A
21
Reject
Reject
N/A
N/A
N/A
Note. *= Discrepancy between single and multiple mediator analyses. Italics= discrepancy w/
latent variable analyses. Bold= Full mediation.
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Table 32. Effect sizes and bootstrap standard errors in single and multiple mediator models
TASK

OCBO

OCBI

CWBO

CWBI

S

M

S

M

S

M

S

M

S

M

PA

.000
(.008)

-.004
(.012)

-.041
(.022)

-.043
(.026)

-.029
(.017)

-.028
(.021)

-.022
(.014)

-.023
(.017)

-.024
(.015)

-.031
(.021)

NA

.016
(.033)

.005
(.041)

.029
(.041)

.128
(.050)

.037
(.042)

.120
(.051)

.033
(.038)

.072
(.038)

.036
(.034)

.081
(.037)

LMX -.022
(.026)

-.046
(.048)

-.164
(.041)

-.047
(.052)

-.137
(.040)

-.097
(.058)

-.107
(.030)

-.028
(.054)

-.100
(.033)

-.038
(.054)

IJ

-.022
(.038)

-.028
(.055)

-.183
(.049)

-.080
(.065)

-.113
(.045)

.040
(.062)

-.141
(.032)

-.137
(.052)

-.117
(.034)

-.095
(.047)

POS

.008
(.018)

.004
(.025)

-.077
(.030)

.037
(.038)

-.071
(.030)

-.021
(.040)

-.031
(.030)

.060
(.046)

-.019
(.029)

.081
(.048)

AOC

.019
(.012)

.039
(.019)

-.051
(.021)

-.001
(.023)

-.040
(.020)

.005
(.022)

-.020
(.015)

.010
(.019)

-.021
(.015)

.002
(.019)

Note. S=Single mediator models; M=Multiple-mediator models. Bootstrap standard errors (5000
samples) in parentheses.
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